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Ordnance Division
(Page 2 - Doctrinal & General Information)

Looking for more information from military/civilian personnel assigned to or associated with the U.S. Army in Germany from 1945 to 1989. If you have any stories or thoughts on the subject, please contact me.

Page 1 (Overview)

The 1970s
GS/DS Maint Units
Class V Ord Units
Special Weapons
Nuclear Surety Insp

The 1980s
Class V Ord Units
Special Weapons

The 1970s
GS/DS Maintenance in USAREUR
(Source: USAREUR Annual Report CY 1975)
USAREUR Support Maintenance Capability Study
In 1974 USAREUR undertook a review of its maintenance organization and policy. The study was necessitated by a number of factors that were impacting the command's maintenance capabilities: reductions in theater depot maintenance in USAREUR; the new logistics echelons above division (EAD) doctrine; the impact of Project CHASE reorganizations; and the reductions in non-combat strengths required by the Nunn Amendment.

In 1974 USAREUR's combat service support maintenance resources were organized into six direct support (DS) and four general support (GS) battalions:

  1st Maintenance Bn (DS) VII Corps Flak Ksn, Ludwigsburg
  19th Maintenance Bn (DS) V Corps Pendleton Bks, Giessen
  51st Maintenance Bn (DS) 1st Spt Bde Sullivan Bks, Mannheim
  66th Maintenance Bn (DS) 1st Spt Bde Rhine Ord Bks, Kaiserslautern
  71st Maintenance Bn (DS) VII Corps Pinder Bks, Zirndorf
  85th Maintenance Bn (DS) V Corps Pioneer Ksn, Hanau
  8th Maintenance Bn (GS) V Corps Grossauheim Ksn, Hanau
  81st Maintenance Bn (GS) 1st Spt Bde Taylor Bks, Mannheim
  87th Maintenance Bn (GS) VII Corps Nellingen Ksn, Stuttgart
  303rd Maintenance Bn (GS) VII Corps Merrell Bks, Nuernberg
The DS battalions were organized with one "rear" and two "forward" DS companies and an attached supply and services company. The battalions provided direct support maintenance on an area basis. Two DS battalions were assigned to each corps and two to the 1st Support Brigade.

Backing up the DS battalions and stationed relatively further in the rear, were corps-level GS battalions: two in VII Corps, one in V Corps and one in the 1st Support Brigade. These were organized with one light equipment maintenance (LEM); two heavy equipment maintenance (HEM) companies and a collection and classification company.

One of the concepts proposed by the capability study called for a balanced program that would distribute the command's maintenance workloads among the two corps, the 1st Support Brigade and theater-level maintenance facilities. This reorganization concept plan was selected and formally approved in November 1974.

The effective dates for the resulting reorganizations were phased across an 8-month period, beginning in November 1975 and scheduled for completion in June 1976.

By the end of the implementation effort the USAREUR DS/GS maintenance organization would be as shown in the chart below:

Planned Combat Service Support Maintenance Organization in USAREUR, 1976
The concept approved in late 1974 called for unique area support battalions to be organized under USAREUR-developed MTOE tailored to the specific requirements of the area that each would support.

Although they would not be identical, the battalions would be composed of the same basic elements:

  area DS companies   formed by combining DS "rear" and "forward" companies
  area GS companies   formed by combining GS LEM and elements of GS HEM companies
  GS collection, reclamation and exchange companies   formed by combining the component repair platoon of the HEM company with the collection and classification company
  supply and services companies   (remained unchanged)
Except for aircraft, ammunition, missiles, medical, and communications security and cryptographic equipment, all combat service support maintenance would be provided by these area battalion, including both direct support to non-divisional units and general support to both divisional and non-divisional units.

The programming and management of repair activities within their respective commands would be controlled by the materiel managment centers of the two corps and 1st Support Brigade. Maintenance requirements that exceeded the capabilities of the area support battalions -- together with types of maintenance specified for performance at designated theater-level repair facilities -- would be programmed and managed by the USAMMAE materiel management center, which would subsequently be reassigned as a USAREUR element.

Class V Ordnance Service in USAREUR
(Source: Annual Historical Review, HQ 21st SUPCOM, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1977)
In a move to decentralize conventional ammunition management, the 60th Ordnance Group underwent a major reorganization in 1977.

