Tactical Air Control System
Page 6 - 412L Aircraft Warning & Control System [U], 1959-1980
US Air Force, Europe

Looking for more information from military/civilian personnel assigned to or associated with any units of US Air Force, Europe that operated or supported the Theater Air Control System. If you have any stories or thoughts on the subject, please contact me.

General Information

The Manuscript

412L Depot Level Maint Fac

USAFE Modification Team

Page 1 (C&C)

Page 2 (Units)

Page 2A (GE Units/Radar Sites)

Page 3 (Systems)

Page 4 (Doctrine)

Page 5 (Communications)

Page 7 (407L System)

The 412L Air Weapons Control System
(Source: History Office, HQ US Air Forces, Europe)
1960s - early 1980s
General Information

Historical Manuscript

The story of the 412L Air Weapons Control System that was used in southern Germany from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s to manage air defense activities in the FOURATAF sector, was documented by the Office of History of the 601st Tactical Control Wing in 1981. The resulting report: "412L Aircraft Warning and Control System, 1959-1980" has just recently been declassified by the History Office at HQ USAFE and has been cleared for release.

A big thank you goes out to Jeff States who initiated the effort, Dr. William Elliott of the History Office who coordinated the effort, and the staff at the History Office who reviewed the manuscript.

The report, in its entirety -- minus the sections that have been sanitized because they are still deemed sensitive -- will be presented below. It will take some time to post the whole report as the scanned pages have to be prepped for OCR and then QC'd and corrected. So please be patient.

In the meantime, if anyone has additional insight or personal recollections concerning the 412L system and its implementation in the European Theater - please contact me. We would love to get your input! Of special interest are also any details on the Kindsbach Cave, its role in the integrated air defense system and on the airmen and soldiers who served there.

(Source: ON GUARD, 86th Air Division magazine, Oct 1961)

CRC - pre-412L

A view of the manual plotting world of a CRC prior to the implementation of the semi-automatic plotting and tracking capabilities of the 412L system in the early 1960s.

(Source: General Electric advertisement in SIGNAL journal, Nov 1962)

412L Mock Up


(Source: Email from William W. Morgan, 412-L ACWS Project, General Electric, Jan 1962-June 1964)
I worked for General Electric from the mid-1950s to about 1967. From January 1962 to June 1964 I was assigned to the 412-L Project, working from the Palast in Wiesbaden. I was a Test Conductor, responsible for running operation tests on the system, usually using aircraft. This was part of the program for verifying that the system performed to design specifications and was in fact ready to turn over to the USAF for operational use.

At one time or another, and usually many times, I went to all of the underground sites to conduct these tests.

For some reason, sitting at my computer, I was thinking about 412-L and decided to do a search on Google. I found your site of course, and it sure did bring back memories. Some of the site names had been forgotten, and I think there are some that I do not see at all. But I have not read everything!

Even at this late date I have some “residual reluctance” to mention the things I do remember. Perhaps more than anything, I remember some of the non-Air Force things. Such as the mausoleum for ”Fritz”, Hitler’s number one glider pilot, who was killed in an accident. And I was sitting in a bar or coffee shop in Hof listening to music on the radio. When the program was suddenly interrupted, and in German the announcer said “John F. Kennedy, the 45th president of the United States is dead”. There was complete silence in the place. And I thought to myself, “I must be interpreting this wrong. Something is not right”. But it was true. It was of course November 22nd, 1962.

The little towns near all the sites were very interesting and nice. The most glamorous though, was in Berlin. I would fly from Wiesbaden in a transport aircraft on Monday morning, wearing a parachute. I always put my military-related ID aside, keeping my passport in my pocket. Thinking if I had to parachute out and landed OK, I would tell them I was a lost tourist. Or something like that...? It was interesting going through Checkpoint Charlie and going to the East Berlin Opera. Where I sat in the same box Khrushchev had used when he visited Berlin. And walking down the brilliantly lit and totally deserted Karl Marx Allee late at night. With my date’s high heels clicking loudly and echoing between the buildings. And thinking there might be thousands of eyes watching us.

I remember the East German or Russian fighters heading west toward the border at supersonic speed. Causing the USAF to scramble fighters. Then almost on the border the East German or Russian fighters would pull up into a vertical climb and then roll back toward the east. Testing to see how long it took the USAF to scramble.

General Electric
I believe GE actually designed the system under contract to the USAF. I know they manufactured it, and we (GE) installed it in the bunkers. (Or, as I said below, supervised or advised USAF personnel who actually did the work.) And then we were responsible for the unit and system testing in preparation for the acceptance testing by the USAF. The GE headquarters was at what was once the Palast Hotel in downtown Wiesbaden.

I don’t know the exact number, but there must have been around 500 GE people at the Palast, and various people at sites to maintain the equipment during the installation and testing phase. The GE people in Wiesbaden filled the Palast, which must have been at least ten stories tall. There were some Air Force officers there also.

Now I am realizing how much time has passed, and how much I have forgotten! When I arrived there in January 1962 from Spain, where I had been managing a test equipment calibration operation under contract to the USAF, the other GE people had been there for some time, and most of the equipment had been installed but was not really running yet as a system I don’t think. Now I remember that my title was “Test Manager”, and there were about 5-6 of us I think. Nominally, one for each of the sites. Although I operated at all of the sites at one time or another. Except perhaps the one at Ramstein (repair facility), which I don’t remember.

First there were individual site tests (after all the units on site were working, such as the troublesome Light Valve), and then it was test as a comprehensive, multi-site system.

I originally worked for the Heavy Military Electronics Equipment Department (HMED) of GE, based in Syracuse, NY. I was a Tech Rep for them on various radar systems, first in Japan and then in Europe. I am trying to remember, but I think 412-L may have come under a GE group in Schenectady, NY.

Type of support that GE provided for the 412-L system in Germany? Also, there was a repair facility at Ramstein AB. Was there some repair/schooling etc done in Wiesbaden?

GE did more than just “support”. It was the design, manufacture, installation and checkout of the individual equipment and system. I don’t even remember a repair facility at Ramstein. I think this must have been used and functional after the acceptance and turnover of the system. I only remember our installation and maintenance people maintaining the equipment prior to acceptance by the USAF.

Training of USAF personnel was an on-going thing on site whenever there was no actual system testing. Although that of course was also part of the training.

Did GE support the German radar sites that operated the 412-L systems after the sites had been turned over to GAF?

As I alluded above, GE had a support contract for at least some of the radar site equipment. I remember working on the AN/FPS-6 height finder radar, and also a search radar, for which I don’t remember the designation. Perhaps SPS-8 or something like that? (Or maybe that was a shipboard radar on which I had worked at one time...?!) I had worked on this in France and Germany during 1958-December 1959, when I left for test equipment operation in Spain. I did overhauls on radar equipment in Turkey and other locations outside of Europe, first out of a depot in Nancy, France and then later from Kaiserslautern.

GE would often get frantic calls from one of the radar sites, with something not working. And I would get in my car and drive out to the site. Which from Nancy and going to Germany would sometimes require an overnight stop!

At this time the radar sites were basically all USAF as I remember. As I sort of remember, I think someone else eventually for the Tech Rep contract for the radar sites. Perhaps RCA. I do remember they offered me a job as I was leaving the project in the summer of 1964. A nice increase in pay too, although I decided to stay with GE and returned to the US. Eventually to work with their Process Control Computer operation in Phoenix, AZ.

Were there several GE offices in southern Germany or just the one in Wiesbaden?

As far as 412-L was concerned, there was only the “office” in Wiesbaden. As I said, installation and maintenance personnel were located at near the sites on sort of a “TDY” basis. Although having said that, I now think that probably the actual “physical labor” of installation was done by USAF personnel, with the GE people supervising.

I think there were still GE Tech Reps assigned for the radar sites, but that was part of the aforementioned HMED group.

While working on 412-L I would sometimes run into them, most of whom were former colleagues from when I worked on the radar site program. The HMED operation was also headquartered in Wiesbaden, although not at the Palast. There may still have been GE people working out of the operation in Kaiserslautern.

I suppose one reason I suddenly entered “412-L” in Google was the fact that periodically I try to locate any of my former colleagues. Or anyone who worked on 412-L from GE. Sadly, I have not had contact with any of them for decades. And now only remember a few individual names. And therefore remember only “sketchy” details on any of the program. A few things are slowly coming back, but very few and very slowly. More may come.

I remember at some of the major system test, sitting beside a 2-3 star AF general. With me effectively controlling air operations unless or until he had to over-ride me in event of something like a diversion for a real “event”. We both had a “Priority” button on our EMS phones. But in day-to-day operations I think I was still only a minor cog. About four levels down from the GE guy in charge. A bit like sometimes being SOPA (Senior Officer Present Afloat) in the Navy when you are only a Lt. (Jg). And for some reason, everyone from the Admiral on down is suddenly away for a short time. Or being the OD, subject to being over-ridden by the Captain if need be.

(Source: Email from Jeff States, 615th AC&WS, Kindsbach, 1962-66) REVISED!
I was stationed at the "Cave" located in Kindsbach, Germany from 1962-1966. The cave was located close to Ramstein Air Force Base and was the underground command center for NATO and the USAFE in Europe.  I was in the initial group of 412L personnel that was sent to Kindsbach to help "bridge" the switch from manual plotting to the "new" 412L semi-automatic system. I attended the GE school in Syracuse for 412L training prior to arriving in Germany.  

Upon out initial visit to the cave, it was obvious that 412L was still going through its basic installation process which would continue for many months. We were assigned briefly to the active unit at the cave (manual) which we were to ultimately replace. They presented the current air picture over Germany to a senior USAFE/NATO staff by using a manual plotting system. We therefore had to learn to write backwards and took our turn working behind a very large plotting board.  

The cave was a very large underground facility and the area that was to house 412L was only very large, empty rooms when we first arrived. Although we didn’t know it at the time, I have since read an official report that 412L was originally designed as a mobile system, but ultimately that concept did not work. To use the existing 412L equipment, it was decided to send it to Germany for use by NATO and the USAFE. In Europe, the 412L equipment would be used as a stationary system similar to SAGE in the US. (Interestingly, the 412L computer was transistorized while the SAGE computer used vacuum tubes)

The cave housed more then 412L. There was a huge communications area with lots of crypto equipment. Weather and intelligence units were also located at the cave. Amazingly, none of us knew or questioned other personnel working in the other units at the cave. We simply reported to work, did our jobs and went back to Ramstein when our shift was over. We also occasionally had to do some work at a special teletype machine that required us to get a top secret security clearance. 

A word about the "set-up" at the cave. 412L at the cave was technically a NATO installation and all of the 412L sites in Germany, in addition to performing their specific duties, would forward their computer information up the chain-of-command to Kindsbach. Our job was to present the consolidated air picture from our various radar sites to a senior NATO/USAFE staff. There was a German officer who was technically in charge, although it was the Americans who ran each shift and made all decisions. Also, there were two French enlisted personnel on each shift until France pulled out of NATO. We had a huge screen (It was 40' x 40') on which we displayed all air traffic currently over East and West Germany as well as some of the Soviet eastern block countries. The large screen was overlaid with a map of Europe and great attention was paid to the border between East and West Germany. The display on the screen was very interesting. It was projected by a machine called a "Light Valve." This machine took the radar data and projected it onto the screen as “moving targets." The presentation was in color and was also dynamic. Of course the good guys were in green and the bad guys were in red (magenta). This was an astounding development and made us all feel we were doing very important work!! Clearly the light valve was the forerunner of today's "Projection TV.” Another innovation of the 412L system was a new phone system which used "tones" to dial the numbers selected on the telephone keypad. Clearly the 412L phone system was the forerunner of touch tone dialing. Remember it was only the early sixties when all of this was happening! 

My tour at Kindsbach cave finished after spending almost 4 ½  years in Germany. Now, more than 40 years later, those years remain very special and exciting. 412L was retired from service in 1984 which is also the year that the USAFE and NATO permanently departed from the Kindsbach cave. Eventually, Germany would permanently seal the cave and today it is a forgotten, underground relic from another time. It survives solely in the memories and experiences of the military personnel who once served there.

(Source: Email from Jerry Evans)
I found your website by "goggling" the name "MESSTETTEN" and you may want some info concerning the USAFE sites.
In my case I was assigned as a instructor at Keelser training Ops people in the 412-L system. I originally transferred from R-G AFB train officers/NCO's/Canadians in SAGE to GE, Syracuse NY for 412-L development/implemptation. We trained a few EM/Officers for the initial placement in Germany and started the school at Keesler.

I was placed on a special training team in 1963 to train German AF folks at Messtetten. If my memory is correct, we trained approx.
500 germans with 11 AF instructors and trained them on live equipment at Freising. My tour was approx 6 mos TDY and I returned to Keesler for discharge in Oct. 1964.

