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Command
& Control
32nd AAA Brigade / Army Air Defense Command
Looking for more information from military/civilian
personnel assigned to or associated with the U.S. Army
in Germany from 1945 to 1989. If you have any
stories or thoughts on the subject, please email me (webmaster).
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This
page is still "under construction"
and will undergo many changes
and additions in the next few weeks.
However, comments,
suggestions, and corrections are very much appreciated!!!
This is a highly complex but very interesting topic, but with your
help I feel we can put something together that is both accurate as
well as informative. I am looking for a lot of help from any vets
who were part of this elaborate air defense network. |
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| AIRCENT
Air Defense - 1960s and early 1970s |
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| (Source: various
sources) |
AAFCE
Emblem
AAFCE
Patch
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The
integration of air defense capabilities within NATO was formalized
in 1954 under "MC 54/1" (Directive of the NATO Military
Committee on the Integrated NATO Air Defense System in Europe)
and approved by the Military Committee (the highest military
authority within NATO) in December 1955. The concept was based
upon four air defense regions (ADRs) with coordinating authority
given to SACEUR.
The Central Region
(covering the area of the BENELUX countries, France - until
they pulled out in 1966/67 - and the Federal Republic of Germany)
fell under the operational command of CINCENT (Commander in
Chief, Central Europe). AIRCENT (Allied Air Forces Central Europe),
the air component responsible for the air defense mission in
the Central Region, provided central direction and control for
the air defenses through the co-ordination of two subordinate
headquarters: Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF), based
at Mönchengladbach, which covered the northern part of
the region, and Fourth Allied Tactical Air
Force (4ATAF), based at Ramstein Air Base, which
was responsible for the southern area.
The air defense assets that made up the integrated air defense
system (that would later evolve into the very extensive NATO
Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE)) consisted of:
- command
and control systems (operations centers and communications networks)
- early warning
and ground control intercept radar installations
- fighter
interceptor aircraft
- surface-to-air
(NIKE and HAWK) missile units.
(NOTE: At a later point, Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft were
added to the NATO Early Warning System.) |
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| COMMAND
AND CONTROL |

86th Air Division (Defense)
Gaggle Plaque
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SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILE UNITS
The 32d
Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade was under the operational
control of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force and provided direct
air defense support to Central Army Group units.
During the period in question, the Brigade consisted of the following
units:
94th Arty Gp (NIKE)
10th Arty Gp (HAWK)
69th Arty Gp (HAWK)
NATO air defense
forces were required to be on a high state
of alert and readiness to respond, immediately and effectively,
to a massive Warsaw Pact air attack. A major portion of the forward-deployed
HAWK batteries were required to be ready to launch an air defense
missile almost immediately, or in a few minutes. The more rearward-deployed
Nike Hercules fire units were under only slightly longer "ready
to fire" time requirements, but also only of a few minutes.
94th Artillery Group - AADCP
10th Artillery Group - AADCP (can anybody
provide some detail on location and mission?)
69th Artillery Group - AADCP
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| USAFE AIR
DEFENSE UNITS - 1950s - 60s |
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| (1) courtesy www.slobberinwolfhounds.com (32nd TFS web site) |
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| NIKE-HERC
Command and Control |
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| General
Information |
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| (Source: Wayne
Scarpaci, HHB 69th ADA Gp, 1968-70) |
DRAFT
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| UNIT |
LOCATION |
CALL
SIGN |
COMMENTS |
| 10th
Arty Gp |
Ernst
Ludwig Kaserne, Darmstadt |
Cricket |
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AADCP |
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? ADA Bn |
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Cork |
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? ADA Bn |
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Chain |
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? ADA Bn |
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Caisson |
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? ADA Bn |
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??? |
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| 69th
Arty Gp |
Emery Bks, Würzburg |
Cocktail |
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AADCP |
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Cocktail
Forward |
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?
ADA Bn |
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Cat |
prob
6/52nd ADA |
?
ADA Bn |
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Cheryl |
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?
ADA Bn |
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Challenge |
prob
4/57th ADA |
?
ADA Bn |
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Charcoal |
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| 94th
Arty Gp |
Kapaun Ksn, Kaiserslautern
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Cinnamon |
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AADCP |
Hill
479 |
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| (Source: 32nd AADCOM The News, Special Orientation Edition, October 1981) |
| 'Invisible' units protect skies, an article on the MCC's at Boerfink and Lauda has been moved to the Missile Control Centers Page, Air Defense section. |
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| AN/MSG-4 Missile Monitor |
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| 1963 |
| (Source: ROTCM
145-70, Branches of the Army, Oct 1963) |
Fire
Distribution System AN/MSG-4 (Missile Monitor)
The Missile Monitor is designed for employment
with the field army to integrate the field army air defense with the
air defense system operated by the Air Force. It is a fully mobile
fire distribution system utilizing standard military vehicles.
Missile monitor provides facilities for an AADCP normally established
at group level, and incorporates up to four battalion fire distribution
systems. Designed for use with surface-to-air missile systems in the
field army, it provides a rapid and accurate exchange of information
between AIRCENT command elements and missile batteries. Information
on the location and identity of aircraft is continuously collected,
displayed at the AADCP, and disseminated to the integrated elements.
Each fire unit transmits operational status to the AADCP, where it
is displayed. Information is automatically exchanged with adjacent
AADCP's and received from tactical air force units. The air defense
commander observes the overall air defense situation, directs fire
distribution, and supervises fire unit operations as required. Battalion
fire distribution systems may be employed independently in small air
defense areas.
The AADCP operations room contains display consoles used for surveillance,
tracking, and tactical monitoring operations. Electronic computers
update, store, and provide continuous target data to these consoles
and to the integrated missile batteries. The electronic display includes
the location and identity of all aerial objects in the defense area
and those targets selected for attack by each fire unit. |
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| 1966 |
| (Source: US Army Air Defense School, Student Outline, March 1966) |
(1) Purpose. A fire distribution system makes it possible to observe and influence the entire air battle scene from the widest viewpoint so separate actions of numerous batteries can be supervised and unified into an integrated defense. The purpose is to bring about a balanced and timely distribution of fire agains any raid, in a logical order of tactical priority, and thereby achieve an optimum kill with the given weapon's capability.