In April 1977, the 15th Ordnance Battalion of the 60th was transferred to V Corps and in October the Group's 101st Ordnance Battalion was transferred to VII Corps. In spite of these changes, the commander, 60th Ordnance Group, remained as the overall theater commodity manager for control of ammunition stocks for these battalions.

60th Ord Gp, 1977

At the same time, the 60th Ord Gp special weapons units including the 23rd, 28th and 545th Ordnance Companies and the 9th and 51st MP Detachments were transferred to the 59th Ordnance Group which was controlled directly by USAREUR.

A minor change occurred in the 84th Ordnance Battalion of the 60th Ord Gp when the 144th Ordnance Detachment located at Baumholder was redesignated the 44th Ordnance Company. This unit was responsible for the direct and general support of over 400 units throughout USAREUR, supplying not only conventional ammunition but missiles and small arms ammunition as far away as Belgium.

(Source: Annual Historical Review, HQ 21st SUPCOM, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1978)
The 60th Ordnance Group expanded its 84th Ordnance Battalion ammunition supply operations into the NORTHAG area with the activation of the 48th Ammunition Detachment at Bremerhaven in May 1978 in support of Brigade 75 (this unit, relocated to Garlstedt, would soon be redesignated as 3rd Bde, 2nd Armd Div). Prior to becoming fully staffed, this detachment was active in support of REFORGER 78 and received abnd stored ammunition at Luebberstedt, Walsrode and Olfen in the NORTHAG area. Also, 44th Ordnance Company was activated at Baumholder on 21 Mach 1978 to operate Ammunition Supply Point #4 in direct support of 8th Infantry Division.

Ammunition Call Forward Plan
All divisions of 60th Ordnance Group were actively involved in the FY 1979 Ammunition Call Forward Plan. This plan, which proposed shipment of over 240,000 short tons of munitions from CONUS to USAREUR, underwent an intensive study to determine the ability of USAREUR to receive, move, and store the proposed tonnage. In coordination with the Corps (V and VII), 4th Transportation Brigade, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Transportation Terminal Group, Europe, Miesau Army Depot, Caerwent Army Depot Activity and the 84th Ordnance Battalion, data was developed which resulted in a recommendation that tonnage proposed in the plan be reduced to 170,000 short tons.

Three former British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) sites were transferred to USAREUR control for construction of storage and maintenance facilities for the NORTHAG POMCUS equipment: Herongen Ammunition Depot, Twisteden Ammunition Depot, and South Park (Ayrshire Barracks, Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen).

Webmaster Note: the conventional ammunition stocks held at Twisteden were probably the basic load for 2nd Armored Division combat units that would arrive from CONUS and that would receive their equipment from the POMCUS sites in the event of hostilities. The PSP at Lübberstedt, on the other hand, could have been the basic load for the 3rd Brigade already forward stationed in NORTHAG area.

Ordnance - Special Weapons Support
(Source: USAREUR STATION LIST, 1 June 1976, and other public sources)
Figure 1: SW Storage Sites (Draft)
Figure 2: Organization of a German Artillery Regiment under Heeresstruktur 3
The STATION LIST for 1 June 1976 also contains some information on the NATO artillery units that were supported by the 59th Ord Gp during that period. Among the units mentioned were several nuclear-capable Armd Arty Battalions (PzArtBtl) of the German Army equipped with M109G 155mm SP howitzer.
The PzArtBtl was a direct support artillery unit attached to the German armored and mechanized infantry brigade.

PzArtBtl 35
PzBrig 3
1. PzGrenDiv
PzArtBtl 65
PzBrig 6
2. JgDiv
PzArtBtl 85
PzBrig 8
3. PzDiv
PzArtBtl 125
PzBrig 12
4. JgDiv
PzArtBtl 135
PzGrenBrig 13
5. PzDiv
PzArtBtl 185
PzGrenBrig 18
6. PzGrenDiv
PzArtBtl 195
PzGrenBrig 19
7. PzGrenDiv
PzArtBtl 245
PzGrenBrig 24
1. GebDiv
PzArtBtl 295
PzBrig 29
10. PzDiv
PzArtBtl 315
PzGrenBrig 31
11. PzGrenDiv
PzArtBtl 365
PzBrig 36
12. PzDiv

Some observations:

It would appear that there was only one armored artillery battalion per division that was nuclear-certified even though most had three DS armd arty battalions.

It would be interesting to get some more information on these units and how they were supported by the warhead custodial detachments - can anybody provide details?