I do have some pictures of the barracks and the USAF people assigned. The OIC was a Capt. The NCOIC was an E-8 and a couple of E-5, E-6
and a few E-4's.

I have fond memories of that part of Germany and the German AF asked the lot of us to stay, but the request by them was turned down.

(Source: Email from Robert E. Blevins)
You did not mention Giebelstadt, where the 602nd AC&W Squadron and part of the 69th Arty (Hawk missiles) were stationed. Also, a part of the systen was the Electronic Switching Center  (ESC), one of the first computerized data switching centers in operation (North Electric Company, Galion, Ohio). I was an electronics technician, and helped on the initial installation of the center. 

I was at Giebelstadt from Nov. 1962 until Jan. 1966. I helped install the ESC and connect it to the other sites via the Deutsches Bundespost and USAF microwave system. The ESC was one of the first computerized switching systems with both voice and data transmission capabilities. This was accomplished by time division multiplex (TDM) modulation internal in the system.

There were 14 "highways" each having 20 available "time slots" resident within the ESC. When transmitting data or voice to another center, there had to be an idle coincident time slot available in each center. I believe there were 280 available time slots in each center. Some of the time slots were used up by "overhead" (each centers computer exchanging control data with every other center) e.g. timing and synchronous data for all sites was derived from a central control location - probably Ramstein.

By today's standards the system was very limited, but the state of the art for the early 1960's. Each site controlled it's associated Hawk and Nike missile detachments and provided control and tracking data to the command center and the fighter intercept squadrons. I believe the tracking radar had a range of 400 nautical miles (not certain). You may get additional information from General Electric Archives. The original ESC was designed by L M Erickson Ldt. Sweden.

(Source: Email from Jim Tarbet, 615th ACW Squadron, Birkenfeld, 1968)
I have seen your site and it has better 412L info than all else combined on the net.

I was a maintenance type and cannot help much on operational aspects. Check out the 615th roster on Radomes for contacts if Ops is your interest. I was in the 615th ACW stationed at Birkenfeld (moved to Neubrucke in Dec 68) and worked at Borfink. That was the same timeframe that HHB 5/6 moved from Hoppstadten to Neubrucke, when the 98th General was mothballed. No, I can't remember any 5/6 people. I do remember (by name only) a SSGT Sandoval from 94th who worked in the bunker.

Since 412L was still classified when I went through school, I did not have any training material. I have very little on it, outside of my "Outhouse of Worthless Knowledge." I do remember that we communicated to Nike through Hill 479 and do remember the 412L network and system structures.

Walt, I promised I would get you something on the 412L systems and equipment, particularly complementary to the information you already had. It is still in "draft" form.
I found this from a data flow diagram that I forgot that I had. It even included all of the cabinet numbers except for the power supply cabinets. It differs from yours only in that it lists each data/control element instead of your generic blocks.
Right now, I am still attempting to verify a few points, primarily the actual function & nomenclature for the AN/GPA-73 and an explanation of the OA-xxxx nomenclature. It appears that the OA-xxxx groups were actually under the GPA-73 (but no bets yet).
A 412L system was comprised of various equipment groups, depending on the site responsibilities and configuration.
There were 7 separate maintenance responsibility areas.
  • Radars & radar signal processing (could be remote from the operations site).
  • Trackers
  • Datalink
  • Weapons Computer
  • Consoles & Displays
  • Light Valve dynamic display
Communications was handled by a separate series of personnel
  • Electronic Switching Center
  • Wire maintenance
  • Radio maintenance
  • GATR and Microwave
  • Commercial telecomm providers.
And then the old Power Production and Air Conditioning people.

1. Det 1, 17th Air Force ran the Allied Sector Operations Center III at Börfink. It was really an integrated unit designation. Unlike the Army, the AF frequently had organizations that existed as a function and with people assigned, but no orderly room or the rest of the formalities. SOC III was a function within Boerfink and it was a 17th AF function. Truly, it was only the command post. All of the remaining operations were 615th as we functioned as the Master CRC.

2. As best I can recall, the function at Hill 479 was an AADCP (we called it "Adcap"). I don't know that much about Army nomenclature but I understood (from your info and other stateside Nike stuff) that 412L weapons computer system (all components) were used instead of the Missile Master or MCC. I really don't know the difference, if any.

3. Further, we did have Army personnel (within Börfink) operating all of the Nike functions, not Air Force. I believe the only Air Force involvement was mission tasking (EUCOM-style shared command). In case you run across it, the only name I recall was a SSgt Sandoval in the 1969-1971 timeframe. I never dealt with them.

4. What was the role of SPATS at Boerfink? SPATS was also designated Det 1, 17th AF. They strictly did both the systems programming and the data analysis. Their system was used strictly for that purpose and could not be used for back-up. It was not a functional site. Their only "mission functional" capabilities were a couple weapons ops consoles used in analysis and they had no out-bound capabilities. SPATS was originally located at Gieb and was relocated to Borfink in 1968 when Gieb's functions were relocated to Lauda and turned over to GAF. The system was housed in the same computer room in the lower level of the bunker. Their offices were on the 4th Floor.

5. There was no back-up to 412L. The compartmentalizing of resources meant that a site could function as a manual site if the data processing equipment went down, operate as a command site if radar was down, operate as an isolated site if datalink went down. In case the whole joint went down (power outage), there was more than sufficient overlap that the network would not be in a truly degraded state.

6. Tthe 1970 IRAN project at Borfink: IRAN (Inspect & Replace As Necessary) included replacing a great number of the coax cable harnesses in the systems. It also included replacing the Typotron storage displays (DID's) with an integrated circuit-based raster display system. The DID's had the weapons or mission data stored on them. They had a bad habit of the image getting burned into the phosphor.

7. The Air Force unit designations & responsibilities were always rather fluid. While 412L squadron designations didn't change, the formal reporting structures were. Watch out for some of the traps. These innocuous drive people nuts yet they interfere with explaining issues.

* Call signs, for example, changed with changes in functional responsibilities.
* 4th ATAF (NATO) was strictly 17th AF with the associated liaison staffs.
* 86th Air Division went away and the 601st TCW came into existence. Outside of who was called, nothing changed.
* HQ USAFE moved to Ramstein and 17th AF vanished.
* And many more ...

One thing not mentioned anywhere was the 412L at Berlin. Apparently discovered by the Russians and then pulled because it could be used on offense. Also, under 412L, Birkenfeld was a split responsibility site. Radar assets were maintained by II Fernmelderegiment 32 (Heinrich Hertz Kaserne, Birkenfeld) while all operations and systems maintenance were 615th ACWRON. Specialized comm functions (crypro, microwave, etc) were under OL-B of the 2184th Comm Sq based at Hahn AB.

The funny thing in all of this is that there were only the 8 functional sites (7 after the Berlin RP was removed) with varying degrees of functionality and there were two rather complete support systems. One was the SPATS system and the other was the training system at Keesler AFB. Note in Lyle's info that he referenced the switch to GEADGE and they took the system at Keesler since training was no longer needed.

(Source: Fernmelderegiment 31, 25 Jahre)


CRC Börfink    
RP Burglengenfeld [2] 5./FmRgt 31 operational Dec 1962; closed 8 July 1983
RP Döbraberg    
CRC Freising 604th AC&WS [1] operational 4 Jan 1965
CRC Lauda II./FmRgt 31 operational 1 Sep 1968
CRC Messtetten I./FmRgt 31 operational 3 Aug 1964
CRP Wasserkuppe
[1] II Abt./FmRgt 31 assumed full operational responsibility for the radar site on 15 Dec 1965
[2] not sure if Burglengenfeld ever had the 412L system installed

(Source: FM 44-1, US Army Air Defense Employment, Oct 1965)

Theater Air Defense Coordination

412L and the MSG-4

MSG-4 in Germany
Typical Army-Air Force Air Defense Coordination System (doctrine)

The organization of Army and Air Force forces assigned to a theater will vary, depending upon the size and geography of the area of operations, assigned missions, forces available, and the desires of the component commanders. (See xxx for a depiction of a portion of the air defense facilities and coordination links in a type theater.)

Army air defense operations are coordinated with other Army and Air Force tactical and tactical support operations by the air defense elements (ADE) located in the supported force tactical operations centers (TOC).

Army AD operations are conducted by AD commanders operating from Army air defense command posts (AADCP). (AADCP operations are discussed further below.) As necessary, the AADCP coordinates its tactical operations with collocated and/or operationally connected Army flight operations centers (FOC) and US Air Force facilities, thereby insuring the safety of friendly aircraft from friendly air defense fires. The following subparagraphs describe the US Air Force facilities:

The tactical air control center (TACC) is the operations center of the Air Force commander's command post. The TACC plans and coordinates the employment of offensive and defensive tactical air effort and air control functions in the theater of operations. Through the TACC facilities, the Air Force commander effects centralized direction of the Air Force effort and coordinated planning. The TACC maintains a visual presentation of the overall air situation on an AD plotting board. The AD plotting board is supplemented with status boards which continuously reflect AD tactical action; fighter, reconnaissance, and airlift mission progress; conditions of alert; and other data pertinent to current AD operations. The TACC also directs the detailed apportionment of available air effort to the various tasks to be performed.

The subordinate control and reporting centers (CRC) provide radar surveillance within a designated area, and have the capability of vectoring fighter-interceptor aircraft in both offensive and defensive operations and furnishing early warning and identification to Army surface-to-air missile units. The CRC is connected to the Army fire distribution system operating in the area by automatic data links or manual communications. To facilitate the required coordination, the CRC, the AADCP, and the FOC may be collocated when the tactical situation permits.

CRC capabilities are extended forward by subordinate control and reporting posts (CRP). These installations are capable of vectoring fighter-interceptor aircraft and providing radar surveillance information to Army surface-to-air missile units. The CRP normally has no responsibility to identify aircraft except for those they are currently vectoring, unless designated as an alternate CRC.

Army AD augmentation elements will be provided for operation in the Air Force facilities involved with air defense at each level, in order to facilitate coordination of Army and Air Force air defense efforts. The size and composition of the Army augmentation elements provided may vary with the situation; however, there must be sufficient personnel for sustained operations.

Electronic Coordination and Control Facilities
The Army Missile Monitor fire distribution system will be used in some theaters of operation, and may operate in the same areas as the Air Force air weapon control system 412L. When operating in the same area, the system should be operationally connected.

The 412L system performs the essential functions of air surveillance, maintenance of aircraft movement and identification information, and weapon control for air defense against air-breathing threats and for offensive strike and reconnaissance missions. Varying numbers of 412L systems may be vetted together to provide coordinated air control for a large geographical area. (See 412L and the MSG-4 graph.)

CRC Army augmentation element personnel will function in the 412L system facilities performing the duties of coordination and missile controllers. In those areas not equipped with 412L digital data facilities, CRC Army augmentation elements will net with appropriate AADCP's to furnish the necessary coordination and control links.

Air Defense Coordination
Close coordination is maintained between AD forces or elements of the services to insure unity of action and to exchange information with respect to capabilities, intelligence, operating procedures and other information concerning AD activities.

The AD brigade has one organic tactical air control center section which provides an Army augmentation element at the Air Force tactcial air control center (TACC). However, when authorized by Department of the Army or the Army component commander, the brigade will be augmented with as many sections as necessary to provide Army elements at the Air Force control and reporting center.


To meet the communications requirements for air defense operations when using AN/MSG-4 Missile Monitor equipment, a VHF/UHF radio relay system is established using attached or augmented signal support units.

The minimum communication links that must be provided by this system between a battalion and its fire units include one automatic data link and three voice channels -

(1) Command.

(2) Operations.

(3) Intelligence/radar reporting. This is operated full duplex on one channel providing facilities for transmission of intelligence from higher to lower echelon and radar reporting from lower to higher echelon.

For liaison and coordination, the AD units should utilize common user channels available through the field army area communications system.

In a static situation, control of radio relay stations should be at brigade or group level. As the situation becomes fluid, the control of relay stations should be at battalion level.

Any additional communications means available, such as commercial circuits, land lines, and area communication systems, should be considered for alternate communications.

Backup Communications
Should the VHF/UHF radio relay system or the Missile Monitor equipment fail, backup communications must be available for manual AADCP operation. Backup communications are establshed using TOE radio equipment.

The following nets are recommended for use with organic communication equipment:

(1) The command net is used for command supervision and control, and limited administration and logistical information if a command and administration net is not available.

(2) The Air Force early warning broadcast net is used for receipt of early warning and identification from Air Force sources.

(3) The Air Force liaison net is used for exchange of information between the AADCP and an Air Force installation.