(2) General description of the AN/MSG-4 fire distribution system (Missile Monitor). The AN/MSG-4 is a mobile fire distribution system designed for the use with the field army to control the fire of Nike Hercules and Hawk guided missile systems.
The AN/MSG-4 is composed of two basic subsystems, the AN/MSQ-28 (AN/MSQ-56) subsystem located at group or brigade level, and the AN/MSQ-18 (AN/TSQ-38) subsystem located at battalion and battery levels.
(3) AN/MSQ-18 (AN/TSQ-38) subsystem.
(a) Operations central (OC). The OC is the tactical command post of the air defense battalion command. The OC is capable of either monitoring the engagement or actually making assignments of targets to its batteries.
(b) Coder-decoder group (CDG). The CDG is located at each of the batteries. Information between elements of the AN/MSG-4 is exchanged over an automatic data link (ADL) in a coded form (digital). The CDG decodes the digital data coming to the battery and changes the information to a form that can be used by the guided misslle system. Information being sent from the guided missile system is converted to coded form (digital) for transmission up to higher echelons (battalion and group).
(4) AN/MSQ-28 (AN/MSQ-56) subsystem.
(a) The major components of the AN/MSQ-28. The major components of the AN/MSQ-28 are the AN/MPS-23 frequency-scan radar, the radar data processing center (RDPC), and the weapon monitoring center (WMC). The two research and development systems are the only systems still carrying this nomenclature. All production models have had design improvements changing the nomenclature to either AN/MSQ-28B or AN/MSQ-56. These design improvements have included modification of the radar, changing its nomenclature to the AN/MPS-23A frequency-scan radar.
(b) AN/MPS-23 or AN/MPS-23A frequency-scan radar. The AN/MPS-23 provides the Missile Monitor with target detection. The radar is unique in that it provides not only range and azimuth, but also elevation angle. As the antenna rotates mechanically in azimuth, it scans electronically in elevation. The elevation capability of the AN/MPS-23 eliminates the need for a separate radar to determine height. Identification, friend or foe (IFF) equipment is also provided with the radar. An ECCM console in the radar enables the operator to determine which ECCM feature of the system is being the most effective during an ECM environment and enables the operator to transfer the best radar response to the RDPC.
(c) Radar Data Processing Center, the RDPC provides initial display of targets, a means of interrogation, and automatic tracking of targets. Tracking is accomplished at six detector-tracker (DT) consoles in the RDPC. Height data are observed on two range-height indicator (RHI) consoles. The position of the target in the X and Y coordinates, the identification, and the raid size are entered into a memory storage at the DT consoles. Height (H) is entered at the RHI consoles. Information entered is carried by ADL to
the WMC and entered into a second memory storage.
(d) Weapon Monitoring Center. The WMC provides the group commander with immediate presentation of the tactical situation at all times. All information entered into memory storage from the RDFC is available in symbolic or read-out form at the weapon monitoring consoles. Battery status to received from the batteries and entered into the memory storage. The WMC can accept data from remote sources for early warning purposes. The group commander can make assigments from the WMC to the batteries.
(5) Block organization and data flow.
(a) The AN/MSQ-28 is an integrated system providing the facility to the air defense commander to collect information on all targets in his area of defense, process and store the target information, disseminate information or target assignments to fire units, and to monitor the status of all fire units.
(b) Information in three dimensions is provided by the AN/MPS-23 radar over cable to the RDPC. Processed information is carried from the RDPC to the WMC over the ADL. Target assignments, reference messages, and battery status information are exchanged through each operations central to the fire unit over the ADL.
(c) The WMC can receive target information from remote sources, which could be from the tactical air force (TAC) or adjacent Missile Monitor systems.
(6) Methods of operation.
Missile Monitor may be operated in six different switch-selected methods of operation. These are essentially different ways of channeling ADL information. Three of these methods of operation are used in the tactical employment of the system, two are used during system emplacement and for test purposes, and one method is used for emergency operation.
(a) Normal method (tactical). In the normal method of operation all commands originate at group level. The commands are transmitted aver the ADL through the battalion operations central (Bn OC) to the fire units at the battery. Status information of the fire units will be transmitted over the ADL through the Bn OC to the WMC at group level. Reference tracks may be received from the Bn OC over the ADL.
(b) Sector method (tactical). When a Bn OC is placed in the sector method of operation, all commands will originate at the Bn OC for all fire units integrated with it. Status information from these fire units will be transmitted over the ADL to the Bn OC and be passed on up to the WMC for monitoring purposes. The WMC at group can transmit reference information on tracks to the Bn OC and batteries while it is in the sector method of operation. The group commander can place a battalion in the sector method of operation
by changing switch positions. It is possible to have any number of Bn OC's operating to the sector method of operation while the remaining Bn OC's may be operating in the normal method of operation. The tactical situation will dictate the method of operation.
(c) Independent method (tactical). In the independent method of operation, there is no ADL between the AN/MSQ-28 at group and the AN/MSQ-18 or AN/TSQ-38. All commands will originate at the Bn OC, and all status information returning from the batteries over the ADL will terminate at the Bn OC.
(d) AADCP survey method (test). The AADCP survey method is a test method in which the WMC will transmit a message of target position continuously so all elements may check for accurate location with respect to the AADCP.
(e) Battery survey method (test). The battery survey method is a test method in which one of the batteries within the AN/MSG-4 system transmits target positional information continuously so all elements can correlate position.
(f) Emergency method (emergency use). This emergency method is used if certain components of the WMC become inoperational and the RDPC data are routed to the Bn OC's and batteries. The emergency method would permit the transmission of target information over the ADL and commands by voice communication to the OC's.
(7) Operating personnel and duties (officer and enlisted).
(a) The platoon leader is responsible to the Army air defense commander for all activities of the Army air defense command post. The platoon leader is normally a major.
(b) The operations officer, being senior on each shift, will perform duties of the Army air defense operations officer (AADOO), be the shift supervisor, and the tactical director of the air defense operations to the weapon monitoring center. He will monitor the actions of other operations personnel and perform additional duties prescribed by the platoon leader. There are normally four operations officers assigned, one for each shift. Rank: Captain.
(c) The tactical directors, working in shifts of four each, operate the four weapon monitoring consoles. Each console is associated with one of the four battalions normally assigned in a defense. Within the limits of SOP they will make specific action assignments and monitor fire unit action. There are normally sixteen tactical directors assigned, four for each shift. Rank: Lieutenant.
