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Theater Army Materiel Management Center
US Army, Europe
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US Army, Materiel Management Agency, Europe
USAMMAE Pamphlet 10-5, unknown date)
Wholesale supply support to the United States
Army, Europe has been provided on a continuous basis since World
War II by one supply and maintenance type activity in Europe. This
organization, changing periodically in title and structure during
its twenty-nine year history, has fulfilled its dynamic mission.
Through 1962, the supply and maintenance mission was accomplished
by a collective group of eight technical services supply control
agencies (SCA's), located mostly in France. During the next three
years (1963 to 1965) the SCA's were merged into the United
States Army Supply and Maintenance Agency (S&MA), which
had its headquarters in Orleans, France. Its supply policy and financial
management function, together with one automatic data processing
facility (ADP) were located at Maison Forte, France, and its stock
control activities, supported by a second ADP facility, were consolidated
at Verdun, France. This new activity was also assigned responsibility
for the supervision of depot level storage and maintenance missions
of the United States Army Communications Zone, Europe, when Headquarters,
4th Logistical Command, located at
Verdun, was deactivated. The complete supply and maintenance mission
was then being performed by the S&MA with eight hundred fewer personnel
than had been employed by its predecessor organizations.
The dissolution of the eight SCA's, the formation of the S&MA, and
the assumption of depot storage and maintenance missions were forward
steps toward the goal to consolidate and automate. The consolidation
resulted in great savings by reduction in facilities and personnel
at no loss of efficiency. It permitted the closing of operating
points in Poitiers and Ingrandes, France, and left those located
at Orleans and Verdun, France, and at Giessen, Germany. The simultaneous
acquisition of modern ADP equipment, timed to coincide with the
consolidation plan, reduced considerably the manual work involved
in processing the thousand supply actions daily.
In mid-1965, the S&MA commenced operating under the military standard
requisitioning and issue procedures (MILSTRIP); during the latter
part of the year the processing of requisitions for brand name resale
subsistence items was relocated to Giessen, Germany. The following
year saw more changes. The United States Industrial
Center, Europe, located at Sandhofen, Germany was discontinued
resulting in the saving of considerable manpower. The four major
rebuild plants at Mainz, Böblingen, Schwäbisch-Gmünd
and Ober-Ramstadt, Germany, which were controlled by the United
States Army Industrial Center, Europe, continued as independent
activities, under the operational control of S&MA, assigned to United
States Army Communications Zone, Europe.
International politics during the mid 1960's set the stage for an
even greater impact on the conduct of United States Army supply
and maintenance operations in Europe. In magnitude and depth, the
relocation of all United States military forces out of France (FRELOC)
begun in March 1966, and completed in May 1967, was a major undertaking
and challenge for the S&MA. The S&MA performed its mission throughout
the dislocation period without serious disruption. By the time the
S&MA operational elements were physically moved, approximately three
million tons of supplies had been shipped from France to Germany
and/or the United States.
After the S&MA completed its move to Zweibrücken, Germany,
further consolidations and management improvement actions highlighted
the streamlining of operations. The Logistics Systems Management
Office of the S&MA was activated to improve the data systems. The
Depot Maintenance Division, which had moved from Maison Forte, France,
to Munich, Germany in February 1967, was relocated to Zweibrücken
in 1968. In addition, during the latter half of 1968, ADP equipment
and personnel (which had been temporarily relocated from Verdun
and Maison Forte, France, and mounted on rail car equipment located
at Hoehmühlbach, 14 miles from Zweibrücken, Germany),
was moved from the train site to the Kreuzberg Kaserne, high on
a hill-overlooking Zweibrücken. Shortly thereafter, in 1968,
third generation ADP equipment was acquired, and programmers were
trained in common business oriented language (COBOL). In October
1968, a major policy change was adopted. This involved the management
of major end items together with their related repair parts by systems
managers rather than management by stock number. To implement this
concept, the Equipment and Parts Division was dissolved and the
Aviation and Electronics Division, the Automotive and Weapons Division
and the Robility Equipment Division established.
On 25 April 1969, the S&MA was inactivated and Headquarters, United
States Army Materiel Command, Europe (MATCOM) was activated
at Zweibrücken, Germany. The responsibilities of the new command
were expanded on 1 July 1969 by Headquarters United States Theater
Army Support Command, Europe (TASCOM), which assigned all TASCOM
depots, maintenance plants, and other wholesale supply and maintenance
activities to MATCOM. Soon after August 1970, the Permissive Action
Link Detachment, the US Army Advanced Weapons Support Command and
the US Army Aviation Maintenance Center, Sandhofen, were reassigned
from MATCOM to TASCOM. Depot complexing actions aligned Nahbollenbach
Army Depot under Kaiserslautern Army Depot; and Pirmasens Army Depot
and Mannheim Depot Activity under Germersheim Army Depot. The Giessen
Depot Activity was phased out and the BNR mission transferred to
MATCOM was inactivated 29 December 1972 and renamed the U.S.