(4) Other liaison nets are used for exchange of information between the AADCP and other units such as adjacent AADCP's, FOC's, FCC's, Navy, armor, and infantry units.

(5) The radar reporting net is used for transmission of radar plots from the defense acquisition radars directly to the AADCP.

(6) The intelligence broadcast net is used for transmission of plot-tell and warning information from the AADCP to fire units. Information transmitted includes the location and identity of airborne objects, emergency warning, and similar information. Acknowledgements by receiving units are made over the radar operating net.

(7) The operations net is used for voice transmission of tactical information relative to air battle operations such as after action reports, rounds expended, engagement results, weapon status, states of alert, and action status.

(8) The admin RATT net provides a command and administrative hard-copy facility between higher headquarters and battalion.


Donald P. Moriarty, II, 10th Arty Gp and 6th Msl Bn, 61st Arty, 1962-65; 32nd AADCOM, 1973-77)
Email moved to Missile Control Centers, Overview Page, Air Defense section


- The implementation, integration and evaluation of the 412L AWCS was coordinated by a Joint Test Center within 86th Air Division. Under the codename Gray Ghost, some 239 sorties were flown by USAFE fighter interceptor squadrons during the second half of 1963. Final turnover to the new system took place suring the Spring of 1965.

- The French used their own System, STRIDA II, which was installed at their control centers at Drachenbronn und Taverny. This system was initially not compatible with the General Electric 412L system. It took three additional years to develop the integration.

- 412L Radar Sites (operated by USAFE in the 1960s) (complete?)

- 412L Detachment, HHB, 10th Arty Group, worked with the 616th AC&WS (USAF) at the Wasserkuppe radar site.

- The 412L system would be replaced by the new GEADGE system in the early 1980s.

- 4 ATAF ADOC, call sign "Lafayette", late 1950s - is probably an element of 4 ATAF Air Operations Center;

- The AN/TRC-87 Communications System ("Track-87") provides complete ground-to-air communications . It is a sub-system of the 412 L AWCS and provides the vital ground-air communications link required to direct deployed tactical aircraft to their targets. Housed in a shelter, the system can be transported by a single truck, helicopter or air cargo plane.

412L Depot Level Maintenance Facility (Det 4, 86th AD)
(Source: Email from Nelson Bryson, Det 4, 86th AD, 1967-70)

412L Maint Fac, Ramstein

Googling 412L AWCS got me to your site.

I was in training on the 412L system located in a Quonset Hut at Keesler AFB from May 1966 through May 1967. I then went to Ramstein where I worked in the 412L Depot Level Maintenance Facility. At that time we were called Detachment 4 of the 86th Air Division.

In the barracks on Ramstein AB where I lived were some of the "scope dopes" and "diddy-bops" that worked in Detachment 2 in the COC. I visited the site once to work on a particularly troublesome display position - probably in 1968-69 - and I still have one of the perfect mirrors (this one was chipped) that reflected the projected radar information onto the huge screen.

In addition to fixing all the subassemblies and PWB's that came back from the sites, Det 4 was tasked with installing ECO's and equipment upgrades as they were implemented throughout the system. At one time or another during 1967 through early 1970 I worked TDY at most of the 412L radar sites that were operational at that time.

Thanks for the memory!

he unmarried guys from both the detachments (Det 2 and Det 4, 86th Air Div) lived on the same floor in our barracks - so we knew each other -- at least in passing on the way to the common latrine.

Det 4 was THE depot maintenance facility for all the radar sites that formed the 412L grid and contained the actual computer systems. Technicians at these sites troubleshot problems to the major assembly level (switch panel, printed circuit board, power supply, etc.) and replaced them rather than fixing them on-site. These assemblies were sent to us for repair and test. We then returned them through our supply chain back to the sites.

At the time I was there the USAF had complete operational responsibility for all the sites and all required maintenance tasks. There were German civilians working in non-classified sections of our facility (machine shop area mostly). However, the assemblies themselves carried at least a secret classification - and some were so sensitive we could work on them only inside a vault (one of my favorite things)! I won't swear to it, but I don't think there were any Germans (GAF, or otherwise) inside the 412L computer facilities during the time I was in Europe. Hand over to the GAF occurred after I left (April 1970).

The Maintenance Facility was one large building - about the size of a supermarket - 25 to 30,000 square feet or so. It was organized into three major "shops". I worked in SAR (sub-assembly repair). The largest shop was PWB (Printed Wire Board) and the smallest (and newest) repaired the brand new "touch tone" telephone systems that provided primary voice telecom for the entire network. There was a QC section that inspected and tested everything before it left the building, a supply corner that kept most components used in the repair processes, and a combination metal fabrication/paint shop that produced, from scratch, any chassis component we needed. There was a small classroom, some storage for incoming and outgoing assemblies, the vault, administrative offices and the latrine.

As I stated earlier, there was a small supply corner in our facility.  How the stuff got there and who was responsible for it, I don't know.  I did know one of the guys (Vietnam Hero!) who worked in supply... he lived in our barracks so I suppose he was assigned to Det 4.

There was no "intermediate" repair facility between us and the sites.  They would exchange the board/assembly and send it to us for repair.  In the three years I was there I can't recall a case where we did not fix a device that wasn't completely burned up... and we fixed a few of those!

It is almost unbelievable to me to think that I went to Ramstein 40 YEARS ago this year! The assigned fighter squadron (which I only visited once) was flying F102's when I arrived and migrated to F4C's while I was there. I still get chills when I see a Phantom. Obviously I was there at the height of the Vietnam war. By the fortunes of war Europe had more jet fuel than tires so every takeoff was on full afterburner just to save rubber. I have slept through many a scramble - two would take off side-by side - so loud that the ground would shake!

Detachment 4, 601st TCW
(Source: USAFE Ramstein Air Base Telephone Directory, January 1971)

412L Maint Fac, Ramstein

USAFE Modification Team
(Source: Email from Ted LaRue)
I worked on a modifications team which was based at Ramstein AB in Germany. I worked for GE MCD (Military Communications Department) which was in Okla. City. I was a civilian working for GE, under contract with the USAFE, we were under the auspicies of OCAMA , Tinker AFB. Most of the other GE people who worked with me were from HMED in Syracuse.

We traveled around to the various 412-L sites installing upgrades and modifications to the equipment. Although I had a relatively brief stay in Germany, the Mod Team was operational for several years as some of my co-workers had been working there for several years. I was there in Germany during 1965-66.

I joined the project in 1965, so I can only tell you from hearsay that most of the equipment was manufactured in Syracuse at GE HMED. They transferred the project to Okla. City from Syracuse later on so some sub-assemblies and parts such as printed circuit boards were made in Okla. City. Most of the personnel who worked on the project in Oklahoma City were transferees from Syracuse. The work in Okla. City was mostly complete by 1966.

I don't know whether the mod team worked under the 86th Air Div or the 17th AF. I used to have some orders somewhere which might tell us. I'm afraid I also don't remember the official designation of our mod teams. We had an office in the maintenance shop/warehouse in Ramstein AB. We had at least one team and at times two working. Each team comprised of one or two installation technicians and a QA man. Only the last few people on the teams were from Okla. City, most of the people were from HMED in Syracuse.

I left Ramstein in the fall of 1966 and most of the modifications were complete. I did hear later (1967) from my former supervisor in Ramstein that GE HMED had a new contract to move the above ground site south of Wurzburg (Giebelstadt - it seems to me we called it "Site "H") into a bunker (Lauda) in preparation for turning it over to the German Air Force. At the time I had already transferred to a commercial department at GE so I didn't take him up on the offer.

If I recall any more details I will let you know. I hope this information will be useful to you.

The Historical Manuscript

  (U) For the past 15 years, the 412L Air Weapons Control System existed in southern Germany to manage air defense activities for NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. Although the 412L was directly responsible to NATO, the 601st Tactical Control Wing supervised the day-to-day activities of USAF units that had a part in its operation. We choose now to write this story while the 412L is being phased out and replaced by modern components

(U) After addressing the frustrations and problems in making it an operational system, this monograph covers important milestones of the 412L era. These include transfer of most sites to the German Air Force, formation of joint German/American management functions Salty Net, and Constant Keystone. It ends, most appropriately, with an introduction to the German Air Defense Ground Environment (GEADGE) system that would replace the 412L during the 1980s.

(U) The documents used for preparing this narrative came out of historical archives at Headquarters USAFE, Seventeenth Air Force, and the 601st TCW. Naturally, it was written from the European perspective with references to stateside developments only when appropriate. The author, SSgt Manuel E. Siso, was completely objective in telling it like it was. This should be a worthwhile historical reference for years to come.


(Pages V: PREFACE)

  (U) This monograph, the first in several years from a Seventeenth Air Force subordinate wing, was by no means a solo effort. In fact, several people played a major part in getting this narrative done. I would like to single out four of them. Mr. Lyle Herbaugh (GS-12), the 412L maintenance contract monitor at the 601st Tactical Control Wing, deserves the most credit for his technical and inspirational guidance. This work never would have gotten off the ground without his contributions of time and three boxes of supporting documents that he "never had the heart to throw out," Colonel Richard Morain, 601st TCW Deputy Commander for Command and Control (and former 615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron commander), also gave his time generously always leaving his door open for countless inquiries. More than 25 times I entered his office with "just a quick question" when simple answers were not possible. Another person who deserves recognition for this work is our typist, Sgt David L. Jones, who retyped this manuscript three times for proofreadings at wing-level for the most technical review; and the Seventeenth Air Force, USAFE, and Headquarters USAF history offices. Finally, the biggest thanks go out to my counterpart in the 601st TCW History Office, Ssgt Steve Toepfer, who provided invaluable guidance on topic selection, tie also carefully proofread each draft. My heartfelt thanks to all of these people.



Table of Contents


15 August 58
(U) The United States European Command assigned operational control of all U.S. Army and Air Force air defense forces to CINCUSAFE.
21 July 59
(U) CINCUSAFE, Gen F. F. Everest, signed an agreement at Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany, calling for the transfer of six radar sites to the German Armed Forces. The German Federal Minister of Defense signed the document at Bonn, Germany, two days earlier.
10 September 59
(U) USAFE turned the Tuerkheim radar site over to the German Air Force. The Germans removed it from the active air defense net turning it into a training school.
4 November 59
(U) Regensburg became the second site turned over to the fGermans. However, operational control was not given until 1 November 1960 after German controllers passed a tactical evaluation there.
13 April 60
(U) Air Force officials at the Pentagon approved expansion of the 412L project to include six sites instead of three.
4 January 61
(U) The German Air Force took over manual radar operations at Freising.


6 July 61
(U) A major agenda item at the USAF Weapons Board meeting was the possible deployment of two mobile GPA-73 units in Germany.
7 September 61
(U) The USAF Weapons Board approved one mobile CPA-73 for deployment at Erbeskopf.
30 October 61
(U) Facility construction of earth-covered igloos completed at Kindsbach.
8 December 61
(U) The USAFE Facilities Review Board approved emergency funds for interim power requirements at Doebraberg, Wasserkuppe, and Giebelstadt.
12 December 61
(U) The chief of the German Construction Agency announced that because of excessive delays, no more design changes would be allowed at the Boerfink bunker.
10 February 62
(U) Installation of mobile CPA-73 started atop Erbeskopf mountain.
1 March 62
(U) Construction at Wasserkuppe completed.
12 March 62
(U) An agreement between the Electronics Systems Division and USAFE established the 412L European Task Organization as the primary point of contact for 412L construction and installation.
1 June 62
(U) Construction at the Freising bunker was completed.
1 July 62
(U) Doebraberg construction was completed..


31 August 62
(U) With construction at Boerfink and Giebelstadt done, all 412L building projects were finished.
1 September 63
(U) The 412L Site Activation Task Force was activated at Wiesbaden Air Base to coordinate the 412L testing program.
6 November 63
(U) USAFE and the Electronics Systems Division of AFSC signed a 412L system turnover agreement.
15 March 64
(U) Following system turnover readiness testing, ESD turned five 412L radar stations over to USAFE (Boerfink, Wasserkuppe, Doebraberg, Giebelstadt, and Kindsbach).
15 April 64
(U) USAFE received Freising from ESD.
4 January 65
(U) The 412L system assumed control aspects of the 4 ATAF air defense mission. The manual system remained operational as a back-up for the next two months.
4 March 65
U) American manual sites at Giebelstadt, Freising, Doebraberg, Langerkopf, Schoenfeld, and Wasserkuppe ceased operations after the 412L proved reliable.