Nuclear Surety Inspections
(Source: Email from Andrew J. Johnson, USAREUR IG Section, 1977-79) 
My next brush with the 59th Ordnance Brigade and its predecessors was June 1977 – June 1979.

I was assigned to the IG shop at USAREUR Headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany and conducted Nuclear Surety Inspections throughout Germany, Belgium, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

In 1978, I conducted the first ever NSI of the chemical storage site of the 636th Ordnance Company (part of the 60th Ordnance Group) near Munchweiler. A copy of the LOC was sent to the Commander of the 82nd Ordnance Battalion.

(Click here to read Col Johnson's recollections of his other assignments to 59th ORD units: 35th Arty Det; 525th Ord Co; BC of 197th Ord Bn)

An inspection team was typically a LTC Team Chief, Major Deputy Chief, and 2-3 Warrant Officers. It depended a little on whether we were inspecting a NIKE, field artillery, or Pershing unit.

When we went into Italy, Greece, and Turkey, we often took two teams so we could share the Warrant Officers if sites were in close proximity. These trips were usually two weeks long so we could cover at least four sites. Inspections of Ordnance companies took the longest because we had to put a crew through maintenance procedures on every type of weapon system they held.

Our preparation usually included reading up on the unit, its mission, and its past performance. If they exhibited a weakness in the past, we wanted to see if corrective action had been taken. Although we had a poor reputation, we never wanted to fail a unit. We knew what that meant for the careers of those that were assigned to the unit. On occasion, we saw the impact of a failure on our NATO allies. I recall being in Greece once and discussing what to do because the brake lines on all the Honest John trailers were dry rotted. We decided to sleep on it and decide in the morning. When we arrived at the site the next morning we learned that the Greek commander had been hospitalized with a heart attack.

Inspection outcomes often took very curious turns. I recall an inspection at a Pershing unit. Everything was going perfectly for the unit. We asked the unit to assume they had just had a lightning strike and to take all the appropriate actions. They took every action perfectly. Our Warrant congratulated the crew on its performance and then a young soldier said – but that’s not how we did it last week when lightning actually did strike the launch pad. A subsequent records review showed that they had in fact messed up several things, to include leaving a suspect warhead mounted to the missile.

One of the things that always bothered us (the inspection teams) was that units would hold their top performers in place until the inspection was over and then release them. Often, when we got on the plane to go home, half of the crew we just inspected was leaving too. We often wondered what would happen if we got back off the plane and had another inspection.

While the folks on the ground often felt great pressure, the inspectors had pressures too. I was gone from my wife and three young kids 75-80 % of the time. If we went out on a 2-week inspection, we typically got the next week at home to do paperwork. If we did weekly inspections, we might be gone Monday – Friday for several weeks in a row, have a week at home to get ready for a longer trip and then take off for 14 days. I did this for 2 years and then took command of the 197th for 2 years. Momma pretty much raised the kids single handedly.

The 1980s
Class V Ordnance Service in USAREUR
(Source: DA Pam 700-16, The Army Ammunition Management System, Dec 1982)
Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS)

Prior to 1973, the Army did not have a standard automated ammunition management system for use in the field. Operations were basically manual; however, several commands had unique ADP systems for providing class V management information and developing the WARS (Worldwide Ammunition Resporting System) report for ARRCOM (US Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command).

In 1972, a detailed analysis of current ongoing automated systems was undertaken to determine a system that would serve as the theater system baseline. The system selected was the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) Central Munitions System. In addition, WARS was selected as the baseline reporting system between the major command (Level 1) and the national level.

In June 1973, the converted USARPAC Central Munitions System was tested by the 60th Ordnance Group, USAREUR. This system was accepted by USAREUR in July 1973, renamed SAAS (Standard Army Ammunition System), and designated as the level 1 (theater) system.

Theater Application - Level 1. The Theater Materiel Management Center (in USAREUR, the 200th TAMMC performs theater ammunition management) is an activity which performs centralized theater inventory management, maintains visibility of all theater assets, and acts as the theater's interface with the DARCOM wholesale level. It performs the mission and functions of supply management, maintenance, serviceability, transportation, intransit control, and SAAS/NICP interface management. It also provides the required logistical/tactical interface management.