Army Materiel Management Agency, Europe with the responsibility
for wholesale logistics as an Agency of TASCOM. Command of the complexes
(Germersheim and Kaiserslautern Army Depot), the four maintenance
plants, the 97th Quartermaster Battalion and Burtonwood Army Depot
was assumed by TASCOM while USAMMAE retained operational control.
The 60th Ordnance Group was formed from part of the former MATCOM
Directorate of Munition and Missiles and incorporated Miesau Army
Depot as a subordinate element.
On 23 January 1973, command and operational control of the 97th
Quartermaster Battalion was transferred to the US Army Transportation
Command, Europe, with USAMMAE retaining the responsibility for technical
On 1 October 1973, command and operational control of the Kaiserslautern
and Bremerhaven Cold Stores was transferred from the Directorate
of Food, USAMMAE to the Kaiserslautern Army Depot.
On 1 January 1974, the 97th Quartermaster Battalion, including the
993d Petroleum Products Laboratory (Base), less the two truck companies,
was reassigned from the US Army Transportation Command, Europe (USATRANSCOMEUR)
to USAMMAE, and placed under the operational control of the Directorate
of Petroleum. The two truck companies, B and C, remained under the
command of USATRANSCOMEUR.
On 1 February 1974, by direction of TASCOM, the two depot complexes,
Kaiserslautern and Germersheim; the Burtonwood Army Depot, and US
Army Maintenance Plants Mainz, Ober-Ramstadt and Boeblingen, reverted
to the command and control of HQ, USAMMAE. The USAMP Schwaebisch-Gmuend,
in view of its impending phase-out on 30 June 1974, remained under
the command of TASCOM, with HQ, USAMMAE retaining operational control.
On 1 May 1974, by direction of USAREUR in accordance with General
Order No. 62 dated 23 April 1974, effective 1 May 1974, USAMMAE
assumed command and control of the 60th Ordnance Group.
On 26 March 1975, USAREUR approved the Project STREAMLINE reorganization
of USAMMAE. This reorganization involved the elimination of the
Directorate of Inventory Control, Stock Control and Subsistence
Management and the establishment of a Materiel Management Center
(MMC). The MMC took over duties and functions of the disbanded Directorates
with the exception of food procurement, a duty which was assigned
to the Defense Supply Agency. This reorganization involved extended
Logistics Activity realignment, to include the closing of the US
Army Maintenance Plant at Boeblingen, and Pirmasens Army Depot;
the realignment of stocks from Nahbollenbach to Kaiserslautern and
Germersheim Depots, respectively, and the turn over of wholesale
subsistence management to the Defense Supply Agency. Coincident
to this reorganization, the Standard Army Intermediate Level System
for Depots (SAILS) was implemented and became operational at Germersheim
Army Depot. Reorganization and realignments were completed on 1
July 1975. (see ALOG article)
and Maintenance Agency
wholesale supply support to the United States Army Europe.
Supervise depot level storage and maintenance Missions
of the US Army Communications Zone Europe. Maintain
operational control of the four major rebuild plants.
Army Materiel Command, Europe (MATCOM)
same support as the Supply and Maintenance Agency. In
addition TASCOM assigned all TASCOM depots, Maintenance
Plants and other wholesale supply and maintenance activities
Army Materiel Management Agency, Europe
same support as MATCOM. In addition the two depot complexes
at Kaiserslautern and Germersheim; the Burtonwood Army
Depot, and the four Maintenance Plants reverted to the
command and control of USAMMAE. USAMMAE assumed command
and control of the 60th Ord Group and exercised management
and technical supervision over US Army petroleum pipeline
systems and related facilities in Central Europe and
Italy. The 63d F&AO, 993 QM Lab, were also attached
Army Materiel Management Center, Europe
USAREUR intermediate level supply and maintenance operations
including supply control, stock control, materiel maintenance,
distribution, and disposition of classes II, III, IV,
VII, and IX supplies, including: (1) PWRMS (2) operational
project stocks, (3) Decrement stocks, (4) USAREUR source
items, (5) ERPSL and (6) health, welfare, and convenience
items. Serves as USAREUR manager for (1) SIMS-X, (2)
AESR, (3) ACS, (4) BOV, (5) critical assemblies, (6)
TARP, (7) WMIP, (8) ORF, (9) DAMWO, and (l0) EPRP.
Personal recollections by Charles Seland
(click on image to read the PDF file)
|Directorate of Management Information Systems (DMIS)
|(Source: STARS & STRIPES, Aug 26, 1973)
|The Directorate of Management Information Systems (DMIS) is responsible for operating a large computer complex on Kreuzberg Kaserne. With a personnel strength of 226 military and civilian employees, and equipped with two large-scale, third-generation computers, the complex operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
The primary mission of DMIS is maintaining management control of millions of tons of supply items through a management information system (MIS).
It also has functional responsibility over the data processing elements of five major depots and four maintenance plants in Europe. (This includes responsibility for systems implementation, maintenance, justification and acquisition of hardware.)
The complex's two computers process more than a quarter-million requisitions a month.
|History 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center
|19.. - 19..