15 December 65
(U) The German Air Force assumed control of Freieing 412L operations. The 604th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was inactivated.
1 September 68
(U) The German Air Force opened the Lauda bunker as a 412L reporting post.
1 December 68
(U) The operation at Lauda was upqraded to control and reporting post. Accordingly, U.S. radar operations at nearby Giebelstadt ceased and the 602d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was inactivated.
5 October 72
(U) After a long delay, the German Air Force agreed to take over Doebraberg by 31 December 1974 and Wasserkuppe at an unspecified later date.
9 October 73
(U) A joint German/American agreement went into effect to establish the 412L Steering Committee and the Joint Direction Staff.
1 July 74
(U) 412L operations at Doebraberg were turned over to the German Air Force. The 606th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was inactivated..


1 October 74
(U) The Joint System Management Group was activated at Birkenfeld to manage day-to-day operations of the 412L system. Group manning consisted of 40 percent American and 60 percent German. Detachment 1, 601st Tactical Control Group, was activated to provide manpower slots.
1 October 74
(U) Philco Worldwide Services started contract maintenance at Wasserkuppe on a test basis.
1 May 75
(U) The Sacramento Air Logistics Center turned over the program depot maintenance program to Philco Worldwide Services.
May 75
(U) Gen John W. Vogt, Jr., CINCUSAFE, identified the interoperability of fixed and mobile radar elements as a key objective for Allied forces in Europe. Thus, project Salty Net was set in motion.
1 July 75
(U) USAFE, with 4 ATAF approval, downgraded operations at Wasserkuppe from a control and reporting post to reporting post.
2 July 75
(U) The 615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron temporarily stopped 412L operations at Boerfink during the Constant Keystone modification.
18 July 75
(U) The 615th AC&WS began manual control and reporting post operations at Erbeskopf. This would continue for the duration of Constant Keystone.


1 October 75
(U) Philco Worldwide Services received its third 412L maintenance contract adding the consolidated intermediate maintenance facility at Sembach Air Base.
20 October 75
(U) Air Force Systems Command published a plan identifying essential elements and milestones for Salty Net.
October 76
(U) Three separate Salty Net tests involving mobile and fixed radar units took place. IBM 4 Pi-CP2 computers (Salty Net Buffers) were used to provide interface.
29 January 77
(U) Salty Net Buffers at four mobile control and reporting posts
were declared operationally ready.
10 June 77
(U) NATO accepted the completed Constant Keystone project.
September 77
(U) The 615th AC&WS resumed master control and reporting post operations (with one-third the space) in the Boerfink Bunker.
1 October 77
(U) All U.S. 412L maintenance responsibilities were combined into the 412L Omnibus Maintenance Contract and awarded to Aeronutronics Services Corporation (new name for Philco Worldwide Services).
June 78
(U) The Salty Net project progressed with the interface of the airborne warning and control system through message processing centers.
13 August 78
(U) A technical radar evaluation at Wasserkuppe was terminated because of ineffective maintenance and management procedures.


18 August 78
(U) The 412L maintenance contract monitor at Wasserkuppe was removed from his position due to maintenance problems there.
22 August 78
(U) The 412L contract manager at the 601st TCW issued a "cure notice" for Aeronutronics Services Corporation to improve its performance at Wasserkuppe.
18 September 78
(U) The 609th Tactical Control Squadron (a 407L mobile radar unit) started a two-month test for conducting all Salty Net interface objectives within message processing centers.
21 September 78
(U) Aeronutronics Services Corporation met all specifications of the "cure notice" issued a month earlier (except where parts were not available).
1 January 79
(U) 412L reporting post operations at Wasserkuppe were turned over to the German Air Force. The 616th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was inactivated.
15 June 79
(U) The 412L contract manager plus members of the USAFE contracting office met with the Aeronutronics Services Corporation director of operations to discuss dissatisfaction over maintenance practices at Boerfink. Specific improvements were requested in management and training programs.
1 October 79
(U) The 601st Tactical Control Wing declared message processing centers operationally ready.
1 September 80
(U) NATO temporarily closed fixed radar operations at Boerfink for transition from 412L to German Air Defense Ground Environment.




(Large file - 440 KB)
(Additional Figure: 412L SYSTEM DATA FLOW, 412L Student Manual)

(Large file - 323 KB)

(Figure I & III: MAPS)

US Radar Sites - pre-412L
(Page 4)

412L Radar Sites
(Page 10)


(Narrative - THE EARLY DAYS (pp 1-3)

The Pre-412L Era
  (U) After 1953, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) developed its nuclear force, the most dangerous threat to western Europe in the event of war was a surprise nuclear attack either directly from the Soviet Union or one of its satellite nations. This was particularly true for West Germany; it was located so close to the threat that a few minutes could mean the difference between survival and total destruction. Military leaders at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) -- the military arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -- believed that such an attack, if successful, could make western Europe untenable as a base for military operations. They also felt that protection of the counter atomic force was a prerequisite to the success of Allied war strategy. 1

(U) Before the Soviet nuclear threat existed, NATO military leaders accepted political arguments in favor of maintaining air defense forces on national levels for reasons of national sovereignty. But, the nuclear threat gave cause for these leaders to voice their views and push for the joining of air defense forces as a single body under NATO control. Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, the Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) commander between 1953 and 1956, put it clearly. He wrote, "The sum of individual national air defense contributions, operating on their own, could not compare with what might be achieved by welding them into a single coordinated system." The fundamental concepts for such a structure were set forth in Military Committee (MC) 54, a SHAPE planning document which the NATO Standing Group approved in the spring of 1956.+ The main objective of MC 54 was SHAPE's gradual assumption of Europe's air defense role on an evolutionary basis. 2

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Primary functions of reporting posts included radar surveillance and the acquisition of early warning information which aircraft controllers transmitted directly to their respective CRCs via telephone. Control and reporting posts did these same jobs plus an added aircraft control mission using radar intelligence and ground-to-air radios. Control and reporting centers performed these identical tasks and that of identifying targets, committing air defense, and supervising their respective CRPs and reporting posts. Also, centers had authority to scramble interceptor aircraft on identification missions. In turn, CRCs reported to the overall airspace managers at the Kindsbach aircraft control center. 5

1. Rpt (U), AAFCE Commander (1953-56), Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, "Mission Completed," (London, 1957), pp 326-27.

2. Ibid.

5. Hist (C/REVW 31 Dec 78), 501st Tactical Control Wing, Jul-Dec 58; info used is (U).

+ (U) After a drawn out, nation-by-nation approval process, NATO assumed this function in 1961.
pp 1 - 3

(Narrative - INTRODUCTION OF THE 412L IN EUROPE (pp 5-35)

The Planning Stages
  (U) This time-consuming manual network remained in use as the primary early warning and aircraft control system for southern Germany through 3 January 1965 while USAFE and the German Air Force (GAF) phased in the 412L semi-automatic radar system. The 412L equipment in a typical control and reporting center consisted of complex data processing computers, display consoles, and communications equipment. The primary elements included GPA-73 consoles (27/28 series) for surveillance and identification. Signals from these consoles flowed into...

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

... an FSA-12 detector/tracker which converted raw radar returns into digital data which was then stored in the FSA-21 computer until needed for intercept computations. In this case, data proceeded to FSA-21 consoles (60 series) where controllers guided friendly interceptors against the intruding aircraft. Army controllers also operated FSA-21 scopes (63 series) as part of missile control activity at selected 412L stations. Both the FSA-12 detector/tracker and the FSA-21 computer fed inputs into a site-to-site data link for instantaneous transmissions to and from other 412L, locations. + Additionally, the 412L system included an FSA-23 jammer tracking module (with associated console) for detecting and tracking aircraft despite the presence of electronic counter measures (ECM). For communications with other sites, air bases, missile sites, aircraft, and command elements: the semi-automatic system contained an electronic switching center (ESC) telephone network. (The diagram graphically depicts the outlay of 412L equipment.) Also, though not specifically included in the 412L equipment inventory, search and height finding radars were an integral part of fixed radar operations. 7

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S
7. Intvw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601st TCW/412L Maintenance Contract Monitor, 20 Nov 80; Diagram (U), General Electric Company, "Data Flow, Typical AWCS Control and Reporting Center," c. 1964..

+ (U) System improvements in the late 1970s enabled the 412L sites to exchange signals with other types of radar systems within NATO channels. This topic is discussed more fully beginning on page 49.
pp 5 - 8

412L Becomes a Reality
D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Through June 1962, the primary point of contact
for solving 412L problems was the USAFE 412L Working Group which included representatives from USAFE staff agencies, Seventeenth Air Force, the 86th Air Division (Defense), NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF),+ the GEEIA, and the 412L European Task Organization (ETO). The ETO was formed in September 1961 after the Seventeenth Air Force project officer suggested that the USAFE 412L Working Group was incapable of managing the system phase-in unless it became a full-time job. The Electronics Systems Division commander, Brig Gen Otto J. Glasser, subsequently recommended the formation of the 412L ETO to coordinate installation and implementation of the new radar system. After studying this proposal, the USAF weapons board approved it. 12

(U) Officials from USAFE, Seventeenth Air Force, the Electronics Systems Division, Air Force Logistics Command, and GEEIA comprised the 412L European Task organization. This organization participated in the 412L Working Group until mid-1962 when it became the primary contact point for 412L problems. The ETO had four specific tasks as outlined in a 12 March 1962 memorandum of agreement with USAFE: 13

-- coordinate the installation of GPA-73 and allied equipment, and integrate it with radars provided by USAFE and the GAF.

-- insure the meeting of operational dates as specified in USAFE Operations Plan 131-61 (Red Ruby).

-- determine that 412L equipment met operational requirements as established by USAFE.

-- operate as an integrated organization for installing and checking out the equipment.

In the meantime, USAFE ensured the fulfillment of USAFE-GAF agreements pertaining to construction completion dates, and made decisions and provided guidance on policy matters which affected 412L system capabilities.+++

12. Ltr (S/REVW 19 Jun 81), 17AF/412L Project Officer to 17AF/Comm Ops, "Status of 412L (1 June-13 June 1961)," 19 June 61, info used is (U); Minutes (U), USAFE 412L Working Group, "Minutes of AWCS 412L Working Group Meeting of 5 June 62," 15 Jun 62.

13. Ltr (U), USAFE/Ops to 86th Air Division (Def), et. al., "Memorandum of Understanding Between ESD and HQ USAFE," 12 Mar 62..

+ (U) This NATO command was responsible for air defense activity in southern Germany.
pp 9 - 13

Boerfink Bunker - Cutaway View
(Page 14)

Construction Difficulties
D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

+ (U) During stateside testing, Air Force engineers found 412L components too fragile for mobility purposes. However, with certyain modifications it was acceptable for fixed radar operations. The Tactical Air Command subsequently rejected the GPA-73 as part of its mobility forces. This left USAFE with the only operational 412L equipment worldwide.
pp 13 - 19

Testing the System
  (U) The first of these tests involved an electronic checkout which ESD engineers performed on both single-site and multiple-site basis. This test was designed to align the system and verify whether or not it could electronically perform its intended functions. The second set of tests, called computer program design verification, were given to ascertain if the computer programs were adequate for the European theater. Finally, system turnover readiness tests (STRT) constituted a group of dynamic situations that determined if the 412L was capable of performing its operational mission. 25

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) The affect construction and testing slippages had on USAFE and its subordinate units were noteworthy, Personnel trained specifically on 412L equipment began arriving in Germany during late 1962 but had no place to work. These assignments resulted from the first set of scheduling revisions (during the construction phase) which later proved optimistic. As a result, the 86th Air Division (Defense) declared them as "temporary surplus" and trained many of them to work with existing manual radar equipment. Others were offered for temporary duty at other USAFE bases. The command wanted to retain them in Germany for immediate reassignment to....