Ammunition assets are divided into five general categories:
Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS) (1)
Operational Project Stocks
Basic Loads (2)
Training/Operational Stocks
Combat Operations Support Levels

Below Theater Application - Level 3. The stock control activity (Level 3) is an activity which exercises stock control over the assets of one or more storage activities.

Storage Activity - Level 4. The storage activity (Level 4) is one whose principal mission is to exercise custody of stocks for distribution to the user (Direct Support Unit role) or to other storage activities (General Support Unit role). This is an operational level and operates in a manual environment.
(1) PWRMS are part of the theater's war reserve and represent stockage levels of mission-essential items to support post D-day combat consumption until resupply from CONUS facilities can be accomplished.
(2) The basic load is that quantity of non-nuclear ammunition the theater commander authorizes for wartime purposes and requires to be designated for and carried into combat by a unit. The basic load provides the unit sufficient ammunition to sustain itself in combat until the unit can be resupplied.

Standard USAREUR Munitions Systems (SUMS)

To accommodate the installation of the SAAS Level 1 system in USAREUR, the Miesau Army Depot lot locator system was renamed as the SUMS and expanded to provide a reporting capability to SAAS level 1.

SUMS operates in two modes, the "depot mode" and the "visbility mode." The "depot mode" accommodates those processes necessary for managing and controlling the day-to-day operations of an accountable supply distribution activity (ASDA) such as Miesau Army Depot. (Class V accountability in USAREUR is decentralized.) This service is provided also for the 84th Ordnance Battalion in support of its management of approximately thirty (30) prestock points stocking war reserves and units' basic loads. SUMS serves all other USAREUR munitions activities in the non-accountable "visibility mode."

As of 31 December 1981, USAREUR had 838,000 short tons of storage capacity on the continent and in the United Kingdom. The largest of the sites were as follows:
(A) short tons
  United Kingdom
Camp Darby
  Saarland Sites (4)
  Other (1)
(1) The 122,000 short ton capacity of the "Other" category is spread among 30-plus sites whose individual capacities range from medium to very small.

(Source: GAO Report, NSIAD-94-148R Military Ammunition in Europe, 1994)
Ammunition Stockpile in USAREUR, FY1991 -- 900,000 short tons on-hand
Number of Storage Sites in USAREUR, FY1991 -- 101

  15th ORD BN
battalion operates a total of 18 PSP's (1984) ; in 1991, AOR encompasses area reaching from Wildflecken (east) to Darmstadt (south) to Mainz (west) and Butzbach (north) (1)
60th Ord Co
3rd AD?
activated Jan 16 1985
144th Ord Co
operates ASP 3 at Wildflecken MTA in support of training ops
184th Ord Co
8th ID?
operates PSP in support of V Corps combat units
2040th CSG
V Corps
  101st ORD BN
20th Ord Co
3rd ID
501st Ord Co
VII Corps units
operates 5 PSP's (1982)
529th Ord Co
1st AD
activated July 15 1985
663rd Ord Co
operates ASP 1 in support of operations at Grafenwöhr MTA
  2041st CSG
VII Corps
  84th ORD BN
  191st ORD BN
  196th ORD BN
(1) The 4230th CSG (Guard), with six detachments, provides physical security for all Class V storage sites under 15th Ord Bn control (1984).

The corps ordnance ammunition battalion operates a number of prestock points (PSP's) throughout the corps area of responsibility. These PSP's contain every kind of conventional ammunition required by the combat units that they support. Each PSP is divided into sections which store the same type of ammo. The ammo is stored in protected concrete bunkers and each supported unit has its own designated location for the ammo storage unique to its mission.

Ammo stocks at the PSP's can be mobilized at any time and transported to Corps forward combat positions.

The concept of "modeling" used in USAREUR means that each unit's basic load - all the ammo needed for the initial stages of a conflict - is stored at the same location. In the event of an outbreak of hostilities, the units would move to their PSP's, upload their ammo and transport it to the field.