Army Logistician, July-August 1976)
UNDER NEW COMMAND
The Army Materiel Management Center, Europe, has been established
as a separate command under operational control of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). The
new command, established under the plan for modernization of logistics
(MODLOG) in USAREUR, will be a control center permitting centralized
management over designated theater assets through continuous review
of supply and maintenance actions. Headquarters of the center will
be located at Kreuzberg Kaserne, Zweibrücken. The Army Materiel
Management Agency, Europe, is scheduled for inactivation on 30 September
Army Logistician, May-June 1977)
Changing Logistics Scene
By Maj Gen Arthur J. Gregg
Major General Arthur J. Gregg is the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army. His
previous assignments include deputy director, Supply and Maintenance
Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department
of the Army, and commander, European Exchange System.
|During the last
few years we have often heard the comment that the action in today's
Army is in Europe. This observation reflects not only on the mission
and quality of the United States Army, Europe, but also reflects on
the spirit and determination of the command to make things better.
While this forward momentum is present in all areas, it is especially
noticeable in logistics. Changes are taking place that will have a
fundamental impact on our logistics concepts, structure, and operations.
Many of these changes have already been implemented.
It appears that our logistics structure is always in a state of change.
These changes are often driven by economic and political considerations
rather than logistics considerations. As examples, the relocation
from France and accompanying reorganization of our logistics structure
were primarily politically driven, while the more recent deactivation
of the theater army support command and the transfer of logistics
operations to the V and VII Corps and 21st Support Command were essentially
economic measures to save resources -- men and money.
There is always some danger, however, in classifying changes by purpose
-- economic, political, or military. In today's complex world these
factors tend to overlap or interrelate, and the degree of importance
is often influenced by time and one's perspective of the changes.
Certainly, this is true of the ongoing organizational and functional
changes under the Modernization of Logistics (MODLOG)
The key change under MODLOG is the elimination
of theater level logistics. The United
States Army Materiel Management Agency, Europe, which managed
our theater level logistics, was inactivated on 1 October 1976. Essential
theater supply management functions were transferred to the U.
S. Armv, Europe, Materiel Management Center, which was
established on 1 July 1976.. Two Army depots have been redesignated
as reserve storage activities, and one of these activities has been
consolidated under the Kaiserslautern Army Depot. As a follow-on action,
stocks at Kaiserslautern Army Depot will be reduced by attrition,
and that depot will also become a reserve storage activity. This means
that V and VII Corps and the 21st Support Command will interface directly
with the continental United States logistics base for support. While
these changes may cause some apprehension among the traditionalists,
they are consistent with the Army's doctrine for echelons above division.
The traditional concept that the operations of the continental United
States commands, such as the Army Materiel Development and Readiness
Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and Military Traffic Management
Command, "stop at the water's edge" has also given way to change.
Each of these commands has been extended into the European theater.
In July 1975, Defense Logistics Agency assumed responsibility for
wholesale subsistence support under its charter for worldwide integrated
management of subsistence. Plans are now being developed for the agency
to operate cold storage facilities at Kaiserslautern and Bremerhaven
and the subsistence portion of the Germersheim Reserve Storage Activity.
On 1 July 1976 the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
assumed responsibility for the Mainz and Oberramstadt maintenance
facilities, which are the only Army depot maintenance facilities in
Europe. With the transfer of these two facilities, that command became
responsible for providing all depot level maintenance for U.S. Army,
Europe. Concurrent with the transfer of depot maintenance facilities,
command of the Transportation Terminal Group, Europe, passed to the
Military Traffic Management Command, which now exercises command of
all water terminals in Europe.
We are also taking many new initiatives in logistics rationalization
and interoperability. During Reforger 1976 and the Autumn Forge series
of exercises, extensive supply and service support was provided to
U.S. Forces operating with allied forces. In turn, we provided similar
logistics support to allied forces serving with U.S. Forces.
The Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg line-of-communication agreements
were, for the first time, significantly exercised. Four ships with
equipment for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were unloaded
and the equipment moved by rail and highway to assembly areas in Germany.
Host nations provided a full range of port and rail services; billeting,
food, and medical services for U.S. personnel; and convoy, fuel, and
limited maintenance support for the more than 2,000 transiting vehicles.
We are expanding our arrangements with host nations for a wide range
of logistics support in peace and war. These arrangements will increase
our reliance on host nations and will allow us to achieve a more favorable
balance between combat and combat service support forces.
Each logistics initiative or change has its own unique challenge.
However, the most pervasive challenges have been the timing and the
commitment of resources needed to pace the command through a series
of changes without degrading peacetime support or our ability to respond
to contingencies. We are encouraged by the current progress.
Army Logistician, May-June 1977)
|MODLOG - USAREUR's
By Lt Col David A. Braithwaite
Lieutenant Colonel David A. Braithwaite is assigned to the Supply
and Maintenance Division, ODCSLOG, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe,
and 7th Army. Colonel Braithwaite has been a project manager on the
U.S. Army, Europe, MODLOG program since its inception.
support of U.S. Army, Europe's combat forces has required improved
and more rapid support for those forces. At the same time there has
been a reduction in the ratio of support personnel to combat forces.