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

... 412L stations once operational. Another problem related to this involved the extension of manual operations at an extensive cost in manpower and money. This was absolutely essential since it remained the only aircraft control and early warning medium for southern Germany. Officials at the Air Force Systems Command estimated a budget override of $14-15 million to complete the program. 27

(U) As a result, USAFE and the Electronics Systems Division took energetic measures to keep the 412L project on its revised schedule once testing began. First, they limited air exercises to permit accelerated system testing. Next, USAFE programming guides were updated with strong emphasis given to a newly established 412L System Acceptance Task Force (SATAF). Finally, to clip soaring contractor costs, USAFE officials agreed to accept the five-site network at the completion of system turnover readiness tests provided there were no "major" problems. In addition, a more optimistic date for operational readiness was moved up to 15 August 1964. 28

(U) On 2 July 1963, General Glasser visited USAFE from his headquarters at Hanscom Field, Massachusetts, to meet with USAFE officials for the specific purpose of setting a 412L testing schedule that could be met. According to the ESD commander this trip contributed as a major turning point of the program. Both sides agreed to accelerate system testing primarily by reducing operational exercises and by eliminating some scheduled maintenance which tended to pre-empt radar equipment from the 412L testing program.+ On 15 July 1963, Lt Gen R.M. Montgomery, Vice CINCUSAFE, advised General Glasser that USAFE would make every effort to meet ESD's objectives concerning the limitation of exercises and that he would make the same request of 4 ATAF. General Montgomery also pledged to keep radar overhauls to an absolute minimum. Finally, GE technicians would be pressured to increase maintenance efforts on the 412L equipment. 29

(U) In return, General Montgomery asked General Glasser to minimize test schedule changes since it took 48 hours advance notice to task aircraft sorties for testing the 412L. The Vice CINCUSAFE also expressed concern over the pending system turnover readiness tests which would begin in December 1963. With regard to this vital phase, the general stated, "It appears that in spite of our objections, AFSC agencies continue to water down this phase of testing until we are no longer certain that the tests will indicate the system's ability to perform the required operational mission." He requested General Glasser's assurance that the 412L would perform as designed when turned over to USAFE. 30

(U) Headquarters USAFE left the July-September 1963
period virtually free from scheduled exercises deferring numerous air operations to allow a long test period virtually free of interruption. However, on 29 August, Lt Gen C.E. McCarty, USAFE Chief of Staff, who was in charge of coordinating 412L business, advised the commander of Detachment 9, Electronics Systems Division, that USAFE could not continue to defer exercises while operational forces in the manual system needed training to remain proficient. He noted that exercise Lion Vert would take precedence over 412L testing for three days in September. In the second half of 1963 USAFE scheduled 990 aircraft sorties for the required tests with just 407 actually flown. Only 22 of the scheduled flights were aborted while General Electric's engineers requested cancellation of the others due to equipment malfunctions. 31

25. Ltr (U), AFSC/ESD, 412L Program Director to Maj Gen C.E. McCarty, USAFE Chief of Staff, "Memorandum of Agreement for Turnover of 412L AWCS From AFSC to USAFE," 11 Sep 63.

26.Rpt (S/NF/REVW 31 Mar 83), Hq USAFE/DCS Ops, Plans and Programs, "USAFE Programming Plans Progress Report," 31 Mar 63, info used is (S/REVW 31 Mar 83).

27. Ibid., info used is (U); Ltr (U), USAFE/Ops to USAFE/Chief of Staff, et.al., "Current Status of 412L Program," 5 Mar 63.

28. See note above, info used is (U); Ltr (S/REVW 30 Sept 83), Gen Disosway (CINCUSAFE) to Lt Gen Gerrity (USAF Dep Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics), "412L Turnover Agreement," 30 Sep 63, info used is (U).

29. Memo (U), USAFE/DCS Ops, Dir Ops & Tng, Air Def Div to ViceCINCUSAFE, "412L Program for USAFE," 12 Jul 63; Ltr (U), ViceCINCUSAFE (Lt Gen Montgomery) to ESD Cmdr (Brig Gen Glassner), "412L Program for USAFE," 15 Jul 63.

30. See note above.

31. Ltr (U), USAFE/Chief of Staff to ESD Det 9, "Operational Exercises," 29 Aug 63; Memo (U), USAFE/DCS Ops, Dir Ops & Tng, Air Def Div to ViceCINCUSAFE, "412L Program for USAFE," 12 Jul 63.

+ (U) The manual and semi-automatic systems utilized the same radar equipment. Accordingly, when maintenance crews worked on this equipment, the 412L equipment could not be used except via site-to-site data links. However, most tests at this stage only involved individual radar sites.
pp 20 - 24

412L Site Activation Task Force
  (U) One of the most significant results of General Glasser's July visit was the agreement to form the 412L SATAF. This group had the authority and responsibility to coordinate efforts of all participating agencies to ensure timely completion of program objectives. On 16 August 1963 General Gabriel P. Disosway, CINCUSAFE, informed General Glasser; Lt Gen T.P. Gerrity, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics; and Lt Gen H.M.Estes, Jr., AFSC Vice Commander, that he supported the intent and purpose of this new management team. Three days later CINCUSAFE informed General Estes that in spite of an Inspector General report which raised doubts of the 412L to perform its mission, "...we must press on with all possible speed to bring the system to an OR [operationally ready] state." To accomplish this objective, General Disosway designated General McCarty to "ramrod" 412L activity in USAFE. He also authorized the 412L SATAF commander free access to his deputies and chief of staff. With USAFE support in hand ESD officially established the 412L Site Activation Task Force at Wiesbaden Air Base on 1 September 1963. General Glasser assigned Col J.J. Dishuck to head the new function. On 1 September SATAF activated the Dynamic Action Management Operations (DYNAMO) office to provide a means of accelerating problem solutions. DYNAMO personnel focused on specific road blocks that normally delayed progress when standard administrative procedures and command channels were used. This office also recorded 412L programming milestones. 32

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Mounting 412L costs threatened a funding overrun
of the entire program. The 412L SATAF informed General Gerrity during his November 1963 visit to Germany that GE had established a completion cost estimate that ran $9.5 million over the 1964 and 1965 412L budget of $12.5million. The addition of the Berlin reporting post and the Giebelstadt overhead facility accounted for some of the excesses. But General Electric also had an estimated 669 employees working on the project in August 1963; the contractor felt this number of people was necessary to make the 412L operational at the earliest possible date. With CINCUSAFE support, General Gerrity advocated on 6 December 1963 that USAFE place military personnel into the acceptance and checkout program as quickly as possible. This would permit earlier phase-out of GE workers, reduce costs, and enhance the transition to a military operation. Furthermore, the 412L system program officer suggested the advancement of ESD's date for the full eight-site turnover from 15 October to 15 August 1964 by combining Freising and Messtetten into the same STRT phase. 36

(U) These ideas were incorporated into a 412L program change dated 20 December 1963 and approved by Headquarters USAF in early 1964. The cost overrun was thus reduced by $5 million. Another $1.2 million savings resulted from GE's reduced equipment modification estimate. Overall, these total actions reduced General Electric's expected cost excesses to $3.3 million compared to the original $9.5 million approximation. 37

32. Ltr (U), ESD Cmdr (Brig Gen Glasser) to ViceCINCUSAFE, "412L Program," 31 Jul 63; Msg (U), CINCUSAFE (Gen Disosway) to ESD Cmdr, et.al., [412L Site Activation Task Force,] CINC 282, 16 Aug 63.

36. Ltr (U), ViceCINCUSAFE (Lt Gen Montgomery) to Gen Gerritty, [GE Personnel in Germany], 26 Aug 63; Ltr (U), Gen Gerritty to Lt Gen Montgomery, [GE Personnel in Germany], 4 Sep 63; Memo (U), Lt Gen Montomery to USAFE/DCS Ops, [412L System Costs], 20 Nov 63..

37. Hist (S/REVW 31 Dec 83), HQ USAFE/DCS Ops, Dir Ops & Tng, Air Def Div, Jul-Dec 63, info used is (U).
pp 24 - 28

System Turnover Readiness Tests
  (U) When 1963 ended, USAFE was still bound to take over the 412L upon ESD's completion of system turnover readiness tests. Nonetheless, General Disosway expressed certain doubts as to the system's potential reliability.With such apprehension he ordered the manual radars to remain on line for as long as it took the semi-automatic sites to prove reliable. As already noted, the STRTs were designed to confirm technical system capabilities when conducted under conditions closely simulating an operational environment. Plans called for the first five sites to undergo testing simultaneously for turnover on 15 March 1964. USAFE accepted the sites on this date, but the simulation of an operational environment was not achieved. In fact, few of the tests were completed succesfully. These items were placed on waiver status for post-turnover clearance. The sites at Kindsbach, Boerfink,Wasserkuppe, Giebelstadt, and Doebraberg were turned over on 15 March 1964; and Freising on 15 April 1964. 38

(U) The Electronics Systems Division assured USAFE that the system turnover readiness tests proved the 412L as technically operable assuming that operations and maintenance personnel did their jobs correctly. This was especially important since testing of the equipment in the United States had never been completed due to money and time limitations. Limited stateside tests also showed a definite lack of system performance. These facts made the STRT even more important in proving 412L reliability. USAFE officials adopted a wait-and-see attitude. 39

(U) The USAFE staff worked with the 412L SATAF to
provide a comprehensive test schedule which AFSC brokedown into technical and operational phases. In yet another effort to reduce spending, operational tests were eliminated leaving just eight technical tests to prove reliability. Later, the 412L SATAF eliminated two of the tests which pertained to aircraft crossing each other's path, and low-altitude tracking through radar clutter. The SATAF contended that these capabilities would be demonstrated during other tests. The tests that did occur were conducted in a closely controlled, near-laboratory environment. They were done with a minimum load of 12 targets during tracking tests, and six targets with 10 interceptor aircraft during the interceptor tests. However, the majority of interceptor aircraft were simulated as self-generated sorties within the computer. Tracking evaluations consisted of straight-line flight paths withone 90 degree turn, one 60 degree turn, and one 45 degree turn. Some targets also flew triangular "emergency" patterns and eliptical "hold" patterns. During intercepts all targets flew on a straight line with constant velocity and altitude except one which descended from high to low altitude. This latter target was never intercepted. Electronic counter-measure testing was performed with one aircraft repeating the tests a number of times. Results progressively improved throughout the test period with some intercepts totally successful including the return-to-base phase. Of importance, one successful run occurred after the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio in the aircraft failed. The entire mission was accomplished by time division data link (TDDL) control only. Such tests provided both operators and maintenance personnel with valuable training experience. 40

(U) As a result of these tests, USAFE officials believed that adequate performance of the weapons control program using two different computer programs was repeatable. Interceptor correlation by automatic IFF/SIF (identification friend or foe/selective identification feature) procedures also improved. The surface-to-air missile checks were also satisfactory communications interruptions between the weapons assignment officer and the fire unit being the main problem. One component, proved to be completely useless and beyond maintenance, was a large geographic data display. With intensive attention by GE's experts, the display only worked in a satisfactory manner over short spurts. However, during testing periods the equipment malfunctioned too often making it virtually useless. Officials at AFSC agreed that the display was inadequate and decided not to turn it over to USAFE when the other testing was completed. Many people felt this display was a bonus item and that its removal would not hamper air defense operations. 41

(U) Tracking was one of the main difficulties during system turnover readiness tests. Though tracking stability improved, controllers experienced variations in aircraft velocity from 50 knots to 3,000 knots and heading vectors off up to 60 degrees. These discrepancies all occurred on straight-line, constant velocity flights. Sometimes, track dots on the scopes jumped to other positions for no apparent reason. Since this occurred on both targets and interceptors, intercept points provided from the FSA-21 computer often varied radically. Almost constant manual override was needed on the majority of the tracks imposing a great workload on surveillance personnel. 42

(U) Also, the emergency SIF false alarm rate was
high at eight per hour versus the desired zero. This meant the 412L would be subject to false emergency "squawks" at the rate of one every seven or eight minutes. Each situation could be verified manually, but the rate was still not satisfactory since it precluded adequate attention to valid emergencies. 43

Obviously, there were many problems which had to be worked out before the 412L could replace the manual radars. Although turned over to USAFE, the system did not possess a total operational capability by mid-1964. Many of the problems were solved during day-to-day operations; but some self-imposed and NATO live exercises were also testing grounds. General Electric personnel corrected most problems at the first six sites while the Electronics System Division continued testing at Messtetten. Final elements of the 412L Aircraft Weapons and Control System were turned over to USAFE on 10 August 1964 -- five days ahead of the revised schedule. After turnover, USAFE Programming Plan 561-64 implemented an operational evaluation and training program to form the 412L sites into a fully operational system. This program revealed additional shortcomings, but most of them were minor in nature and correctable with engineering assistance furnished by the ESD 412L field office. 44

(U) Although some 125 deficiencies in the system
still existed in December 1964, USAFE officials felt they were minor in nature and would not hinder the air defense operation. Therefore, General Disosway established 4 January 1965 as the date the 412L Aircraft Warning and Control System would assume the air defense mission for the 4 ATAF region in southern Germany. As prescribed, the manual system remained on line as a back-up until 4 March 1965. During this 60-day period, the staffs at the 86th Air Division (Defense), Seventeenth Air Force, and United States Air Forces in Europe were satisfied with the performance of the semi-automatic radars. As a result, manual operations at Hof, Pruem (Schoenfeld), Langerkopf, Freising, Wasserkuppe, and Giebelstadt were discontinued.+ The sites which had both manual and semi-automatic systems simply phased out the older equipment. However, USAFE terminated operations at Pruem and Langerkopf turning those sites over to USAREUR. The following chart depicts the organizational alignment of the USAFE controlled radar stations as of 4 January 1965:

602nd AC&WS++
  CRP   Giebelstadt  
604th AC&WS
  CRC/MCC   Freising  
606th AC&WS
  RP   Doebraberg  
615th AC&WS
  CRC/MCC/SOC   Boerfink  
616th AC&WS
  CRP   Wasserkuppe  

38. Ltr (U), CINCUSAFE (Gen Disosway) to USAF/DCS Systems & Logistics, "412L Program," 24 Mar 64, w/1 Atch, 412 Testing Briefing.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ltr (U), CINCUSAFE (Gen Disosway) to USAF/DCS Systems & Logistics, "412L Program," 24 Mar 64, w/1 Atch, 412 Testing Briefing.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

+ (U) On 29 October 1964, the 601st Tactical Control Group was activated. The mobile radar units of this group later served as back-ups to the fixed sites.