(d) The surveillance and entry (S&E) officer, being the senior officer on shift in the RDPC, is responsible to the operations officer for the RDPC operations. He operates a DT console and performs additional duties prescribed by the platoon leader. There are normally four S&E officers, one for each shift. Rank: Lieutenant.
(e) The section chief is the senior noncommissioned officer assigned to each shift and performs supervisory duties under the direction of the operations officer. He is directly responsible to the operations officer for march order and emplacement. He operates a DT console. There are normally four section chiefs assigned, one for each shift. Rank: E-6.
(f) The senior fire distribution operators operate the DT console in the RDPC and perform additonal duties prescribed by the section chief. There are normally four senior fire distribution operators, one for each shift. Rank: E-5.
(g) The fire distribution operators operate the DT console in the RDPC and perform additional duties prescribed by the section chief.
(h) Target trackers act as ECCM operators in the radar equipment trailer of the AN/MPS-23 radar. They also perform additional duties prescribed by the section chief. There are normally four assigned, one for each shift. Rank: E-4
(i) Plotter-tellers maintain a manual target plotting system to provide an alternate means of reporting air defense intelligence. They also operate system consoles and perform additional duties as prescribed by the section chief. There are normally three assigned. Rank: E-4.
(j) Height-finder operators operate the RHI console in the RDPC and perform additional duties as assigned by the section chief. There are normally eight assigned, two for each shift. Rank: E-5.
(8) Power requirements.
(a) Ten trailer-mounted generators are furnished for power to the AN/MSQ-28 equipment, but five of these generators serve as spares.
(b) The AN/MPS-23 radar requires a 60-cycle, 100-kilowatt generator.
(c) The RDPC and the WMC each require a 60-cycle, 45-kilowatt generator and a 400-cycle, 45-kilowatt generator.
(9) Trailer-mounted electronic shop AN/MSM-34. There are three electronic shop trailers with the AN/MSQ-28 equipment. Each major component of the AN/MSQ-28 has a trailer to house spare parts and test equipment for maintenance purposes.
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WMC Console
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D-T Console
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RHI Console |
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(Source: US Army Air Defense School, Student Outline, March 1966)
Technical note: ADL came in two varieties: PCM (Pulse Coded Modulation) and FSM (Frequency Shift Modulation); these were (roughly) analogous to "pulse" and "tone" dialing modes on the telephone, respectively.... Also, remember that
we (in the MSG-4 system) had "pushbutton phones" in the mid-1960s! When did they come into common civilian use?)
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AN/MSG-4 Cabling and Communications
(1) Basic types of communications.
(a) Automatic data link. ADL is used for the transmission of electronic messages throughout the fire distribution system. It can be transmitted by either radio or cable.
(b) Voice communications. Voice communications are used for the passage of tactical information such as equipment status and after action reports. Voice communications are also used as a backup to AOL.
1. Local and administrative lines. The local and administrative lines are used for administrative, maintenance, and supply purposes.
2. Hot loop nets. The hot loop nets are furnished on a full-time, high priority basis and are used for the exchange of tactical information
such as condition of readiness, action status, and progress of mission. There are three hot loop nets available in the AN/MSG-4 system: group, battalion, and automatic.
a. Group hot loop. The group hot loop is used for the simultaneous exchange of information between the weapons monitoring center (WMC), radar data processing center (RDPC), and the four battalions.
b. Battalion hot loop. There are four battalion hot loop sets, each connecting one battalion to the WMC via the Army area communications system. The RDPC is not connected in the battalion hot loop.
c. Automatic hot loop. The automatic hot loop is automatically initiated during a RED air defense warning. It connects the operators telephone units at console No. 1 through No. 4 in the WMC to the four battalion hot leaps, respectively.
3. IRR nets. There are five IRR nets provided for use on a full-time, high-priority basis. They are used for the exchange of intelligence and radar reporting information such as weapon supply and early warning. The IRR nets avallable are the group IRR net and the battalion IRR net.
a. Group IRR net, The group IRR net is one in which the WMC, RDPC, and all four battalions are tied together to form an overall IRR net. The RDPC has priority over the WMC because it provides and uses the majority of information transmitted via the IRR nets.
b. Battalion IRR net. There are four individual battalion IRR nets, each connecting one battalion to the RDPC.
(2) Console communications facilities. The console communications facilities consist of telephone instruments, transmit control circuits, operator's telephone unit, and telephone connecting station.
(a) Telephone instruments. The telephone instruments (headset-handset) consist of a receiver, microphone, and hand-operated transmit control switch.
(b) Transmit control circuits. The transmit control circuits consist of a hand-operated or foot-operated switch used to energize the microphone.
(c) Operator's telephone unit. The operator's telephone unit amplifies all incoming speech signals, provides an audible indication of incoming calls, and connects the telephone instruments to the battalion hot loop during a RED air defense warning.
(d) Telephone connecting station. This is the connecting link between the controller's telephone unit and the voice communications lines.
1. Initiating a call.
2. Receiving a call.
(3) State-of-alert function. The state-of-alert circuits receive the audiofrequency signals indicating air defense warnings (RED, YELLOW, or WHITE) and provide visual indications. In addition, these circuits supply digital air defense warning data for transmission by ADL to the fire units,
(a) Audiofrequency air defense warning signals. These signals are sent out by the air defense artillery operations officer in the WMC.
(b) Digital air defense warning data. This information is supplied to the battalion ADL input-output buffer for transmission to all units in the AN/MSG-4 system.
(4) Army Area Communications System. Radio and wire systems may be used to provide communications circuits for voice and automatic data transmission.
(a) Radio. Multiplex radio facilities may be provided for simultaneous communication in two directions,
(b) Wire. The wire circuits used may be the standard WD-1 field wire or the Spiral-4 cable,
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| 1968 |
| (Source: US Army Field Manaual FM 44-95, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT, NIKE HERCULES, April 1968) |
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| CHAPTER 5 |
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| COMMAND AND CONTROL |
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| Section I. THEATER OF OPERATIONS |
5-1. General
FM 44-1 presents the detailed principles of command and control of theater air defense operations. A detailed listing of Army air defense officer functions, command relationships, and typical command arrangements are also included. |
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5-2. Field Army
Nike Hercules battalions and batteries required for defense of the field army are retained at field army level under the command of the field army ADA organization (normally an ADA brigade). Nike Hercules units are normally further assigned to an ADA group directly subordinate to the ADA brigade. Nike Hercules is not normally further assigned below field army level. |
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| Section II. CONTROL MEASURES |
5-3. General
Key control elements include control of unit assignments, mission assignment, and control of fires. Control is exercised in accordance with theater air defense policies and procedures, and by provision of liaison and communications.