The actions taken in this environment have resulted in a reduction
of approximately 50 percent of the support forces since 1969. Each
reduction action was accomplished through elimination and consolidation
of support activities, which eventually resulted in a less than optimum
logistics support posture. Improvements to the system were required
and could only be made through a significant restructuring of the
logistics support channels. From this requirement came the Modernization
of Logistics program, or MODLOG.
MODLOG was initiated in September 1975 and was based on the dual premise
that U.S. Army, Europe, must recognize that additional resources will
not become available in peacetime and, therefore, the command must
structure itself to live within its present resources. The program
has been designed to incorporate the Standard Army
Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS) subsystem and to result
in a structure compatible with the Echelons Above
Division-Extended doctrine. The program orients on the
command's wartime logistics missions, eliminates redundancy between
U.S. Army, Europe, and continental United States agencies, and promotes
partnership arrangements with contractors, host nations, and continental
United States logistics activities. The three objectives of the MODLOG
program are to --
key feature of the MODLOG program is the air line
of communications (ALOC) for shipping repair parts directly
from the Continental United States European-oriented depot to U.S.
Army, Europe, units. This ALOC began in January 1977 and delivers
approximately 1,500 short tons of repair parts each month to nearly
90 direct support and general support units. The ALOC originates at
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, and terminates at either Rhein Main
or Ramstein Air Bases, Germany. Intra-Germany distribution of ALOC
materiel is by Army trucks with direct delivery to the direct and
general support units. Achieving the planned goal of 20 days order-ship
time will not only provide better and faster response to the supported
units but will also permit a reduction in the quantity of repair parts
stored in the command's depots. The ability to accomplish these actions
permits optimal logistics support.
To achieve the first objective, U.S. Army, Europe, is establishing
a limited general support supply base
in the V Corps, VII Corps, and the 21st Support Command. The general
support base is destined to provide each of the subordinate commands
a stand-alone capability and the ability to deal directly with Continental
United States logistics activities. This is being accomplished by
providing each subordinate command with an expanded materiel management
center, the SAILS automated data processing system, a general support
supply company, an expanded G4 office to cover the additional coordination
required, and a branch office of the U.S. Army, Europe, retail stock
of Requisitions and Supplies - Proposed under MODLOG
current requistion flow from direct support units is through
the respective support commands and the U.S. Army, Europe,
Materiel Management Center to the appropriate Continental
United States national inventory control point. Materiel
is sent to the direct support units and the depots through
the Direct Support System. Requisitions leaving the U.S.
Army, Europe, Materiel Management Center are stock-funded;
and money from the operation and maintenance, Army, account
is obligated to reimbuse the stock fund upon receipt of
a bill. Under MODLOG the requisitioning process for all
requisitions except for major and theater critical items
will be transferred from the U.S. Army, Europe, Materiel
Management Center to the support command materiel management
will continue to be controlled by the U.S. Army, Europe, Materiel
Management Center. As shown in the chart on page 6, the U.S. Army,
Europe, Materiel Management Center will operate outside the main flow
of requisition traffic and control the war reserves and project stocks
in the three remaining reserve storage activities at Kaiserslautern
and Germersheim, Germany, and at Burtonwood in England. The direct
support unit requisition flow under the new system will be to the
respective support command materiel management center and from there
to the continental United States national inventory control point.
All requisitions leaving the support command materiel management center
will cite U.S. Army, Europe, stock fund authority and materiel will
be forwarded to the direct support unit by the ALOC. Upon receipt
of the materiel at the direct support unit, operation and maintenance,
Army, funds will be obligated to reimburse the stock fund.
The general support supply companies
being established in each support command will stock, in support of
operational readiness, a safety level of repair part supplies based
on demand history. Additionally, each general support supply company
will also stock missile essential repair parts stockage list items,
with the corps support commands stocking for their own missile systems
and the 21st Support Command stocking for all others.
General support air items, including aircraft intensively managed
items, will be stocked in the aviation intermediate maintenance battalions.
All general support secondary items, regardless of storage locations,
will be controlled and released by the support command materiel management
center, unless they have been designated as theater critical. The
general support supply companies will also stock, at the direction
of the support command materiel management center, selected items
of direct support unit excesses from within their respective commands.
Direct support units will continue the current practice of retaining
all nonstockage list items for 60 days and all authorized stockage
list items in quantities up to twice the requisitioning objective
number. All items exceeding these criteria and not selected for stockage
at the general support supply company will be returned to the 21st
Support Command's central field return processing point at Kaiserslautern.