++ (U) Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.
pp 28 - 32

The Berlin Connection
  (U) An interesting sidelight on the development of the 412L within Europe involved radar operations in the isolated city of Berlin. Each of the four major Allied powers (United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) occupied a portion of Germany and its capital city following World War II. The situation in Berlin soon irritated the Soviets because the city was located in the heart of their zone. In an effort to reunite Berlin through submission, the Soviets imposed a blockade in 1948 that closed off all land access routes into Berlin. The United States and Great Britain responded with a constant flow of aircraft into the city to deliver food, coal, and other necessities until Russia removed its blockade in mid-1949. Radar stations in both West Germany and Berlin helped insure that aircraft remained on course within Berlin's air access corridors. 46

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

46. Monograph (U), USAFE/Hist Office, "Historical Highlights: United States Air Forces in Europe, 1945-1979," 20 Nov 80.
pp 33 - 36


The Manual Sites
  (U) There have been several references of shared responsibilities between German and American air forces regarding the construction of 412L facilities. Until 1959 USAFE owned and operated all nine manual radar sites in southern Germany. But in mid-1959, at about the same time that initial 412L programming plans were completed, the CINCUSAFE and Germany's Federal Ministry of Defense (FMOD) finalized an agreement calling for the transfer of six manual sites to the German Bundeswehr (Armed Forces). Both sides negotiated in the light of SHAPE planning document 54/1, an amendment to the original NATO air defense policy directive. The amendment stated, in part, that early warning radars should be a host-nation responsibility. The agreement specified that Tuerkheim would be turned over within 45 days of the document signing and Regensburq 45 days later.+ The transfer of the remaining sites at Hof (later Doebraberg), Wasserkuppe, Freising, and Giebelstadt pended further negotiation. The overriding factor influencing subsequent transfers was the training of German controllers since there was to be no loss in air defense capability. The German Minister of Defense (MOD), Franz Josef Strauss, signed the document at Bonn on 19 July 1959, and CINCUSAFE, General Frank F. Everest, followed suit at Wiesbaden Air Base two days later. It would be almost 20 frustrating years later, on 1 January 1979, when the German Air Force took over Wasserkuppe to complete the accord. 53

(U) Headquarters USAFE intended to transfer the radar stations in two phases. The first period involved the two sites specifically stated in the contract. The command fulfilled this commitment by turning over Tuerkheim on 10 September 1959 and Regensburg on 4 November 1959. However, USAFE retained operational control of the stations until the Germans demonstrated a capability to fully operate them. Accordingly, USAFE kept some 65 personnel at Tuerkheim to assist German controllers and maintenance personnel in establishing an effective instructor cadre. The site was removed from the active air defense net, but remained on call as a backup while serving as the formal training school for German controllers. Regensburg remained active with both USAF and GAF controllers through most of 1960. In September USAFE administered a tactical evaluation of the German controllers. They passed and operational control was given to the GAF on 1 November 1960. Still, eight American advisors remained there providing technical aid and advice to newly trained controllers and maintenance personnel. 54

(U) Although the transfer agreement left out specific
turnover dates for the remaining stations, USAFE had hoped to transfer them at the earliest possible date. The German Air Force left little hope for the fulfillment of this objective when it proposed in December 1959 to stretch it out through 1965. This was based on a high percentage of one-year German Air Force conscripts that made it difficult to maintain a sufficient number of trained personnel to operate the radar stations. Headquarters USAFE later worked out a verbal understanding with the Germans to transfer Freising and Hof in 1960, and Wasserkuppe and Giebelstadt the following year. However, the GAF later made a formal request to the USAF Chief of Staff that it take over Freising only at the end of 1960 ant to postpone the others until 1964. On 13 April 1960, GAF and USAFE officials met to clarify their positions. Basically, the Germans reemphasized their expected shortages in trained personnel. But USAFE representatives pointed out that 412L construction projects at Giebelstadt, Doebraberg (Hof), and Wasserkuppe had already been cancelled based on the earlier verbal agreement and that the deferment would now impact 412L progress. 55

53. Memorandum of Agreement (U), CINCUSAFE with German Federal Minister of Defense, "Arrangement for Transfer of Certain Radar Stations to the German Bundeswehr," effective 21 July 59; Hist (S), 601st TCW, Oct-Dec 78, info used is (U).

54. Rpts (S/NF/REVW 31 Dec 80), Hq USAFE/DCS Ops, Plans and Programs, "USAFE Programming Plans Progress Report," Sep 59 - Dec 60, info used is (U).

55. Ibid., info used is (U).

+ (U) Refer to the map on Page 5 for the locations of the nine manaula radar sites.
pp 36 - 38

  (U) Subsequent meetings over the next three months resulted in a German Air Force commitment to receive Freising at the end of 1960. In addition, the GAF would assume all operations and maintenance funding for the other three sites beyond 1962. The two air forces also established a joint working group to resolve problems involving future transfers. The group held its first meeting in Bonn on 3 June 1960 at which time the Freising transfer occupied most of the agenda. Conferees also determined that USAFE would again fund 412L construction projects at Giebelstadt, Hof, and Wasserkuppe in view of GAF plans to build a $25 million bunker for the CRC at Messtetten. 56

(U) Following this meeting the GAF started gradual assignment of personnel into Freising's manual operation. By December 1960 enough controllers had arrived for USAFE to conduct a tactical evaluation. After successfully completing this inspection, the German Air Force took over the site with complete tactical control on 4 January 1961. NATO's 4 ATAF retained operational control. This was the first turnover of a site that would eventually have 412L operations. But this site takeover only applied to the manual equipment. A second transfer involving the Freising 412L operation took place in 1965. 57

(U) In the years following the first transfer of Freising, it became apparent the USAFE and GAF officials viewed the 1959 transfer agreement differently. The Germans felt it applied only to manual sites, while USAFE contended that it applied to all sites; USAFE expected the GAF to takeover the complete 412L system (except Berlin) at the earliest possible date. During 1962 and 1963 the German Air Force was content with training sufficient controllers to operate the Messtetten CRC in its entirety and Freising as a joint operation. Due to space limitations and language differences at 412L schools in the United States, very few GAF personnel attended them. Thus the training process was not only slow but depended totally on USAFE augmentation at Freising during the first year of its operation. Considerable progress was made throughout 1965 until the GAF finally assumed control of the Freising CRC on 15 December 1965. 58

(U) According to the 1959 transfer agreement and subsequent amendments to it, the German Air Force had an option to purchase USAFE-owned equipment at each of the transferred sites. For unknown reasons the GAF chose to buy radar and communications equipment at Freising but not the GPA-73. As a result USAFE was left responsible for custodial and supply support on this equipment. The American command set up an operational location that first operated under the 86th Air Division (Defense) and, after 1968, the 601st Tactical Control Wing. This set a precedent which was followed for the next two transferred sites. 59

56. Ibid., info used is (U); Ltr (C/REVW 16 Nov 80), USAFE/DCS Ops, Dir Ops & Tng, Air Def Div to CINCUSAFE (Gen Smith), "(U) Transfer of Freising to German Air Force," 18 Nov 60, info used is (U).

57. See note above, info used is (U); Plan (U), USAFE/Ops, Plans and Programs, "USAFE Programming Plan 568-65, 412L Site - Freising," 8 Dec 65.

58. Hist (S/REVW 31 Dec 82), 17AF/DCS Ops, Dir Def Ops, Jul-Dec 62, info used is (U); Minutes (U), 86th AD (Def) -- 1st AD (German AF), "AC&W Working Group Meeting No. 9," 23 Aug 62.

59. Intvw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601st TCW/412L Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.
pp 38 - 40

Lauda-Loeffelstelzen (Giebelstadt)
  D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) The Germans opened the Lauda bunker as a reporting post on 1 September 1968. Over the next seven months, responsibilities there increased until Lauda assumed full control and reporting center operations. When it advanced to control and reporting status on 1 December 1968, the 602nd Aircraft Control and Reporting Squadron was discontinued at Giebelstadt. 62

(U) In conjunction with this move 4 ATAF also wanted to move the Giebelstadt overhead facility which had since been renamed the System Program Analysis Test Site (SPATS). Through 1967 it was planned to move SPATS into the new Lauda bunker. But this facility was only two-thirds the size of Boerfink. On 27 January 1968, limited space plus air conditioning problems at Lauda prompted an FMOD request to move SPATS to Boerfink. Approving this move, 4 ATAF subsequently transferred the Sector Operations Center to Kindsbach where it remained through 1980. 63

62.Rpt (U), Germany's Federal Ministry of Defense to CINCUSAFE, et.al., "CRC Lauda," 11 Sep 68; Rpt (U), USAF Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, "USAF Unit Lineage and Honors," [602nd Tac Con Sq], 7 Nov 73.

63. Msg (U), USAFE to 86th Air Div/Ops, "Lauda 412L," 270925Z Jan 68.
pp 40 - 42

Doebraberg and Wasserkuppe
  (U) For seven years following 1967 both Germany and the United States continued to operate three fixed radar facilities in southern Germany. All other air defense radars throughout NATO, including those in northern Germany, were strictly a host nation responsibility. Until 1972 the United States continued to accept the German Air Force logic of personnel shortages for not taking over the remaining sites. But in that year USAFE officials began to take a harder look at the situation and came to realize the Germans possessed sufficient personnel with experience and skills to operate the entire system. Accordingly the German Air Force offered to take over just one more site -- Boerfink -- by December 1974. This proposal was made in the context that Germany be relieved of taking over the other two sites. 64

(U) On 4 October 1972, a newly appointed Minister of Defense, Georg Leber, met with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in the United States. One of the topics covered during this courtesy visit was U.S. dissatisfaction over delays in transfering 412L stations to the GAF. Prior to this meeting, the United States Commander-in-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) suggested that Secretary Laird propose the German takeover of both Wasserkuppe and Doebraberg by December 1974 and leave Boerfink operations under USAFE. This was most advantageous to the United States because Doebraberg and Wasserkuppe were remote sites on the East German border causing unique support and morale problems. Furthermore, Boerfink was the master control and reporting center (MCRC) in southern Germany and supervised the rest of the 412L system. As such the United States had to retain a certain number of personnel there to make peacetime decisions that agreements between the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain prohibited Germany from making. Fo rinstance, German air weapons controllers could not commit a weapon (aircraft or otherwise) to fire against an airspace intruder before a certain phase of war was reached. Also, they could not order the scramble of nuclear-armed aircraft or missiles. 65

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) On 5 October 1972, the Germans shifted position after a meeting between the USAFE deputy chief of staff for operations (Brig Gen W.L. Creech) and two German generals (Heinz and Monreal) in Bonn. The GAF now agreed to assume full responsibility for Doebraberg "as rapidly as possible" but no later than 31 December 1974. In addition, the Germans would accept Wasserkuppe at an unspecified later date. When USAFE officials looked at the situation strictly from the German viewpoint, they saw there was little incentive to speed up the process. Indeed, Germany reaped full benefit of American facilities at United States' expense. 67

(U) The German Air Force accepted Doebraberg on 1 July 1974 after a six-month phase-in period. The 606th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron inactivated on this date. However, the Germans again refused to purchase GPA-73 equipment so the 601st Tactical Control Wing had to establish a three-person operating location there to provide liaison, supply support, and equipment custodialship. 68

(U) The situation was somewhat different at Wasserkuppe as the Germans remained reluctant to take over its operation. In early 1975 USAFE announced plans to inacti
vate the 616th AC&WS on 1 July 1975. But as this date approached USAFE instead received 4 ATAF approval to downgrade the site from a CRP to a reporting post. This reduced 52 manpower authorizations with most slots coming out of the operations area. This action made it easier to negotiate the site turnover. In the meantime, the German Air Force was beginning plans to replace the now aging 412L equipment with the more modern German Air Defense Ground Environment (GEADGE) system beginning in 1980.+ Subsequently, talks between the representing military commands of the two nations finally resulted in the turnover of Wasserkuppe and inactivation of the 616th AC&WS on 1 January 1979. However, the United States would provide contractor maintenance there until the site began a complete GEADGE operation sometime in 1983. ++ The contractor provided its own supply support so there was no need to establish an operating location there.