5-4. Control of Assignments
Assignments of Nike Hercules units are made in accordance with established priority lists for air defense. A commander receiving an assignment of these units may assign them as necessary to accomplish his mission. Any limitations placed on the receiving commander must be defined in the terms of attachment or assignment.
5-5. Mission Assignment
Nike Hercules unit assignment or attachment carries with it a mission to provide air defense, or for, the force, unless specified otherwise. A force receiving a Nike Hercules unit allocation further assigns missions of defense of |
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specified vital areas or force elements, subject only to limitations which may be included in the assignment or attachment order. Because the air defense means made available are generally limited, the force commander should prescribe priorities for air defense of his force units or installations.
5-6. Control of Nike Hercules Fires
a. Concepts.
(1) The right of self-defense against hostile air and ground attack is never denied. Commanders at all echelons have the responsibility to take whatever action is required to protect their forces and equipment against enemy air attack. Such action will be governed by rules and procedures established by the air defense commander. If emergency action deemed necessary is contrary to established rules, it should be carefully weighed for its effect on the operations and safety of other friendly forces, and, if taken, reported to the appropriate commander at the earliest practicable time. |
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(2) Nike Hercules units normally make air defense engagement decisions based on the rule that aircraft identified as hostile will be engaged. This rule may be changed by higher echelons to allow relatively unrestricted engagement or to impose increase fire restrictions. This concept for control of fires is dependent on provision of clear and detailed air defense rules covering the items discussed in b through f below, and communications to allow higher echelons to modify the air defense rules if the situation demands.
b. Conditions of Readiness and Air Defense Warning.
(1) Conditions of Readiness. Conditions of readiness are the means used by specified authorities to maintain air defense at a state of preparedness compatible with the real or apparent imminence of attack. The terms, defense readiness condition (DEFCON) and defense readiness posture (DEFREP), are frequently used in relation to conditions of readiness. In response to each condition of readiness, the Army ADA commander prescribes a required state of alert for each ADA unit under his command (appendix B).
(2) Air defense warning. Air defense warnings are normally issued after the air defenses have reached their highest conditions of readiness and represent the ADA commander's evaluation of the probability of air attack. The warnings are: RED, attack imminent or in progress; YELLOW, attack probable; and WHITE, attack not probable. The conditions of readiness ((1) above) and the air defense warnings serve as a basis for implementation of the air defense rules and procedures of the regional ADA commanders. These rules for engagement and procedures are established in operation orders or SOP (app B).
c. Rules for Engagement.
(1) Rules for engagement are promulgated by the area ADA commander to define, as a minimum, the responsibilities, procedures, and criteria for aircraft identification and engagement in consonance with the theater alert system. |
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(2) The following rules for engagement are considered typical for Nike Hercules operations:
(a) Conditions short of war -- engagements are conducted only in self-defense or as ordered by designated ADA commanders.
(b) Wartime -- engagements are conducted in accord with the prevailing weapon control status (d below) and the hostile criteria (f below).
(3) Implementation of the rules by Nike Hercules requires that determination be made of the friendly or hostile character of each aircraft; therefore, the rules are based on use of reliable identification criteria.
d. ADA Weapon Control Status. Each ADA weapon control status indicates the degree of air defense fire restriction imposed upon Nike Hercules units. A "normal" wartime status for Nike Hercules units should be specified in the rules of engagement. Authority to change ADA weapon control status, if any, should also be specified.
(1) Weapon free. Fire at any aircraft not identified as friendly. Under this status, "unknowns" may be engaged. An "unknown:" is an aircraft whose identity has not been established.
(2) Weapon tight. Fire only at aircraft positively identified as hostile. Theater rules for engagement will specify exact criteria for declaring an aircraft hostile when operating under this status. Examples of hostile criteria are presented in f below.
(3) Hold fire. Do not fire. This status may be used to impose restrictions on a defense as a whole. The status is normally transmitted as follows: "All units -- hold fire." Hold fire may also be given for certain indicated flights (e(1) below). BCO actions are identical in both cases.
e. Special Control Instructions. Other weapon control instruction pertaining to specific engagements or actions may be prescribed by the AD commander (who establishes rules for engagement) in controlling the Nike Hercules system. Typical terms are: |
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(1) Hold fire. Hold fire is used to protect friendly aircraft. This term, as defined in Army regulations, should not impose a blanket restriction on an entire area and all flights therein, but only on certain indicated flights. This status should only be invoked if safeguards over and above those inherent in the "normal" weapon tight status are required. The special control instructions are normally transmitted as in the following example: "Fire unit 68 -- hold fire -- track 97." When received by a BCO, it means --
If you have not fired:
• Do not fire.
• Cease tracking.
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If you have fired:
• Destroy missile immediately.
• Cease tracking. |
(2) Cease fire. Cease fire is used to preclude simultaneous engagement of a target with both interceptors and SAM. When received by a BCO, it means:
If you have not fired:
• Do not fire.
• Continue tracking.
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If you have fired:
• Permit missile to continue to intercept. |
(3) Cease engagement. This instruction is used to alert a unit already engaging a target to prepare to engage a target of higher priority. When received by a BCO, it means:
If you have not fired:
• Do not fire.
• Cease tracking.
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If you have fired:
• Permit missile to engage target, then transfer to new target. |
f. Hostile Criteria. The theater rules for engagement will define criteria by which an aircraft may be designated hostile. For example, SOP may classify aircraft as hostile which are
(1) Attacking friendly elements.
(2) Improper response or no response to IFF challenge.
(3) Spraying smoke on friendly elements without prior coordination.
(4) Dropping flares at night over friendly territory without prior coordination.
(5) Discharging parachutists or unloading troops in numbers in excess of the normal aircraft crew without prior coordination. |
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(6) Engaging in mine-laying operations without prior coordination.
(7) Improper or unauthorized entry into an area designated as restricted.