This field return processing point will
receive, classify, and store the materiel for 60 days while it is
reported through the Defense European Pacific Redistribution Agency
to the national inventory control point. During this time, the processing
point will respond to referral orders from the redistribution agency
and also to shipping directives from the national inventory control
point. Because requisitions go through the agency on their way to
the national inventory control point, the agency, in effect, will
cross-level field returns among major subordinate command direct support
units. This will satisfy current requirements and prevent one unit
from returning an item while another unit is requisitioning the same
By getting disposition instructions from the national inventory control
center and the redistribution agency within 60 days from the date
the materiel is reported excess, large quantities of unwanted stock
will not be retained. This will also minimize the number of personnel
needed to care for it. Plans are to maximize, to the extent possible,
the use of returning ALOC aircraft for retrograde shipment of field
The MODLOG task, to eliminate theater level intermediate logistics,
is two-thirds complete with the establishment of the ALOC and the
inactivation of the U.S. Army Materiel Management Agency, Europe.
The agency's materiel management functions have been assigned to the
USAREUR Materiel Management Center or transferred to other commands.
The remaining task is to reduce depot stocks to pre-positioned war
reserves, operational project stocks, and decremented stocks. The
depots will then be converted to reserve storage
activities. Department of the Army has approved the depot
stock reductions, and a detailed plan has been jointly developed and
approved by the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and
U.S. Army, Europe.
Excess materiel reports have been provided to the national inventory
control points for screening against item demand histories. The inventory
control points, in turn, are providing disposition instructions to
Headquarters, U.S. Army. Europe. Excess materiel is being shipped
from the depots to the continental United States and property disposal
is scheduled for completion by September 1977. Other materiel in the
depots is being purchased and issued to the subordinate commands for
the initial stocking of the general support base and otherwise reduced
through satisfying the units daily demands.
Funds from the sale of this materiel will be returned to the Army
Materiel Development and Readiness Command. Selected portions of the
materiel will be reconstituted in a Continental United States depot
for U.S. Army, Europe. The total reduction effort is scheduled to
be completed by the end of fiscal year 1978.
U.S. Army, Europe, will increase its reliance on Continental United
States for support of the European forces by eliminating redundant
logistics functions and by halting functions not essential in wartime.
As a first step in achieving this objective, remote areas will be
placed on direct support from Continental United States for non-subsistence
materiel rather than on the U.S. Army, Europe, Materiel Management
Center. Remote areas are defined as all activities outside the geographical
boundaries of the V and VII Corps and 21st Support Command. They include
the areas of Berlin, NATO SHAPE Support Group, Southern European Task
Force, Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, and all the military assistance
advisory groups and missions throughout Europe.
In the past, activities in remote areas submitted requisitions to
the U.S. Army, Europe, Materiel Management Center for fill or pass
to Continental United States for fill. As daily operating non-subsistence
stocks in the depots are reduced and oriented more toward operational
readiness of the combat forces, requisitions from remote areas will
be sent more frequently to Continental United States for fill. The
command has, therefore, arranged for remote area requisitions to go
directly to the appropriate Continental United States national inventory
control point, thereby reducing the time required for a supply action
to begin. Points have been established in Berlin, NATO SHAPE Support
Group, and Southern European Task Force through which all accounts
in those respective areas will requisition. The central account in
the Southern European Task Force incorporates accounts in Italy, Greece,
All remote areas obligate operation and maintenance, Army, funds upon
submission of their requisitions. All accounts have reported improved
direct support from Continental United States since this procedure
was implemented. The other remote areas generally receive their main
support from channels outside U.S. Army, Europe, but had the option
to draw on it for support until I October 1976 when this option was
Placing all commissaries under the Direct Commissary
Support System for nonperishable subsistence is another
task being pursued jointly by U.S. Army, Europe, Department of the
Army, and the Defense Logistics Agency. When the system is fully implemented,
both brand name resale and troop issue commissaries will requisition
and receive supplies directly from Continental United States. A small
reserve of nonperishable subsistence will be retained at Germersheim
Reserve Storage Activity as a peacetime surge tank for emergency requirements.
Another initiative under MODLOG is the transfer of selected functions
to Continental United States agencies located in Europe or in Continental
United States. The first action completed was the transfer of the
Mainz Maintenance Plant and the Ober-Ramstadt Tire Recapping Plant
to Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
on 1 July 1976. Operation of the European ports was transferred to
the Military Traffic Management Command
on 1 July and Southern European Task Force ports were transferred
on I October 1976. U.S. Army, Europe, has negotiated with the Army-Air
Force European Exchange System to operate the clothing sales stores
and expects to complete this action by mid-1977.
U.S. Army, Europe, has also started negotiations with Department of
the Army and the Defense Logistics Agency
for DLA operation of the Bremerhaven and Kaiserslautern perishable
subsistence cold stores. Although no target date has been set, the
concerned commands agree that operation of the cold stores by DLA
is logical. The remaining function transfers being negotiated with
Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command are relatively minor
but are being pursued in order to draw upon the Continental United
States computer capability and data repositories. Examples of these
functions are the processing of TAMMS and modification work order
information, Army equipment status reports, and catalog data support.