64. Msg (U), CINCUSAFE to USAFE Chief of Staff, et.al., "Turnover of 412L System," 281330Z Jul 72.

65. Msgs (U), CINCUSAFE to USAFE Chief of Staff, et.al., "Status of 412L Turnover Negotiations," 211641Z Aug 62 and 301730Z Aug 72; Intvw (U), Author with Col R. Morain, 601 TCW/Dep Cmdr Tac Con, 6 Dec 80.

67. Msgs (U), CINCUSAFE to USAFE Chief of Staff, et.al., "Status of 412L Turnover Negotiations," 121052Z Oct 62.

68. USAFE SO GB-67, 20 Nov 78, [Inactivation of 616th AC&WS]; Intvw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601st TCW/412L Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.

+ (U) See Page 62.

++ (U) See Page 57.
pp 42 - 45

(Narrative - 412L ACTIVITIES IN THE 1970'S (pp 45-61)

System Management
  (U) During the hand over of fixed radar stations, management for the overall system gradually degraded. Looking back, the 86th Air Division (Defense) served as the single manager of the 412L system from 1964 through 1968. But, in 1968, the air division fell prey to one of many USAFE manpower reductions caused by a Congressional order to reduce military spending. On 14 November the 86th Air Division (Defense) was inactivated with 412L operational responsibility transferred to Seventeenth Air Force; the 601st Tactical Control Wing gained maintenance responsibilities. In addition, the German control of Lauda beginning in late 1968 made the 2d Air Division of the German Air Force more active in the control of the system. In effect, central system management was eliminated. 70

(U) Management became further fragmented in 1972. Personnel reductions on the Seventeenth Air Force staff prompted a change over of operational responsibilities to the 601st TCW. But, the wing only had national authority over its own elements. Various management functions were divided among staffs at 4 ATAF, USAFE, SOC III, German Air Force Tactical Command, 2d Air Division (GAF), Seventeenth Air Force, and the 601st TCW. Actions taken by these various echelons of command often conflicted adversely affecting overall air defense management. 71

(U) The status of the 412L system was a matter of mutual concern from 1968 through 1972. Despite efforts to coordinate management decisions, degradation of the system continued. This unfortunate circumstance resulted in the formation of a 412L "Peaking Team" in early 1973. Comprised of both USAFE and GAF technical experts, the objectives of this team were: (a) to determine the current status of the 412L system; (b) document their findings; (c) develop appropriate corrective actions; and (d) implement restoral actions at each site. Their findings at Boerfink, Wasserkuppe, and Lauda confirmed the suspected troubles. Over the years there had been a subtle degradation of the system which resulted in site registration errors,+ data links that did not function as expected, and overall less than optimum performance throughout the system. In addition, lack of central control and standardized maintenance procedures was evident. Based on these findings, GAF and USAFE officials agreed to establish a joint system management effort. 72

(U) This agreement, which went into effect 9 October 1973, established a common structure for 412L system management and formally established Programming Center Birkenfeld (PCB) as a bi-national activity to provide guidance and procedures for operation, maintenance, logistics, management, and personnel training required for 412L equipment. In addition, the PCB absorbed the functions of the System Program and Analysis Test Site. The joint agreement also formed two new management agencies. The 412L Steering Committee consisted of two colonels representing the USAFE staff and the German Federal Ministry of Defense. This committee managed all common air defense tasks within SOC III jurisdiction except those specifically under NATO control. The other agency was the 412L Joint Direction Staff (JDS) and served to implement steering committee decisions and directives. There were four voting on the JDS including American officers from Seventeenth Air Force and the 601st Tactical Control Wing, and Germans from the 2d Air Division and the GAF Tactical Command. Specific responsibilities of this staff included:

-- continuation of the 412L Peaking Team.

-- establishment of computer software configuration control board procedures.

-- development of an on-going radar quality control program.

-- supervision of engineering studies of air defense communications links.

-- assumption of responsibility over Programming Center Birkenfeld.

-- providing a permanent management activity.

Meetings of the JDS were attended by all American and German military organizations which had a hand in 412L operations. 73

U) Another key provision of the 1973 agreement authorized the formation of a technical advisory staff to assist the Joint Direction Staff. After a few JDS meetings, which took place at six-week intervals, it was apparent that a full-time 412L management activity was required. Accordingly, on 31 January 1974, the JDS proposed the activation of the Joint System Management Group (JSMG) to provide responsive management for the entire system. On 19 February, the Seventeenth Air Force commander, Maj Gen John C. Giraudo, authorized 601st TCW staff members to meet with 2d Air Division officials to develop an agreement on the formation of this group, but not to commit U.S. personnel or funds without USAFE approval. On 1 October 1974 the JSMG became a reality with 40 percent American manning and the rest Germans. Detachment 1, 601st Tactical Control Group was activated at Birkenfeld to provide personnel for both the JSMG and Programming Center Birkenfeld.++ 74

70. Brfng (U), 601st TCW/Dep Cmdr Logistics to NATO Air Defense Electronic Environment Committee, "412L System Management in Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force," 30 Jul 74.

71. Ibid..

72. Ibid..

73. Ibid..

74. Ibid.; Agreement (U), 412L Joint Direction Staff, "Agreement on Establishment of Joint Systems Management Group," effective 1 Oct 74; Msg (U), CINCUSAFE to 601st TCW/Dep Cmdr Logistics, et.al., "Implementation of . . . (JSMG)," 211501Z Oct 74.

+ (U) Site registration errors meant that when one site identified an aircraft at one location on the consoles, other sites would show it at different locations.

++ (U) The 615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron previously provided manning for the PCB.

pp 45 - 48

Salty Net
  (U) Shortly after the 412L took over air defense warning and control responsibilities in the 4 ATAF region on 4 January 1965, six semi-automatic radar sites also became operational in the 2 ATAF area with one station in Belgium, one in the Netherlands, and four in northern Germany. Together these sites were called NATO Air Defense Ground Environment or NADGE. Each site was configured similarly to the 412L sites with data display consoles, detector/tracker sets, electronics switching center communications, and site-to-site data links. The heart of this Hughes Aircraft-built system was the HM-3118 computer. NADGE and 412L data links were compatible to allow an exchange of radar intelligence between the two. Also in the early 1960s, USAFE introduced a mobile radar network called the 407L to provide tactical control for offensive forces, and a limited air defense capability in either a garrisoned or deployed configuration. Over the first several years the 407L used manual radar processing equipment. By 1973 the largest mobile units, called control and reporting posts, had received a semi-automatic capability with the addition of TSQ-91 mobile operations centers and their Hughes Aircraft HM-4118 computers. The mobile CRPs also possessed site-to-site data links but they were not compatible with the fixed systems. There were five such CRPs throughout Germany following expansion of 407L operations into northern Germany in 1976-77. Additionally, USAF developed an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) radar in the early 1970s that would further strengthen command and control of NATO forces in the 1980s. Obviously, commanders at war headquarters locations such as SOC III would reap great benefits if data from all three systems could be integrated into a single display. 75

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) The Salty Net Buffer package was about the size of a typing table with a teletype console on top,+ The unit matched up different computer message formats and transmission speed rates so they could be transmitted between sites regardless of origin. The first 4 Pi-CP2 computers arrived in Germany in early October 1976 and testing started almost immediately. In the first test the 603d Tactical Control Squadron (407L) at Sembach Air Base linked with the Lauda CRC (412L) from 6-10 October. Next, the 603d tied into the NADGE site at Uedem, Germany, from 18-21 October. All three radar stations were united for the final testing phase from 25-29 October. Test results proved favorable pointing to an early operational date. Four mobile CRPs received Salty Net Buffers over
the next few months and became operationally ready in this configuration on 29 January 1977. 78

(U) In the meantime, Electronics Systems Division
officials asked USAFE to eliminate testing between the AWACS and the second 4 Pi-CP2 computer based on their completed modification of the message processing center. Headquarters USAF approved this plan revision because it would cause only minimal delays while saving some 62 million in the Salty Net project. The revised second phase moved forward in 1977. In-place buffers were connected with MPCs by June 1978 completing the interface. Nonetheless, Salty Net was not yet completed since a computer program change (or software adjustment) would allow the MPC to perform the task of the first 4 Pi-CP2 computer thus eliminating an excess piece of equipment. With this modification radar interoperability would depend on just one interfacing system. The 609th TCS at Bad Muender conducted MPC tests with the software change from 18 September through 15 November 1978 interfacing with as many as two NADGE and two 412L stations simultaneously. These tests proved successful except for minor computer program difficulties. The Electronics Systems Division returned the program to Hughes Aircraft for needed corrections. After completing these changes the message processing centers took over the complete interoperability tasking on 1 October 1979. After a brief period the Salty Net Buffers were returned to the Air Force Systems Command for disposition. 79

75. Intvw (U), Author with Col R. Morain, 601 TCW/Dep Cmdr Tac Cont, 8 Dec 80; Intvw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle E. Herbaugh, 601 TCW/412L Maintenance Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.

78. . MFR (U), 601 TCW/Ops Programs (Capt C.R. Parkhill), "Salty Net Testing Status," 7 Oct 76; Hist (S/DECL 31 Dec 84), Jul-Dec 76, pp 53-54, info used is (U); Ltr (U), 17AF/Cmdr to USAFE/Ops, "Accelerated Deployment of MPC," 29 Dec 76; Rpt (U), Elec Sys Div, "Salty Net Implementation Plan (Revision 3)," 31 Jan 77.

79. Program Guidance Letter (U), USAFE Dir of Programs, DCS/Plans, "Central Region TACS Interface (Salty Net) Task II," 1 Apr 77; Intvw (U), Author with Capt R. Bauman, 601 TCW/Salty Net Project Officer, 25 Oct 79.

+ (U) The actual computer was a suitcase-size commercial item that had been adapted for military use. Some 400 of them were in use throughout the Air Force during this time.
pp 49 - 52

Constant Keystone
D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Constant Keystone had a major impact on the aircraft warning and control system. Before this program, three 412L agencies operated out of the Boerfink Bunker. These included the Master CRC, an alternate sector operations center, and Programming Center Birkenfeld. The MCRC occupied the upper three floors of the underground, four-story complex; while the alternate SOC occupied a few offices in this area. The programming center worked out of the bottom floor. After Constant Keystone the master control and reporting center remained in the bunker with most of the same equipment. However, smaller status display boards were installed because the larger ones in the old operations area (a large two-story room) would not fit on the bottom floor where it was moved. The 615th AC&WS also moved its administrative function to Neubruecke because there was not enough room for it. Finally, the PCB and the Alternate SOC transferred their operations to nearby Heinrich-Hertz Kaserne at Birkenfeld.+

(U) Before the Alternate SOC could function on its own away from the bunker, it needed an FSA-12 dector/tracker set plus consoles to display the sector aerial situation. There were no extra ones anywhere in the world. One proposal the 601st TCW staff developed involved the transfer of certain equipment from the CRC to the alternate SOC and downgrading the 412L operation at Boerfink to that of a reporting post. The wing staff also suggested leaving the back-up SOC within the bunker and moving the radar unit to Birkenfeld. However, Headquarters USAFE did not agree and instead requested the removal of the FSA-12 from the 412L maintenance school at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, for use at the Alternate SOC. Headquarters USAF approved this since most 412L maintenance was being contracted out.++ 83

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Meanwhile, certain aspects of Constant Keystone advanced. The 615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron ceased operations in the bunker on 2 July 1975 to remove 412L equipment and store it at the Nahbollenbach Army Depot. To stay operational the unit set up manual UPA-35 consoles in a GAF-owned warehouse on Erbeskopf mountain adjacent to the radar sensor equipment. Operations in this configuration started 18 July 1975. Although the unit could not perform MCRC functions in a manual mode, the 615th ACSWS did operate as a CRP with 412L interface via the voice net. The transition from semi-automatic to manual operations created a need for new operating instructions (OIs) and lesson plans for training purposes. The 615th AC&WS recinded 25 sets of Ols and rewrote 35 others. The unit also updated 32 lesson plans and developed 10 new ones. 85

(U) With the temporary closure of the Boerfink Bunker, the 615th AC&WS relocated most of its master functions to the Messtetten CRC. The MCRC provided ground environment system management over the 412L system by implementing tactical decisions made by SOC III commander. Specific duties transferred to Messtetten included weapons allocator, master display controllers, master identification officer, system technical director, and system master controller. The Kindsbach SOC absorbed master scheduling duties. The 615th did not altogether give up these tasks but instead sent personnel to each location on a rotating schedule. The unit provided eight crews (15-17 people) at Messtetten. Augmentation at Kindsbach involved just four air weapons controllers. 86

(U) With manual control operations and 615th augmentation well under way, plus U.S./German financial matters resolved, construction finally started in February 1976. The bunker was completely gutted by June when reconfiguration began. Four months later the project progressed to where installation of certain electronics equipment could begin. On 10 June 1977, NATO accepted the bunker as AAFCE's Static War Headquarters. 87

(U) Installation of 412L components back into the bunker progressed more slowly. By mid-August 1977 the master control and reporting center was finally ready for operational acceptance evaluations to ensure system capability. These tests yielded satisfactory results. An environmental inspection team from Hahn Air Base evaluated the new working area on the bottom floor to determine whether or not conditions had become cramped. Floor space was found within acceptable standards. By the end of September 1977 the 615th ACSWS ceased personnel augmentations and restored its own MCRC operation. 88

82. Intvw (U), Author with Col R. Morain, 601 TCW/Dep Cmdr Tac Cont, 8 Dec 80 (Colonel Morain was an operations officer and commander of the 615th AC&WS from 1977-79).