(8) Use of ECM devices (e.g., chaff and reflectors) over friendly territory without prior coordination.
(9) Bearing the military insignia or having the configuration of am, aircraft employed by a known enemy nation.
(10) Operating at prohibited speeds„ altitudes, or directions.
g. Methods of Control.
(1) General. Theater rules or unit SOP may specify or imply the required Nike Hercules method of control.
(2) Centralized. Under this method of control an ADA commander may require that engagements be conducted only after receipt of permission from a designated higher ADA echelon. The higher echelon may also designate tentative targets, by electronic or voice command, when operating in this method. The right of unit self-defense is not denied. This method is not appropriate for Nike Hercules units during wartime.
(3) Decentralized. Under this method of control, engagement decisions are made at Nike Hercules battalion or battery level, based on the rules for engagement and subject to any temporary engagement restrictions imposed by higher echelons. This is the normal wartime control method for Nike Hercules fire units conducting air defense missions.
(4) Autonomous. When communications with higher headquarters have been lost, Nike Hercules batteries may continue to engage targets, based on the rules for autonomous operations prescribed by higher echelons. Battalions may also operate autonomously if they lose communications with the group, but the batteries may still be in centralized or decentralized method of control.
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| Section III. FIRE DISTRIBUTION |
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5-7. General
The Missile Monitor (AN/MSG-4) fire distribution system (FDS) is used for oversea-deployed Nike Hercules battalions (fig. 5-1). Missile Monitor is a mobile, electronic FDS designed for SAM systems that provides rapid and accurate exchanges of information from ADA command elements to fire units, and a rapid collection of data by command elements, to decrease the reaction time of the defense. It provides the ADA commander with a means of fire distribution and supervision that permits him to transmit commands directly to any fire unit in the defense or to provide data to the fire unit commander to allow selection of the best target for engagement. The methods of operation permit flexibility in varying tactical situations. The FDS is air-transportable and uses standard military vehicles for ground transportation.
5-8. Equipment Description
a. Radar Set AN/MPS-23A. This is a mobile, medium-range, frequency-scan radar. It furnished azimuth, elevation, and range data to the radar data processing center (RDPC). The frequency-scan feature provides target height information and range determination by electronic means and eliminates the need for height-finder radar. Azimuth is obtained by mechanical positioning according to the direction of the radar antenna.
b. Radar Data Processing Center. The RDPC is a mobile data processing center that obtains azimuth, elevation, range data, raid-size, and identity from the frequency-scan radar AN/ MPS-23A, displays these data at its consoles, and generates reference track data that are sent to the weapons monitoring center (WMC).
c. Weapons Monitoring Center. The WMC is the mobile tactical center of the Missile Monitor FOS. It is a processing center that receives data from the RDPC and fire units; it processes, displays, and correlates this data;
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and it transmits data to the fire units. Data may also be exchanged with adjacent WMC's and Air Force agencies.
d. Battalion Operations Central AN/MSQ-18. The operations central AN/MSQ-18 at battalion headquarters is housed in a modified M109 van body mounted on a conventional 2½-ton truck. The AN/MSQ-18 may coordinate up to eight Nike Hercules batteries, serves as a link between the defense acquisition radar (DAR) and the fire units, and is designed to be functionally associated with the WMC in the Missile Monitor system (fig. 5-1).
e. Battalion Operations Central AN/TSQ-38. The AN/TSQ-38 is the helicopter-transportable version of the AN/MSQ-18. It has the same or similar components as the AN/MSQ-18 and performs the same functions. One major difference is that the PPI's of the AN/MSQ-18 have a display range of 160 nautical miles (296 kilometers) while those of the AN/TSQ-38 have a display range of 320 nautical miles (593 kilometers).
f. Coder-Decoder Group AN/MSQ-18 and AN/TSQ-38. The coder-decoder group (CDG), the battery-level component of the AN/MSQ-18, is mounted in a modified M109 van body when used with the AN/MSQ-18 system and in a helicopter-transportable shelter when used with the AN/TSQ-38 system. The CDG functions as an automatic data link between the battery and the battalion.
g. Battery Terminal Equipment AN/GSA-77. The battery terminal equipment (BTE) is capable of integrating any ADA missile battery with any of the ADA FDS. The AN/GSA-77, which will replace the coder-decoder group, weighs less than 250 pounds, is small (2 feet x 2 feet x 1 foot), and requires a minimum amount of maintenance. When provided with communications a defense equipped with the BTE can operate in a battery data link mode without being integrated with any central FDS or netting station.
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5-9. Organizations and Duties
General. Personnel and equipment to operate the Missile Monitor are provided by cellular teams by TOE 44-510. Personnel are organized in the ADA command post platoon consisting |
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of a command post headquarters section and a weapons monitoring and radar data processing section. Personnel are provided for continuous operation of the Missile Monitor on a four-shift basis. |
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| (Source: Email from Ralph Dodds) |
MSG4 Deployment to Germany, March 1960
I stumbled across your website doing a search on my name.
I was really pleased to find your site.
I was the first operations officer of the MSG4 Det, and later one of the 3 shift
leaders, until I was reassigned to the 94th Group S3 Office where I did
Operational Readiness evaluations of the 24 Nike units.
I was delayed in going back to the US due to the arrival of a baby girl in June 1963.
As Operations Officer, I was greatly involved in getting the 6 battalions and
their 24 fire units electronically integrated with the WMC. I don`t remember the
date when all 24 console lights were glowing and the data links worked reliably
but all involved breathed a sigh of relief.
I have very fond memories of the outstanding military technical personnel at the
hill, a selfless group. I think I can still remember
the battalions under the 94th Group and their call signs. |
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ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM THE WEBMASTER:
Q:
When was the MSG4 Detachment formed? Was it in Germany or was it
formed in the US and then transferred to Germany when the MSG4 equipment
was shipped to the 94th?
I think Tom Legere mentions some of the answer in his text.
The package was formed at a test site known as Site Monitor, a few miles from Ft
Bliss proper. Don`t know the start date.
I was the chief of the CDG (Coder Decoder Group) branch, Electronics Dept of the
school. All of the branch personnel went to the Hughes school on the CDG and
then we formed the branch to teach maintenance on the CDG, primarily to NATO
personnel, but also some US Army soldiers. I was overdue for an overseas tour
and jumped at the chance to go to Germany.