The final objective of MODLOG is to increase host-nation
and contractor support. This is a continuing lone-range
effort that will not end with the MODLOG program. To attain this objective,
the command is contracting for the maintenance of rail equipment and
for the operation of laundry and drycleaning plants. Other areas being
investigated for possible contract are kitchen police, installation
equipment maintenance, line haul of petroleum, and motor pool operations
and maintenance. U.S. Army, Europe, has also investigated possible
host-nation performance of ammunition depot operations and security.
Each of these actions is being evaluated in light of the command's
responsibilities to be sure that any required capability will be available
The logistics restructuring under the MODLOG program is targeted for
completion by 30 September 1977. By then, the general support base
will be established and both V and VII Corps and 21st Support Command
will be standing alone requisitioning class II, limited class IV,
and class IX items directly from Continental United States using the
SAILS ABX system. The inventory in the depots will be substantially
reduced and most of the other actions will also be completed. These
improvements will be accomplished with fewer manpower spaces. The
significant results of the program will be improved responsive support
and increased operational readiness of the combat forces.
Army Logistician, September-October 1979)
in the Eighties
By Maj Gen Sampson H. Bass, Jr.
Major General Sampson H. Bass, Jr. is the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Logistics at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army.
His previous assignments include commanding general, 3d Support Command,
V Corps, and Project Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and Installation
|The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political as well as a military alliance
formed to deter aggression and promote stability in the North Atlantic
area. While this concept of deterrence has successfully maintained
peace in Europe for more than a quarter of a century, the organization
is looking to the future to meet the logistics challenges of the 1980's.
The NATO signatories have recognized that an effective logistics environment
requires not only a high degree of national self-sufficiency but also
a sophisticated level of interdependency. This philosophy has fostered
the thrust of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR)-NATO logistics
for the 1980's to optimize logistics resources.
Meeting the requirements envisioned for the 1980's will cause USAREUR
to make significant changes based on the dynamic European environment.
Circumstances responsible for these changes include an expansion of
the traditional Central Army Group (CENTAG) area into the Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG) area; increasingly complex relationships with
NATO allies requiring interdependency through expanded use of host
nation support; and the introduction of new technology, including
sophisticated weapons and new computer systems.
In developing and carrying out these changes, these actions are necessary.
Implementation of a total systems manager concept at theater army
level for each of the tactical weapon and critical logistics systems
must become a reality. In addition, wholesale logistics activities,
such as the U.S. Army Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) and
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), must increase their presence in
the theater to enhance the Direct Support System and strengthen the
continental United States (CONUS)-communications zone (COMMZ) interface.
Cooperative alliance logistics, which includes more and better use
of activities such as the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, must
be further developed.
Since the supply system and the force structure required to manage,
receive, store, issue, and distribute supplies must be applicable
to peacetime, transition to war, and wartime situations, a realistic
balance between peacetime constraints and wartime demands will have
to be achieved. In general, peacetime policies and procedures that
provide for facilities and force structure must be the same as those
in war. Provisions must be made for transition to war within a short
warning scenario and for sustaining combat forces in the early stages
of war until resupply from CONUS can be effected.
In anticipation of wartime needs, the role of the general support
(GS) base takes on critical importance. The wholesale (DARCOM) activities
in theater will contribute to the sustainability of the GS base by
repairing end items, components, and assemblies for GS base stock
fill. These stocks are used to fill surge requirements of the combat
elements and, as necessary, to support units deployed from CONUS.
The GS base is being expanded from the current 6,000 to 9,000 lines
to 15,000 to 20,000 lines. This capability will provide USAREUR the
sustainability required during both the transition to war and during
To provide the corps with the capability to accommodate the expanded
GS supply base and to conform to new doctrinal procedures, additional
GS supply units and command and control headquarters are programed
to enhance the corps logistics base in peacetime. The transition to
war will provide the opportunity to further add to logistics depth
as pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks become more intensively
managed and CONUS-based war reserve stocks and preplanned supply support
packages are called forward. General support base activity will expand
from its present function -- fill of high priority requests and redistribution
of excess -- to become the major source of supply for theater elements.
The CONUS air line of communications materiel flow begins to shift
from the direct support units (DSU's) to the general support units
(GSU's) to fully implement the sustaining base.
Following the declaration of hostilities, replenishment stocks will
flow into the GSU's from the surface line of communication as will
critical end items, components, and assemblies supplied through production
lines established when possible by the theater.
Greater interdependency between USAREUR and the host nation will be
realized through expanded use of labor support and transportation
services to free trained military technicians to perform other and
more urgently required tasks. In addition, allied trades would be
incorporated into established organizations to further increase wartime
capacity and production to return required items to the supply system.
Lastly, we have developed an extensive program to provide covered
storage for all pre-positioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS),
theater reserve equipment, and ammunition to support an increased
number of divisions in war until CONUS resupply is effected. The program
includes POMCUS in NORTHAG equivalent to three divisions, thus increasing
the levels of theater reserve stocks, and continued enhancement of
the supporting logistics force structure.
You can see now the direction that USAREUR logistics will take in
the 1980's. Let's look next at the improvements required by evolving
doctrine in specific areas of support.
Subsistence. Class I support of USAREUR
was drastically affected by organizational changes in the mid-1970's.