The Ordnance Ammunition Company is composed (1985) of
Hq Platoon
1st Magazine Platoon
(2nd Magazine Platoon)
Maintenance and Service Platoon
Communications Platoon

A Forward Storage Theater Site (FSTS) consists of approx. 20 bunkers or storage magazines
A Prestock Point (PSP) consists of approx. 30 magazines

(Source: German Bundesarchiv, via Rick Anders, and other sources)

Conventional Class V Storage Sites in Germany

Information is still incomplete.
(Sources: Base Realignment and Closure announcements, early 1990s, HQ USAREUR)


Also known as Walldorf Ammunition Area?
(near Büdingen)
Koeppern Ammo Area?
Germans designate PSP as MUNA Münster; colocated with the conventional Class V storage facility was a large SW-storage fac (NATO 111)
Germans designate PSP as Munitionslager Hainhaus
(near Tauberbischofsheim)
(Standortmunitionsniederlage Tauberbischofsheim?)
Steinbachtal Ammunition Area (at Büchelberg)
Germans also designate PSP as Munitionslager Wehrheim; in use by US Army from 1949 to 1996
Bimbach Class V Storage Area?
PSP 25
(near Schw. Hall)
PSP 26
probably MUNA Kupfer Ammunition Facility
Bad Mergentheim
probably Roggenberg Ammunition Area
PSP 28
PSP 30
(near Ansbach)
PSP 31
at Urlas?
(near Günzburg)
PSP 32
PSP 35
PSP 50
PSP 51
(near Worms)
PSP 52
at Eppelsheim?
PSP 54
(near Germersheim)
PSP 75
PSP 76
PSP 77
PSP 78
at Hochstetten (near Linkenheim)
PSP 79
(near Heilbronn)
PSP 80
(near Ulm)
PSP 81
PSP 82
(near Bamberg)
PSP 94
PSP 242
RASP 951
RASP 952
RASP 953
RASP 971
RASP 972
PSP 32

RASP 951


1. (KB)

2. (KB)

3. (KB)

RASP 972


1. (KB)

2. (KB)


Ordnance - Special Weapons Support
(Source: Building for Peace: US Army Engineers in Europe, 1945-1991)
LRSP Sites in Germany 1981
Long Range Security Program, 1976-1982

(details to be added soon)

(Source: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Responsibility: Ordnance Versus Field Artillery, by Lt Col Joseph A. Fields, ORD, 8 March 1990)
In a Study Project (US Army War College) paper written by Lt Col Fields in 1990, the author examines the role of the Ordnance Corps and Field Artillery in providing supply support for theater nuclear weapons for US-firing units versus non-US firing units and discusses some recommendations for improving the current (late 1980s) system of theater nuclear weapons support.

Our focus will be on the parts of the eport that describe the current structure and functions of tactical nuclear weapons support. (If you want to read the entire report, you can find a PDF version on the DTIC.mil website.)

LTC Fields' research in the matter included - besides his own personal experience within the Ordnance Corps where he was involved directly with the supply of conventional and nuclear ammunition in Europe as well as Korea - numerous interviews with senior ORD and FA officers as well as a visit to the 59th Ordnance Brigade in Germany.

There are several elements of tactical nuclear weapon's support that differentiate it from that of standard conventional ammunition. These peculiarities and their second order requirements form the basis of the functions to be discussed. The principles of control, accountability, security, field storage, maintenance, and safety are the salient factors. These factors thus lead to the mission to be discussed and the missions being performed by both field artillery as well as ordnance units.

The primary mission that I will examine is that of custody. A unit that is designated a custodial unit is one "charged with responsibility to maintain custody of nuclear weapons, issue nuclear weapons to delivery units, and conduct nuclear logistical operations." The sub-elements that are derived from this custodial mission are numerous.

They encompass, naturally, the ownership of the item which represents legal title to each weapon and always stays with the United States. Possession of the weapon is physical control and denotes the control of access of the weapon and its components. The element of security is the provision of a safe and secure environment and that of accountability is the provision of a formal record of the ownership of the item.

Contained within the "issue" element are such diverse sub-parts as the transportation of the weapon, documenting the appropriate transfer of possession, and ancillary tasks such as appointment of custodial agents. It is evident that safety and security weigh heavily during all elements of the "issue" process as with all other processes.

Finally, the definition of "conduct nuclear logistical operations," contains tasks such as performing:

the assembly of the weapon
pre-operational checks
operational/organizational maintenance
permissive action link (PAL) operations
weapon emergency destruction and nonviolent/semiviolent disablement
maintenance and proficiency of a "US only" secure communication/release system
nuclear surety program precepts

While this list is not all inclusive, it serves to highlight the vast majority of tasks performed at the "custodial unit" level.