(Before the CDG branch, I attended the Martin FUIF school and then
helped organize the FUIF branch, Electronics Dept. We taught maintenance on the
FUIF equipment used in CONUS. My main job was going to the different defense
areas in the US and orient the battalion personnel to fire control by electronic
means. The FUIF was the equivalent of the CDG in the MSG4 setup.)
The MSG4 package was organized at Site Monitor and the word put out for
volunteers to man and train with the MSG4 detachment and eventually go to
Germany. The testing by the Arty board had been going on for some time when I
joined and was completed just after I joined.
The operations personnel consisted of several first Lts, about 16 second Lts
and a detachment commander Capt Fitzgerald.
The maintenance personnel as described by Tom made up the other part of the MSG4
detachment.
We trained for maybe 2 weeks or so and then received orders to leave for
Germany. This was march 1960, I think.
I was promoted en route and became the Ops officer of the detachment when we
arrived in Kaiserslautern, Ger.
The 32d Bde and 94th Arty Group were in different kasernes in Ktown.
Q: Can you tell me anything about the organization of the MSG4 Det? Were
the personnel assigned to the det primarily used to man the scopes, or
did the detachment also perform other responsibilities (communications,
maintenance and repair, etc)?
The Detachment had a small Hqs, with the operations Pers. in one section
and the maintenance pers in the maintenance section. The Det was under the Hqs,
94th Arty Group.
There were Hughes Co pers to provide support, if needed.
The arty personnel were to man the WMC (Lts) and the EM the RPC and manual
AADCP.
The maint. personnel were on site to take care of the equipment and generators.
All of the soldiers working on 479 were under the Det. CO. The maint personnel
were Signal Corps.
Once operations were started we had 3 shifts of operations pers. Worked 3 days,
3 nights and off 2 days
During exercises or actual alerts, the entire det. stayed on the hill.
Had our own mess.
Obviously it was going to take some time to get our equipment ready as we had to
electronically integrate the 24 batteries and their CDGs and the 6 Bn OCs.
So all of the Lts were assigned to batteries to learn that side of the job. They
were returned when we needed them to man the MSG4 equipment, some months later.
That was a very good idea.
Q: I assume that the MSG4 equipment was mobile. Was it completely installed in trailers or was it moved into fixed structures on the hill (479)?
Yes the equipment was mobile and the equipment stayed in the trailers.
A maintenance man stayed in the rear of the WMC van, monitoring the data links.
When there was a big problem, the operations pers evacuated the van and the
maintenance pers took over.
At the opposite end of the WMC was the station for the ops officer. One of the
Hughes personnel (ex army Communications) built a small switchboard for voice
commo to the SOC, 24 fire units and 6 bn ops officers. All commands and
authentication procedures went thru here. SOC to WMC to BNs/fire units.
The WMC was accessed thru the AADCP side door. The RPC and radar vans were
nearby.
Q: Was there any integration into the Air Force control system (412L) or
any other NATO command and control system in operation at that time? If so, can you provide a brief description.
Sometime after we became operational, I think, the 412L system was
installed at the SOC at Langerkopf and we had an electronics data link to the
WMC. Army pers manned the consoles that we worked with.
I`m not sure if the consoles were 412L or some equipment installed for just the
Army use.
The WMC and the fire units could use the data (symbols) to designate targets to
the batteries.
The biggest problem we had was accurate symbology associated with an aircraft.
The WMC/fire unit accuracy got to be pretty good. The SOC data wasn`t quite as
good, as I remember.
Q: Can you provide the call signs in effect for that period?
The only one of the 6 bns I can remember today is that the 2d Bn, 56th
Arty was Chrome. |
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(Source: CW-4
Emile (Tom) Legere, USA-Ret)
NOTE: For additional doctrinal and technical details, see Ed
Thelen's wonderful Nike
Missile web site) |
AN/MSG-4
Weapons Monitoring Center
It was my honor to serve as Command and Control Officer in both the
G-4 and G-3, Plans Sections, Hq. 32nd AADCOM, during the period 1975
- 1978. My primary duties involved the early fielding of the AN/TSQ-73
Command and Control System and the implementation
of a Direct Support System for the AN/GSA - 77 Terminal Equipment
(BTE). Additionally, I was also the Maintenance Officer for the first
deployment of the AN/MSG-4
Weapons Monitoring Center with the 94th ADA Group
in March 1960 to Hill 479,
Bann, Germany.
I will be pleased to contribute to your efforts to compile a history
of the 32nd AADCOM in Europe. I think that I know where many of the
ghosts are buried and will try to help in keeping your facts straight.
Since you have expressed a particular interest in the deployment of
the MSG-4 to Germany in 1960, I will start there, and provide the
AN/TSQ-73 deployment information with another message later on.
In late 1958, I was an enlisted (SFC) Radar Instructor with the USA
Signal School at Ft. Monmouth, N.J. The School was tasked to assign
an NCO, and, I was selected, to attend a 17 week AN/MSQ-28 Weapons
Monitoring Center course at the Hughes Aircraft Company Facility,
located at Fullerton, Ca. The assignment was TDY enroute to the USA
Air Defense Board at Ft. Bliss, TX. As I recall (remember, this was
46 years ago), the WMC Course began at Fullerton on or about 1 Dec.
1958. My classmates were mostly all E-6 and E-7 NCO's drawn primarily
from Signal Corps Radar and Communications assignments, a couple of
Signal Corps Warrant Officers, and a couple of Signal Corps Lt's.
There were also a couple of NCO's assigned by the USA Air Defense
Board.
The class materiel was all Greek to the majority of us as we were
introduced to strange things like BOOLEAN ALGEBRA, BINARY ARITHMETIC,
AND and OR GATES, FLIP-FLOPS, and other things like MEMORY DRUMS,
REMOTE STARTS and SEQUENCERS.
The Weapons Monitoring Center was, except for some display circuitry,
completely transistorized, something that was completely new to the
Army, and had a Memory Drum to store track and Fire Unit Data. What
made this unique, was that for the first time, the Army would have
a capability of maintaining automatic data updates on the location
and speed of a large numbers of aircraft with minimal operator updating.