Under a reorganization that took place in 1974, corps and division
ration breakdown points were eliminated while most troop issue commissaries
were civilianized and turned over to installation control.
Although this made peacetime operations more efficient, it practically
eliminated class I support capability for field operations. In 1976-1977,
the troop issue function was separated from the resale commissary
and troop issue subsistence activities were established. These activities
were placed under control of combat service support (CSS) elements
of the major USAREUR commands. These actions improved the peacetime
class I support functions but still left three serious shortfalls.
The first, lack of adequate visibility and support capability for
in-country stocks, requires development of procedures to incorporate
class I into a GS base. The 1974 reorganization eliminated not only
the majority of the CSS organizational class I spaces but also the
class I management spaces in the corps materiel management center
(MMC). We are attempting to resolve this shortfall through decentralization
of subsistence management from USAREUR's theater army MMC to the corps
support command. This substantially expands the class I management
capability in USAREUR subordinate commands and creates a nucleus for
GS operations in peace and war.
A second shortfall involves the transition of retail subsistence operations
from a peacetime posture to that required to provide wartime support.
Current functional realinements should minimize the reorganizational
turbulence characteristic during transition to war. As in the case
of GS base requirements, decentralization is proving to be the vehicle
for resolving the shortfall.
Implementation is occurring through the installation of the expanded
Standard Army Intermediate Level System (SAILS-ABX). It will replace
an older system used in processing class I requisitions and managing
stock fund operations. Its installation will allow corps support commands
to submit requisitions directly to the CONUS inventory control point.
The SAILS-ABX enhances the corps stand alone capability in class I
The final major shortfall involves insuring that the class I wholesaler
is capable of performing his mission in war as he performs it in peace.
Assumption of wholesaler missions by the theater army commander during
the first critical days of war could create unacceptable turmoil.
We are now in the process of finalizing agreements with the DLA for
the class I mission.
Defense Subsistence Region-Europe, the in-country agency of DLA, will
provide wholesale inventory management of class I. In periods of mobilization,
it will interface with the theater army materiel management center
to execute applicable USAREUR operation plans and war standing operating
procedure missions and tasks. Distribution of class I will be provided
through a single pipeline managed by DLA under theater army guidance.
The first step of this plan was completed when DLA accepted control
of USAREUR class I storage activities in April of this year.
U.S. Army, Europe, has an austerely manned peacetime petroleum, oils,
and lubricants (POL) management structure. Accepting current resource
limitations as an expected constraint in the peacetime force structure,
USAREUR has carefully reviewed critical shortfalls and identified
two significant areas requiring immediate action.
The first is a requirement to provide corps with a POL planning and
management capability. This capability has fallen victim to peacetime
resource diversions. The POL plans officer at corps G4 and the POL
management section within the support command materiel management
center have been eliminated in recent manning documents. A current
USAREUR action reinstates the POL plans officer at corps G4. While
peacetime requirements do not require full manning of the POL section
of the support command materiel management center, the need for a
nucleus of POL personnel does exist. This addition will enable the
corps to manage their GS level POL stocks better than they are now
able to do.
The second significant shortfall occurs in the area of wartime management
of theater level POL stocks. Previously, USAREUR has been a CENTAG-oriented
force. Northern Germany was considered to be "someone else's" responsibility.
As such, a single petroleum group was considered adequate for USAREUR
POL operations. That is no longer the case. The geographical structure
of NATO creates new challenges in providing POL support to U.S. Forces
throughout Europe. To satisfy these challenges, USAREUR has proposed
that a second petroleum group be used to support the NORTHAG area.
The two petroleum groups would not be limited to their traditional
pipeline operations mission, but would also perform all other functions
associated with POL supply and distribution.
As with other commodities, class V has seen changes in the 1970's
that will significantly impact on ammunition management in the 1980's.
These changes have been both organizational and requirements-oriented.
In the implementation of echelons above division doctrine, the forward
ammunition direct support battalions were reassigned from the USAREUR
ammunition group to each of the corps. The remainder of the group
was assigned to the 21st Support Command to manage the rear area.
Ammunition management cells are now being added to the corps materiel
management centers. These actions are consistent with phase II requirements.
The corps are now in a better position to make the transition to war
although there is still a shortfall in ammunition management and handling
capability. During the early 1980's, the corps must expand and strengthen
this capability in order to cope with their significantly increased
class V mission.
Another change that had a drastic impact on ammunition management
was the threefold increase in the USAREUR ammunition stockage objective
resulting from the publication of new ammunition consumption rates.
This had the immediate effect of highlighting a tremendous shortage
of storage space and handling capability. It also added a new dimension
to the scope of management because it resulted in the need to establish
a multimillion dollar storage expansion program, which is expected
to be completed in the late 1980's.
The program involves expanding U.S.-controlled sites, acquiring space
in host nation depots, and securing additional real estate in Germany
as well as other NATO countries for construction of new storage activities.
This, in turn, requires additional personnel to manage the large increase
in stocks in numerous and diverse locations throughout Western Europe.