83. Ltr (U), 601st TCW/Cmdr to CINCUSAFE/DCO, "Installation of. . . Headquarters in the Boerfink Bunker," 11 Jul 74.

85. Hist (U), 615th AC&WS, Jul-Sep 75 and Oct-Dec 75.

86. Ibid.; Ltr (U), 601 TCG/Cmdr to 2 Air Division (GAF), "Messtetten Augmentation," 7 Apr 75.

87. Msg (U), CINCUSAFE to USAF Chief of Staff, "Contsant Keystone Monthly Rpt (as of 29 Feb 76)," 130800Z Mar 76; similar reports for 151435Z Mar 76; 180700Z May 76; and 151630Z Jun 76; Hist (U), 615th AC&WS, Apr-Jun 77.

88. Hists (U), 615th AC&WS, Jul-Sep 77 and Oct-Dec 77.

+ (U) The German Air Force's 2nd Air Division, which supervised the German-operated 412L sites, was located here. The division commander also served as alternate SOC commander.

++ (U) See Page 57.
pp 53 - 57

Contractor Maintenance
  (U) From the beginning of 412L operations in 1965 through 1974, active duty military personnel maintained equipment at American 412L sites. This was finally viewed as a waste of valuable resources since the 412L was never installed anywhere else in the world. In a cost-reducing effort USAFE requested that the NATO Air Material Supply Agency (NAMSA) at Capellen, Luxembourg, administer contract maintenance services at Wasserkuppe beginning 1 October 1974 on a test basis. The 601st TCW paid for the contracted services through this agency. NAMSA contracted Philco Worldwide Services of Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, for the job of maintaining USAF owned 412L and radar assets at Wasserkuppe. Philco assigned 34 civilians to replace 88 military people without affecting the operational mission there. This was possible because civilians worked strictly within their specialty while active duty personnel had numerous work interruptions like work details, additional duties, and 30 days annual leave. To the contrary, Philco employees with the company more than two years got just 10 vacation days annually. Military maintenance personnel remained at Wasserkuppe through the end of 1974 while Philco gradually assumed full maintenance duties. During 1975, NAMSA awarded two additional contracts. On 1 May, the Sacramento Air Logistics Center turned over program depot maintenance (PDM) after determining it was cheaper than conducting its own program. The depot funded this portion of the contract. Then on 1 October, Philco took over the consolidated intermediate maintenance facility at Sembach Air Base. 89

(U) The United States Air Forces in Europe continued using NAMSA as a "middle man" for the 412L maintenance contract through September 1977. However, USAFE concluded this arrangement on 1 October due to conflicting NATO and USAF procurement regulations. At USAFE request the NAMSA staff had already written two additional contracts adding Boerfink and Kindsbach. Before new contracts were signed, USAFE interceded turning the contract over to its own contracting office. This office combined separate 412L contracts into the 412L Omnibus Maintenance Contract and awarded it to Aeronutronics Services Corporation effective 1 October 1977.+ This agreement covered two years plus a USAFE option on a third year. The 601st Tactical Control Wing established a 412L maintenance contract monitor position to ensure full terms of the contract would be met. 90

(U) Over the first several months of the omnibus
contract, Headquarters USAFE and the 601st TCW viewed contractor performance as satisfactory. Had it not been for the pending transfer of Wasserkuppe to the German Air Force at the end of 1978, this unofficial rating would have continued. But the Germans requested a technical radar evaluation as a prerequisite to taking over. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine maximum 412L capabilities at that site. It started on 14 July 1978, but was cancelled ahead of schedule on 13 August 1978 because radar equipment did not meet technical order specifications. Repeated deficiencies pointed directly toward ineffective maintenance and management procedures. Problems were further complicated by the on-site contract monitor's failure to report known equipment failures to proper authorities. The director of maintenance at the 601st TCW (and 412L JDS representative), Col Robert L. Curry, removed this monitor from his position on 18 August 1978. 91

(U) As an added measure the 412L contract manager at the 601st TCW, Mr. Lyle E. Herbaugh, issued the Aeronutronics Services Corporation (ASC) a "cure notice" on 22 August 1978. The contractor was given 30 days to correct deficiencies in the following areas: (a) technical skills; (b) training programs; (c) radar workcenter management; (d) quality control; and (e) performance of radar equipment at technical order standards. The 601st TCW sent a team of experts headed by Mr. Herbaugh to monitor corrective actions and ensure that all 412L equipment worked according to specifications. By 21 September 1978, all equipment affected by the cure notice was tested and accepted except those items which needed parts (i.e. search radar, selective identification feature, and height receiver). The wing allotted five additional days for each item once the parts arrived. 92

D E L E T E D __ S E C T I O N S

(U) Another major problem with regard to the omnibus
contract occurred at Boerfink where two complete quality control inspections were necessary during 1978 and 1979 before minimal equipment performance was obtained. Because of this and the earlier cure notice served at Wasserkuppe, 601st TCW officials did not want to extend the contract into the option year. On 22 June 1979, Brig Gen Leon W. Babcock, Jr., 601st TCW commander, requested the USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Brig Gen J.T. Edwards, to review the possibilities of hiring a new contractor. General Babcock pointed out that it could cost an additional $400,000 but that additional money could be turned into higher wages and thus attract more highly qualified maintenance technicians. A week earlier, Mr. Herbaugh plus members of the USAFE contracting office met with the ASC director of operations to discuss overall dissatisfaction over maintenance at Boerfink. The inability of the 615th AC&WS to fully perform its mission was the primary topic. Air weapons controllers there often had to revert to manual control techniques to complete aircraft taskings. Wing and USAFE officials felt that management deficiencies and a low skill level of workers were the primary causes of maintenance deficiencies. 94

(U) Before the meeting ended the ASC director made two pertinent decisions: (a) he replaced the maintenance manager at Boerfink; and (b) he laid the groundwork for a more vigorous training program there. Although somewhat satisfied, General Babcock did not withdraw his request for a review of the current contract. General Edwards felt that advantages gained by changing contractors would be lost because of long training periods, and that there was no guarantee of improved performance. He also felt ASC deserved a chance to improve its quality of work based on feedback from the operations director. Maintenance performance improved throughout 1979 and 1980 to the extent that the 601st TCW offered ASC another contract extension beginning 1 October 1980. This contract would remain in effect until American involvement in the 412L system ceased due to transition to German Air Defense Ground Environment equipment. 95

89. Intw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle E. Herbaugh. 601 TCW/4121 Maint Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.

90. Ibid.; Statement of Work (U), USAFE Contract Office with Aeronutronic Services Corporation, "412L Omnibus Maintenance Contract," eff 1 Oct 77.

91. Intw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle E. Herbaugh, 601 TCW/412L Malnt Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80; Minutes (U), 601 TCW/Dir of Maint, "(412L) Joint Direction Staff," 25 Oct 78; Ltr (U), 17AF/Cmdr to 2d Air Div (GAF), "2d German Air Division Concerns With 412L Air Defense
System," 21 Aug 78.

92. See note above.

94. Ltr (U), 601 TCW/Cmdr to USAFE/DCS Logistics, et.al., "FY80 Contract for Maintenance of 412L Air Weapons Control System (AWCS)," 22 Jun 79; Intw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601 TCW/412L Maint Contract Manager, 1 Oct 79.

95. See note above; Intw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601 TCW/412L Maint Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.

+ (U) Aeronutronics Services Corporation was a new name for Philco Worldwide Services.
pp 57 - 62

(Narrative - GEADGE AND 412L PHASEOUT (pp 62-64)

  (U) The first day of September 1980 marked the beginning of the end for 412L operations in southern Germany. On that date, 4 ATAF shut down the first site -- Boerfink -- in preparation for installation of GEADGE equipment. The one-of-a-kind 412L was becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain. This was particularly true since the system was of 1950s technology and components were no longer made on a routine basis. The problem was further compounded because no other radar system in Europe was compatible with General Electric's GPA-73 in so far as spare parts were concerned. 96

(U) GEADGE would not significantly improve radar capabilities in aircraft height and range data. Rather, it was needed to replace aging equipment. The heart of the new system was the Hughes Aircraft HM-5118 computer which combined the intercept computer and detector/tracker chores. It should be remembered that the NADGE system in 2 ATAF used the HM-3118 computer while mobile CRPs and message processing centers operated with the HM-4118 computer. Under GEADGE all data processing consoles (including those earmarked for Army missile control) plus electronic switching center equipment would be replaced. 97

(U1 Since the German Air Force became the primary user of 4 ATAF fixed radar sites, it would pay all equipment and construction costs. Accordingly, it would own the complete GEADGE system including the American control and reporting center at Boerfink. This would relieve USAFE from most of its commitments to the existing system. For instance, the omnibus maintenance contract would terminate; and liaison supply detachments at Doebraberg, Freising, and Lauda would inactivate. American participation at Programming Center Birkenfeld plus the various joint working groups and committees would also end. Detachment 1, 601st Tactical Control Group would thus inactivate. On the other hand, American operational requirements at SOC III remained valid and would relocate back into the Boerfink Bunker.+ This agency would absorb master controlling functions reverting the 615th AC&WS to a CRC. However, this last American operational unit in the 412L system would continue master CRC chores during the GEADGE transition period.

(U) Several options were examined to keep the 615th AC&WS operational during the GEADGE modification. Headquarters 4 ATAF considered using the same mobile configuration as used during Constant Keystone. However, the Salty Net project made it possible for the 615th to use one of the semi-automatic mobile CRPs instead. In November 1979, 4 ATAF received official approval from Headquarters USAFE to augment most MCRC operations at the 603d Tactical Control Squadron. The SOC III at Kindsbach would absorb the master display center function. However, the 603d was not manned for 24-hour peacetime operations so the 615th AC&WS would have to provide augmenting air weapons controllers. Other mobile radar units around Germany would also have to send maintenance personnel to the CRP near Sembach Air Base. The mobile unit also had to task another CRP for an extra TSQ-91 cell to house Army missile control activity.++ 99

96. Intvw (U), Author with Maj J. Pike, USAFE/Dir Tac Air Cont Div, 1 Dec 80.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid; Intvw (U), Author with Mr. Lyle Herbaugh, 601 TCW/412L Maint Contract Manager, 20 Nov 80.

99. see note above.

+ (U) Due to modern technology, GEADGE equipment would not take up as much room as 412L equipment did.

++ (U) The TSQ-91 was a three-celled inflatable building used as an "operations central" by 601st TCW mobile CRPs. In this instance, one of the three cells of the TSQ-91 at the 602nd TCS was used by the 603rd TCS.
pp 62 - 64

(Narrative - SUMMARY (p 64)

  (U) Many of the problems that hampered 412L progress during its construction and installation phase were not expected during GEADGE transition. The GPA-73 started out as mobile equipment but was adapted for fixed radar operations in southern Germany. Resulting modifications delayed construction, reduced stateside testing, and created cost overruns. To the contrary, the Hughes Aircraft HM-5118 had been installed and tested in Spain as part of the Combat Grande project during the late 1970s, passing all operational tests. Officials at the 601st TCW had no reason to expect GEADGE problems similar to those of the 412L. 100

100. Intvw (U), Author with Col R. Morain, 601 TCW/Dep Cmdr Tac Cont, 8 Dec 80.
p 64

Wasserkuppe - Radar Dome covers AN/FPS-67A Search Radar

412L Radar Site - AN/FPS-6C HF Radar

412L Radar Site - AN/GPA-73 System


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