The Memory Drum provided storage for up to 100 LOCAL Tracks (Aircraft
Radar returns) detected by the Collocated AN/MPS-23 three-dimensional
Radar (Another first for the Army) which sent Target range, azimuth,
and height data to the Radar Data Processing Center (RDPC) for processing
into digitized track data, which was then passed, by cable, to the
WMC for possible assignment to up to 32 subordinate Hercules or Hawk
Fire Units for action.
In addition to the 100 Local Tracks stored, the WMC could store up
to 92 REMOTE Tracks provided by adjacent MSG-4 Units (this has special
significance later, when the MSQ-28 was deployed to Europe), and up
to 8 Battalion Tracks provided by up to 4 subordinate AN/MSQ-18 or
AN/TSQ-38 Battalion Operation Centrals (BOC's), each of which was
capable of semi-automatically generating 2 Battalion Tracks (1 per
console - the BOC DID NOT have a Memory capability) based on radar
video provided by it's collocated Defense Acquisition Radar (Usually
an AN/GSS-1 Radar, the mobile version of the WWII AN/TPS-1D) - NOTE:
The Defense Acquisition Radar (AN/GSS -1) was still the BOC Radar
as late as 1978, and was maintained primarily with salvaged parts
from cannibalized TPS-1 and GSS-1 radars stored and provided by the
Lexington Army Depot, Kentucky.
Back to MSG-4 deployment: The WMC Course was 19 weeks in length rather
than 17 weeks as stated above, although we did have a two week break
during the 1958 Christmas and New Year period, when the Hughes Aircraft
Facility closed down for those holidays. The Course was completed
in April 1959, and we then reported for duty with the USA Air Defense
Board, where we learned that we would participate in the Army Acceptance
Tests of the prototype AN/MSQ 28 AADCP System (WMC, RDPC, and AN/MPS-23
Radar) to be conducted at SITE MONITOR, an Installation about 15 miles
east of Fort Bliss, Tx.
Subordinate to the AADCP were four AN/MSQ-18 Battalion Operation Centers,
and as I recall, a mixture of 16 Hercules and Hawk Fire Units (a Hercules
Battery was 1 Fire Unit, and a Hawk Battery was 2 Fire Units, since
a Hawk Battery, at that time was capable of two simultaneous engagements.
Later (1975), with the fielding of the TRIAD configuration, a Hawk
Battery was capable of three simultaneous engagements, with its three
Firing Platoons). The TRIAD configuration had significant impact on
Command and Control when the TSQ-73 was deployed, and especially when
the GEADGE system was deployed. (I'll talk about that when I cover
the AN/TSQ-73 deployment).
My primary duty was to integrate the subordinate BOC's and fire units
prior to each individual test and to monitor equipment performance
during the conduct of that test. Integration consisted of establishing
communications with the subordinate units and to ensure that all Missile
Battery Data Link (MBDL) information was transmitted and received
between the WMC, the BOC's, and fire units correctly. (Following
text inserted 5-18-2004) This was accomplished at one of four
identical consoles, by the utilization of that console's Fire Unit
Selection Push Buttons (one for each of 32 fire units), and the horizontal
Command Panel which contained, going right to left, a Track Ball,
up to ten Voice Communications Push Buttons, then separate push buttons
for the following Commands:
ENGAGE A
(Conventional Warhead - Used for either Hercules or Hawk Fire Units);
ENGAGE
B (Low Yield Nuclear Warhead - Hercules ONLY);
ENGAGE
C (High Yield Nuclear Warhead - Hercules ONLY);
HOLD
FIRE; and
CEASE
FIRE.
There were also two REFERENCE Control
Pushbuttons; TRANSMIT ONE, and TRANSMIT ALL (Use of these pushbuttons
would cause either ONE selected LOCAL or Remote Track, or ALL Local
and Remote Tracks to be transmitted to ALL BOC's and Fire Units interfaced
with the WMC.)
An additional pushbutton was provided - The HOOK push button. The
Console's Plan Position Indicator (PPI) provided digital display of
detected targets by separate symbology For FRIEND, FOE, or UNKNOWN
aircraft, and the geographical location of each fire unit, and the
target pairing to that fire unit. If available, live targets would
be used for integration, but in most instances, a SIMULATED TARGET
representing a POINT IN SPACE was generated by Operation of the WMC
SIMULATION PANEL.
The procedure was to HOOK a target by placing a HOOK Symbol over the
selected target symbol by means of a Track Ball (Similar to the operation
of a "Mouse" used with today's PC's), and depressing the HOOK pushbutton
which caused the target symbol to expand in size. The pushbutton associated
with the unit being integrated would be illuminated GREEN, indicating
the Fire Unit was READY for assignment. Depressing (Selecting) the
Unit's pushbutton would cause it to turn RED indicating that the unit
was in the process of engagement. The WMC operator would then depress
the appropriate ENGAGE Command pushbutton, causing a MBDL COMMAND
MESSAGE to be transmitted to the selected Fire Unit.
Simultaneously, a blinking dashed pairing line would extend from the
fire unit symbol to the assigned target symbol indicating that that
target had been assigned to that fire unit. When the Battery Control
Officer (Hercules) or the Tactical Control Officer (Hawk) correlated
the assigned target symbology generated by the MBDL MISSILE BATTERY
DATA LINK data received and processed by the Battery Coder-Decoder
Group, with the video provided by his local acquisition radar (HIPAR
or LOPAR for Hercules, or PAR or ICWAR for Hawk) on his tactical PPI
display, he would then designate the target to the Target Tracking
Radar (Hercules) or the Illuminator Radar (Hawk). Designation of the
target to the Tracking/Illuminator Radar would automatically cause
an ACKNOWLEDGE message to be transmitted to the BOC and WMC. The BCO/TCO
could also manually acknowledge by pushing a button (Acknowledge ???)
provided at his Console. When the Acknowledge message was received
by the WMC, the blinking pairing line would cease to blink, but remain
dashed, and the Acknowledge Message would also be displayed on the
Battery Read-Out Panel. When the fire unit TTR/Illuminator LOCKED-ON
to the target, it would cause the coordinates of the TTR/Illuminator
acquired target to be transmitted to the BOC and WMC. This would cause
the dashed pairing line to become solid, terminating at the point
at which TTR/Illuminator was LOCKED-ON. If the BCO/TCO had acquired
the assigned target video the pairing line would intersect with the
assigned target symbology on the WMC PPI. If the BCO/TCO had designated
the incorrect target video, the Pairing Line would terminate at the
point designated by the BCO/TCO, telling the WMC Operator that the
Fire Unit was engaging the wrong target, and he could then transmit
the Appropriate command to the fire unit telling the BCO/TCO to terminate
that engagement. When the Fire unit launched it's Missile (Hercules)
or Missiles (Hawk), a firing message would automatically be transmitted
to the BOC and WMC, causing that status to appear on the Battery Read-Out
panel. After the completion of the engagement the BCO/TCO would evaluate
the results of the engagement by determining if he still had target
video. If no video remained, a KILL message would be transmitted,
and if video remained a NO KILL message would be transmitted. This
entire procedure could be performed silently without verbal exchange
between the participants, for purposes of communications discipline.