In the 1980's, USAREUR must look to strengthening its ammunition management
capability at all echelons in order to meet this challenge. This must
be done by increasing the number of management personnel as well as
improving ammunition management systems. Expansion of the Standard
Army Ammunition System to the corps needs to be accelerated. Overall,
the challenge of the eighties requires a competent peacetime management
structure that can rapidly make the transition to war.
During the latter half of the seventies, the logistics of class IX
supply truly came of age. Despite significant reductions in the logistics
force structure, we instituted an air line of communication and the
Direct Support System, started direct CONUS requisitioning by the
corps, and installed SAILS in the major subordinate commands of USAREUR.
The result of these programs has been to forge a strong. resilient,
responsive system for class IX that combines the advantages of airlift,
rapid data transmission by satellite, and a modern automated management
To maintain a high state of readiness, we must continne to manage
and refine the programs that were successful in bringing us to where
we are today. Although the reduction in order-ship time from 65 days
in December 1976 to 29 days in March 1979 has been a significant achievement,
further reductions are desirable and continuation of the air line
of communication-Direct Support System is mandatory. Similarly, we
must continue to improve our supply management capability by extending
SAILS-ABX into the corps and upgrading our SAILS hardware with the
IBM 370-138 systems.
During the eighties we will improve our wartime sustainability by
expanding the GS base in the corps and the COMMZ. This program calls
for a repair parts supply company in each corps and a similar unit
in the COMMZ. These units will manage an inventory of 15,000 to 20,000
lines designed to cover the combat authorized stockage list of the
DSU's and GSU's and provide a safety level to the theater of 30 days
of sup ply of air line of communication parts and 60 days of supply
of non-air-line-of-communication class IX. In peacetime, the GS base
will enhance readiness by filling issue priority group I requests
for authorized stockage list items, and in wartime the GS base will
insure sustainability by being the primary source of supply for the
DSU's and GSU's in USAREUR.
The fundamental maintenance task in the 1980's continues to be support
of materiel readiness. The maintenance doctrine of the 1980's will
evolve to place greater emphasis on the "support forward" concept.
This concept, as described in the Phase II Study, provides that most
corps level direct and general support maintenance capability will
be devoted to the rapid repair and return of combat essential weapon
systems to using units. More time-consuming jobs and efforts in support
of the theater as a whole will be accomplished by COMMZ or CONUS maintenance
units and activities.
To accommodate these changes, USAREUR is reorganizing its theater
army repair program to provide for more end item repair work by corps
GS maintenance units and increased major assembly repair by the 21st
Support Command. Plans call for USAREUR's area maintenance organization
to be streamlined to improve the communication and evacuation capabilities.
The role of DARCOM in the theater will continue to be of great interest
and importance. The definition and division of maintenance tasks between
USAREUR and DARCOM is the key to determining DARCOM's role and is
the subject of ongoing study efforts. One example of the expanded
role of DARCOM is the transfer of calibration and repair of test,
measurement, and diagnostic equipment in theater from USAREUR to DARCOM.
The Army's concept of transportation in Europe has evolved considerably
during the past decade and will keep pace with changing logistics
doctrine as we move into the 1980's. The challenge planners face is
to structure a transportation system that will support the flow of
supplies to the users in the volume required.
Today's transportation specialist in Europe has to work on two very
important problems-the first is to continue to prepare and develop
an organization that works well in peace and war, and the second is
to absorb and integrate the expanding role of host nation support.
The existing transportation network can make the transition to war
without having to absorb drastic new changes in missions and functions.
Operators at many levels now do essentially the same kinds of tasks
they will be required to perform during wartime. Because the transportation
system is operating now to support U.S. Forces in Europe, training
goes on day-to-day and is not limited by maneuver area availability
and only infrequently by weather.
The 4th Transportation Brigade is the peacetime operator for activities
that stretch from the European coast to deep within the interior and
include sea, air, rail, highway, and inland waterway routes. During
wartime this role will expand even further when the 4th Transportation
Brigade becomes the transportation command-a mission that brings with
it responsibilities for theater management of surface transportation.
Within this framework, coordination with other component commands
and allied transportation agencies becomes routine.
Planners are being challenged now to constantly update procedures
and refine techniques that will provide for sufficient mobility during
peace and serve as a basis for transition to war. Equally challenging
are the problems transportation planners in Europe will share with
their fellow logisticians during the 1980'show to operate in a logistically
The real problem is how to live in an era where host nation dependency
is a way of life. The years ahead will be marked by learning and getting
used to the fact that the ship that arrives at Rotterdam or any other
port in Europe will be berthed with commercial tugs and discharged
by contractor stevedores, the cargo loaded onto a host nation train
by local nationals, and then moved halfway across central Europe before
it gets into U.S. hands. It means getting used to the fact that we
depend largely upon civilians to move the ammunition we fire and the
food we eat. That bothers a lot of people, but the fact is that USAREUR
is committed to the concept of host nation support. We must now concentrate
on ways to make it happen.