The doctrine for the nuclear weapon support operation is in consonance with the currently deployed structure. Within a theater of operation (USAREUR, for example), there exists an ordnance brigade which commands the requisite number of ordnance battalions which provide supply support to the U.S. deployed corps. The recently published FPM 9-6 (1 Sept 89) discusses the inclusion of Field Artillery in the supply support mission by stating:

Within a theater of operations that is a combined theater, USAAGs (U.S. Army Artillery Groups) are assigned to support host nation forces. During peacetime, these USAAGs are composed of a US ordnance company and US field artillery detachments (USFADs) and are responsible for storing and maintaining nuclear warheads and nuclear projectiles in support of host nation forces. Host nation security forces provide external security for nuclear weapons stored by USAAG ordnance companies and USFADs.

The vast majority of tactical nuclear support structure is found within USAREUR. The 59th Ordnance Brigade is the command and control headquarters for tactical nuclear weapon support. It accomplishes this mission through subordinate ordnance battalions providing support to deployed U.S. corps and USAAGs providing support to non-U.S. forces. There are five USAAGs commanded by lieutenant colonels. Each one of these groups has from two to five custodial detachments assigned. They also have at least one ordnance company which provides both direct support and selected general support maintenance. All the artillery groups mentioned are located within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

Additionally, there are three groups located outside of the FRG (but within the confines of NATO) which have a similar structure and mission. They differ in that they range in detachment strength from two to four and they are commanded by colonels. Like their counterparts in the FRG, each group has an assigned ordnance company.

There is one other organization, which exists in the Eighth United States Army, that is similar to the artillery groups. It is the Weapons Support Detachment-Korea (WSD-K). Its' unclassified mission statement is to be prepared to "provide Nuclear Support Teams (NET) prepared to deliver nuclear weapons using Republic of Korea weapons systems under the provisions of the Eighth United States Army Tactical Nuclear Standing Operating Procedures." This unit, with an average military strength of 163, is so unique in its tactical nuclear weapons mission and "one-of-a-kind" command relationships that I will not include it In further discussion. Suffice it to say that it exists and it is different from the custodial unit definition previously listed. If a re-look of the organization of WSD-K Ss deemed necessary, it should be undertaken as a separate study.

There are approximately 170 officers and 1335 enlisted soldiers with artillery occupational specialties serving in the command and control and custodial unit operating structures of the NATO artillery groups.


(Excerpts only)

-- When there were direct support (DS) special ammunition ordnance companies in support of the deployed corps, the doctrinal manuals so reflected this organization.

On 1977, the 60th Ordnance Group transferred the DS companies to the (at that time) 59th Ordnance Group. The 59th Ordnance Group immediately re-structured into a direct/general support (DS/GS) concept. The doctrinal manuals eventually reflected the new structure implemented by the 59th Ordnance Group.

Doctrine development in the nuclear weapon's supply arena has simply followed the deployed USAREUR structure. The Warhead Support Concept (which I will discuss later and is currently under evaluation) is but one in a long line of this phenomenon.

Through interviews with active and retired ordnance and field artillery personnel, it appears that the association of field artillery personnel with their NATO counterparts was initially mandated due to a training requirement. In the early days, when allocation of tactical nuclear weapons were initially made to the NATO corps, there existed a concern as to the level of training of our allies and to put it very plainly, their competence. Shooting a free flight rocket, like the Honest John, with a large "nuc" bolted to the front of it was challenging even for crack U.S. artillery troops.

Over the years, however, the relationship between the artillery groups and their supported units has changed in that there is no emphasis today on the technical field artillery tasks. There is not a case where a USAAG would issue a round of nuclear ammunition and then proceed to check and verify the fire direction data. Nor do the personnel of the artillery group check the laying of the particular field gun or howitzer. Upon release, the tactical nuclear weapon is issued to the supported unit, period.

-- In the USAAG, field artillerymen with the 13B MOS perform the security functions such as entry control and warhead guard. In the US Corps, military police personnel with the 95B MOS perform the security functions.

-- In the USAAG, the 13B performs the functions of unlocking, pre-fire inspection, mating/de-mating, and other functions. In the ordnance companies (supporting US Corps), the MOS 55's perform the unlocking function, and the pre-fire inspections, fuze setting, and other related functions.

-- When dealing with strictly US-firing units, the Ordnance Corps supplies the item (nuclear warhead). In a combined theater such as USAREUR, the US provides its allies with tactical nuclear weapons through the USAAG.

The USAAG does not exist outside of USAREUR - it was invented as a peacetime, USAREUR-peculiar organization. .

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