Once the integration had been successfully completed with ALL of the
units scheduled to participate in that particular test, the system
would be turned over to the Officers responsible for the conduct of
that test. Except for occasional operator errors, few equipment problems
occurred during the conduct of these tests.
This testing phase provided excellent training vehicles for preparing
us to field the system in that we learned to view the entire AN/MSG-4
Command and Control System as one entity with The AADCP, BOC's, Hercules
or Hawk Fire Units, and ALL of the associated communications and Radars,
as comprising the whole SYSTEM, as opposed to viewing the AADCP as
a separate "BLACK BOX". In other words, a SYSTEMS ENGINEERING concept.
Unfortunately, the training of future operator/maintenance courses
(AN-MSG-4, AN/TSQ-51, and AN/TSQ-73) DID NOT stress this concept,
but stressed the "BLACK BOX" approach to the detriment of successful
employment of these systems in later years. The people associated
with these future deployments had to learn the hard way, and, some,
never learned at all. Case in point, of the five AN/MSG-4 Systems
deployed (three in Germany, and two in Korea), only one became fully
operational (94th ADA Group), and another partially operational (AADCP
2 at Inchon, Korea). The other three - the 10th and 69th Group Systems
in Germany, and AADCP 1 at Camp Humphries in Korea NEVER BECAME OPERATIONAL.
Sad, but true - I was there at both the 94th Group, and AADCP 2 in
Korea.
One of the reasons for our success, was that our approach was that
ARMY Air Defense NEEDED the AN/MSG-4 Systems, and that we had to make
it work. If a malfunction occurred we worked right alongside the Hughes
Tech Reps, to resolve the problems, and return the system to an operational
configuration as soon as possible. This approach enhanced our understanding
of the overall system, and expedited the successful completion of
the Acceptance Testing of the system. Conversely, those responsible
for testing the AN/TSQ-73 walked away from the system when a malfunction
occurred and turned the system over to the Litton Reps, and returned
ONLY when the system was returned to operational status, resulting
- in my opinion - with unnecessary delay in fielding that system.
We did encounter a major catastrophe while testing the system. A generator
operator while changing generators powering the RDPC, inadvertently.
plugged the power cable so that the cable ground connector was connected
to one of the three "Hot" phases effectively "grounding" that Phase.
This resulted in a major power surge to the RDPC, and virtually incinerated
a large number of circuit boards, resulting in eliminating the RDPC
and AN/MPS-23 Radar from further test participation. Fortunately,
when this incident occurred, those systems had already been successfully
tested. We did, both RDPC and WMC Maint. People, expend many, many
hours repairing RDPC circuit boards.
I don't remember precisely when, but we were given the opportunity
to volunteer to become part of an AN/MSQ-28 Deployment Packet when
the System was scheduled to be deployed to Germany. Since my wife
was from Germany, and I had liked my prior duty there, I, of course,
volunteered and was accepted as a member of the Deployment Packet.
The Signal Corps was planning to introduce a new Warrant Officer MOS
- 4842 - Data Processing Maintenance Technician, and since the ADA
Board was one of the only sources of personnel qualified in that field,
the Board was requested to solicit those of us who were interested,
to make application for appointment, so I did make an application,
along with about eight others.
In addition to preparing for the deployment of the AADCP AN/MSQ-28
System to Germany, the ADA Board was still tasked to conduct cold
weather testing of the system, as well as the follow-on testing of
the Production AN/MSQ-28, prior to the deployment of those system
to Germany and Korea. It was obvious that the number of qualified
system repairmen available was inadequate to meet all of these needs.
It was then necessary to train additional personnel to accompany those
of us who had already been selected as part of the Deployment Package,
and this requirement became the task of the Hughes Aircraft trained
repairmen, as well as continue with the testing of the system.
This is good point to provide the roster of Deployment Packet. WMC
Maintenance personnel trained at the ADA Board are indicated by (**)
following their names.
AN/TSQ-28 AADCP Deployment packet roster:
Note: Approximately an estimated 20 to 30 (Perhaps more) 1st and
2nd Lieutenants were members of the packet as most of the WMC and
RDPC Operator positions were to be manned by officers. That roster
is not available to me, but a few of the names I do recall are: |
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1. |
Capt.
(Name-?) Fitzgerald |
Packet
Commander |
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2. |
Capt.
Colin Bozeman |
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3. |
Capt.
Ralph Dodds |
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4. |
1st
Lt. Johnnie Howorth |
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5. |
2nd
Lt. Philip Pharese |
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6. |
2nd
Lt. Thomas Franklyn |
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7. |
2nd
Lt. Joe Thurston |
(Later
- 1978, G3 of the 32nd AADCOM) |
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| Roster of
AADCP Maintenance and enlisted AADCP operations personnel: |
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1. |
1st
Lt. Albert G. Stratton |
AADCP
Maintenance OIC |
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2. |
CWO
W2 Frank B. Coombs |
AN/MPS-23 |
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3. |
CWO
W2 Sydney B. Hunter |
WMC |
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4. |
CWO
W2 Richard W. Lee |
RDPC
and AADCP Operations |
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5. |
CWO
W2 Harold A. Moulton |
AN/MPS-23 |
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6. |
CWO
W2 Farrell E. Tew |
RDPC |
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7. |
MSGT
E7 Walter D. Blackwood |
WMC |
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8. |
MSGT
E7 William W. Barrow |
RDPC |
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9. |
MSGT
E7 Johnnie E. Grant |
RDPC |
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10 |
SFC
E7 Marshall N. Dana |
WMC |
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